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of a Military Training Simulator
War has the potential to transform the social and political order in 
which we live. How can a nation best prepare for war is the question 
that military organizations must face every day. This book is about 
that struggle between the unthinkable and the mundane daily  
work that takes place in a military organization. 
The study takes the world of modelling & simulation as entry point 
to critically explore the social-political processes in the military 
organization. Through a detailed analysis of the development of 
an advanced training simulator the author shows how a ‘realistic’ 
simulator is produced. The study demonstrates how ‘reality’ 
is negotiated between many different parties making it a co-
production. 
Maarten van Veen is information scientist and currently employed 
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War has the potential to transform the social and political order in 
which we live. How can a nation best prepare for war is the question 
that military organizations must face every day. This book is about that 
struggle between the unthinkable (war) and the mundane daily work 
that takes place in a military organization. I took the world of modelling 
& simulation as my point of entry to critically explore the processes in the 
military organization. As an information scientist I have always wanted to 
write a qualitative study combining social science and technology. The 
part-time DBA program Humanisation of Organization at the University 
of Humanistic Studies  seemed to be a great chance to accomplish 
that goal. Thus I started the research for this book in 2007 after a 
visit to a military training exercise. At the visit a sophisticated military 
training simulator was presented as a self-evident effective training tool 
and a logical step in the advancement of military training. It took me 
many years to realize that my research was not about simulation tools, 
but about its validation. Practitioners in the field of military training 
simulators claim that simulators offer a value-free representation of 
reality. A training simulator can – in their opinion – simulate military 
operations ‘realistically’. However, I try to show in this book that creating 
a value-free representation of reality is impossible. I have also made 
this point in papers that I have presented at several conferences. 
The conferences helped me to sharpen my ideas. I have completely 
reworked my conference papers – which were sometimes unfinished 
probes – and have used bits and pieces in this thesis 
I will briefly sketch the intellectual development that is evident in the 
conference papers. The paper that can – in hindsight – be identified as 
the starting point of my research was presented at the Technology in 
Wartime Conference organized by Computer Professionals for Social 
Responsibility (Veen, Fenema, & Grant, 2008). The paper pointed out 
that training simulators embed certain ideas about warfare and that 
the technology therefore has an ethical dimension. Parts of this paper 
are used in chapter one and two. I have developed this point further 
in some of my later papers. I will point to a few important milestones. 
First, the paper presented at The state of things: Towards a political 
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economy of artifice and artefacts (Veen, 2009a) looked at the origins of 
the training simulator to trace the ideas that guided its development. 
Parts of this paper are used in chapter six. Another milestone was the 
paper I presented at the Bodies of Theory Workshop (Veen, 2010). Here 
I focused on how the injured body of the soldier is represented in a 
training simulator. This paper is extended and reworked in chapter four. 
Third, at the recent BSA workshop: Who and What is management for I 
presented a paper about the relevance of the ‘correct’ representation 
of ballistics for selecting a manufacturer (Veen, 2013). This paper served 
as the foundation of chapter five. Fourth and lastly, I mention the paper I 
presented at the largest conference on Military Training Simulators  
I/ITSEC (Veen, 2009b). Parts of this paper are used in chapter eight.  
It explored the concept of validation, which has become the overall 
theme of this study.
First, I want to thank the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) 
of the Ministry of Defence who made this research project possible. 
I am especially greatly indebted to my former head of the Logistics 
& Information department at the Faculty of Military Sciences Prof. Dr. 
Walther Ploos van Amstel. He convinced me to participate in the part-
time DBA program of the University of Humanistic Studies, insisting that 
‘it is good to look beyond this military academy’. Further I would like to 
thank Prof. Dr. Tim Grant, who became the supervisor of project  
NEC-05 after Walther left the military academy and continued to support 
my research project with great enthusiasm until his retirement in 2012.
Second, not only have the heads of the department supported 
me, but many of my co-workers have also supported this project both 
mentally and practically. I would like to mention a few in no particularly 
order. My former colleague Peter Jongejan was at first very sceptical 
about scientific research at the Faculty of Military Sciences, but later 
supported my study by taking over classes and providing constructive 
feedback on my research papers. I also would like to express my 
gratitude to my colleagues Edwin Dado, Paul van Fenema and  
Eric-Hans Kramer of the Military Business Sciences with whom I had 
many encouraging discussions about my never-ending research 
project when I was in doubt as to whether I must continue with it. I 
should also thank my interviewees who had the patience to talk with 
that ‘unknowledgeable civilian’ and answer my ‘stupid’ questions. 
Jan Vermeulen was especially helpful; he invited me to different 
demonstrations and shared with me his insights about the military 
organization (among other things). I am also grateful for the work of 
Petra Koeman, who helped me transcribe some of the interviews, and 
Maria Kamphuis, who corrected my English writing. 
Last but certainly not least I would like to thank Hugo Letiche and 
Geoff Lightfoot for their patience. I came to understand that I am a very 
slow writer, which frustrated my supervisors enormously. I am very sorry 
for that. Your feedback was always very valuable and I had to study it 
carefully. Doing so and reading all the books and articles you suggested 
of course took a lot of time but I learned a great deal from it. Without 
your guidance I could never have completed this project at all. It has 
been a very exciting and inspiring journey. The DBA program at the 
University of Humanistic Studies taught me many concepts and theories 
about social science, and for this I am very grateful. Were it not for this 
program I would never have come in contact with many wonderful 
professors and classmates.
On a personal level this project took a much bigger slice of my life 
than I had anticipated when I signed up for this part-time DBA-program. 
I had written quite a number of educational books and thought that this 
project would be something like that. Boy, was I wrong! If I had known 
then what I know now about writing a thesis, I would probably never 
have started it. The support of my wife, family and friends pushed me 
along. They haven’t seen me as often as they would have liked (at least 
that is what they say) because I had to read, write, think or procrastinate. I 
hope that has now come to an end. 
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in the military organisation. Naturally I will offer a brief outline of the 
restrictions involved as to the theories of simulationists on validation. 
This book is a study on the validation of complicated technology 
– simulation technology in this case – in a military organisation. It is 
not my intention to decide whether the described training simulator 
is valid, but how it has become valid. In short, the objective of my 
study is to describe the processes how a training-simulator within a 
military context is being validated. I positioned my investigation in the 
domain of Science and Technology Studies (STS). This discipline aims 
at investigating the relationship between technology and society. The 
domain offers a vivid picture of developments in technology in which 
the cohesion between social and technical processes is described in 
detail. The vocabulary of my study is based on the early works of Bruno 
Latour. He describes in great detail how scientists create scientific facts, 
and circulate them. This perspective was followed in my study for which 
I identified four aspects, further discussed in separate chapters: (a) 
practical validation, (b) industrial validation, (c) military validation,  
and (d) political validation.
The practical aspect of validation is aimed at the way the training-
simulator is used. On closer examination, however, usage is a 
complicated concept. During this activity various goals are pursued. 
Trainers are interested in the training simulator, because it promises 
them ‘mastery and control’ and at the same time possesses the promise 
of a ‘realistic training’ to both commanders and soldiers. Everybody 
speaks of realism in terms of scientific representation, ‘It seems exactly 
the same’, but when looking more closely we notice representation to be 
understood as a problem of configuration. The observed shortcomings 
are immediately jumped at to improve the likeness. As a consequence, 
technology is constantly negotiated by all parties concerned. Obviously 
validation is not something to be ascertained, but something to put 
changes into operation. In practice soldiers, trainers and developers are 
constantly negotiating in order to validate the training simulator. Hence, 
validity is not a feature of the training simulator, but a co-production. 
Summary
 
My thesis deals with the way a military training simulator is being 
validated. People in the simulation-world, for the purpose of 
convenience I will call them simulationists, define validating as ‘the 
process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation is 
an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the 
intended uses of the model or simulation’ (U.S. Congress, 1995, p. 35). 
The gist of the matter is the relationship between the ‘real world’ versus 
the ‘model world’ which I have taken as a starting-point to study the 
way professionals seek evidence for the validity of the desired training 
simulator.
Simulationists consider themselves authorities in the field of 
modelling and simulation. They see themselves as extremely suited 
for defining the reality of a simulation, for which they have developed 
an extensive set of testing methods and procedures. Their scientific 
approach, however, shows some fundamental flaws. It is extremely 
difficult to assess the reality of a model due to the complexity of various 
factors. A somewhat complicated simulation uses different models, 
which influence each other reciprocally, for example, a simulation 
of a military operation will combine various models on behaviour of 
opponents, weapons, geography and so on. Besides it is fundamentally 
impossible to collect high-grade empirical data on future events 
without all kinds of assumptions on the occurrences to be expected, for 
example, there’s no guarantee that a simulation calculating the impact 
of military performance will generate correct results with regard to 
situations, which still have to take place. 
The observation that the validity of a simulation cannot be 
ascertained with a fair degree of certainty has become the object of 
my investigation. For that purpose an extensive case study was carried 
out in which I concentrated on when, in what way and where exactly a 
training simulator is validated. My investigation bears upon the practice 
of validating instead of the theories having been developed by the 
simulationists. So in lieu of focussing on how validation ought to be 
executed, I will direct my attention to the validation process carried out 
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In the chapter on political validation attention is paid to the way Ministry 
of Defence presented her policy on military training simulators to 
Parliament. The focus was not particularly put on the interaction between 
the Minister and Parliament, but on the presentation of simulation 
technology to Parliament (and thus the public). This analysis is based 
on several letters on simulation technology in the period from 1986 
to 1993. The letters give insight how the Ministry of Defence ‘builds’ 
toward a so-called simulation-network. Three claims played a key role; 
simulation-technology would lead to (a) gains in training quality; (b) 
save training costs; and (c) spare the environment. The underlying 
assumption was that simulation-technology would offer at least the same 
training experience as ‘real’ training exercises. I analysed how claims 
were developed and passed ‘trails of strength’. From my observation 
it appears that the three claims were not criticised, because the 
interests of the various parts of the military organisation were taken into 
consideration. I took this example to discuss how ‘matters of fact’ and 
‘matters of concern’ are connected. Simulationists should learn from this 
that facts and values cannot be separated.
In the final chapter the four aspects of validation are put together. 
My conclusion is that validation is a paradoxical notion. The military 
organisation should validate decisions as to this technology, however, 
at the same time it should be realized that not everything can be tested. 
Reality cannot be used as a ‘touch-stone’, because statements on this 
subject are directly linked to historicity and interests of various actors. 
Simulationists choose the wrong approach that only will disguise the 
social-political issues at stake. Not only should ‘reality’ in terms of 
scientific representation – ‘matters of fact’ – be tested, but her value 
for society –’matters of concern’ – as well. Considerations on military 
performance, military marketplace, training philosophy and simulation 
technology – the so called ‘values’ – are wrapped in facts at the moment. 
Facts which, on closer examination, contain implicit assumptions. For that 
reason people involved in the training simulator should stop claiming 
that a simulator is a ‘value-free’ reflection of reality. 
My final conclusion is that the military organisation should not go 
for ‘quick fixes’, but should spend more time and effort in analysing the 
apparent problem from various points of view. Decision-making should 
not only be left to military men, but should also take into consideration 
The industrial aspect of validation deals with the relationship between 
the Ministry of Defence and the Military Industry. Their interactions 
contribute largely to the validity of the training simulator. Ministry of 
Defence formulates so-called requirements for the products that are 
wanted. The military industry can then make suggestions as to the 
realisation of the product and give an estimate of the costs involved. 
Ministry of Defence must formulate these requirements in order to 
enable industrial parties to submit proposals. Should that, indeed, not  
be the case, then any party being in the position to deliver exactly 
what is requested can ask any price. The main challenge for Ministry 
of Defence as to the military training simulator was to formulate the 
accuracy of the representation – ballistics in this case – not too precisely. 
It was thus avoided that the instruments of the simulationists would 
decide the comparison of the proposals. In accordance with this 
instance I will demonstrate that requirements are less definite than 
what simulationists think. Requirements are not merely describing 
desired technology, but also practicing an invisible form of policy, by 
including some parties and excluding others. However, this plasticity of 
requirements is highly necessary ‘to keep things going’.
My description of military validation describes the way military staff 
validates the usefulness of the training simulator. For that reason I will 
draw the attention to a few discussions on simulation technology held 
inside the Ministry of Defence. The chapter will explore how the need 
for the military training simulator has been created. This need was 
developed by restructuring the way military men were trained in order to 
make simulators indispensable. The focus during these discussions was 
not on the purchase of an individual training simulator, but on a series 
of simulators each of them with a specific role in the various phases of 
training. Military training is, evidently, considered to be a process in 
which skills are accumulated. In other words, the soldier in the making 
has to pass a succession of training simulators, the ultimate product 
being the professional soldier. Much attention in military validation 
is being paid to the program needed to achieve that ‘endproduct’. 
The training-simulator is only one stage and has to fit within the entire 
program. That’s why simulationists should realize that a training simulator 
will always be part of a more compassing program. A specific training 
simulator is of little importance in the entire scheme. 
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experiences from the outside world. In the quick search of answers 
problems are often simplified, because not all people involved are 
listened to. For purposes of convenience the question ‘Why?’ disappears 
from sight. However, if the military organisation wants to be in a position 
to execute her duties thoughtfully, more attention must then be paid to 
questions on the values of man and technology. Seeking for answers to 







In November 2006, in the early days of my academic career at a military 
university, I participated in a field trip to Truppen Übungsplatz Alten 
Grabow, a well-known training area in former East Germany. Here I met 
a captain who was preparing his platoon for deployment to Uruzgan, 
Afghanistan. He explained that the training exercise ‘Falcon Guard’ 
was focussed on skills that were required for restoring the stability in 
a region. In the training scenario, a disastrous economic decline in the 
former East Germany had led to riots from extreme-left and extreme-
right groups. Paramilitary groups murdered politicians, set fire to 
government buildings, and vandalised the offices of large multinationals. 
His team was assigned the task of restoring peace and order in the 
area. Together with his commander, the captain had formulated specific 
aims for the tactical training, for example, securing an area, clearing a 
building from enemy threat, executing an offensive operation in urban 
terrain, and supporting other army units. I asked the captain why these 
aims were relevant for Uruzgan. He told me that the content of the 
scenario hardly mattered, only the specific military skills were relevant.1 
Operating in urban terrain, for example, was very important for securing 
a compound in Uruzgan. The skills involved in operating in urban 
terrain are about overseeing areas, entering enemy buildings safely, 
and communicating with local people. The purpose of the mission to 
Uruzgan was to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the populace, making the 
skills of securing an area and gaining local support essential. Therefore I 
asked him how he could judge whether these training aims were being 
achieved. He pointed to a group of containers and a large white tent 
near the command centre. On the tent the text ‘Mobile Combat Training 
Centre’ was printed. In one of the containers four soldiers were watching 
computer screens and listening to radio traffic. The screens showed a 
map of the training area cluttered with symbols. In the tent I met the 
commander of the Mobile Combat Training Centre. He explained to 
me that the computers were linked to the more than one thousand 
soldiers and their weapon systems in a training area of more than thirty 
square kilometres. The symbols represented the exact locations of 
the individual soldiers and their vehicles. The weapon systems were 
modified to fire laser beams instead of bullets. When a weapon fired, 
information was exchanged with the target to enable the computers to 
calculate the damage that would have been caused by real ammunition. 
Vehicles, tanks, mines, artillery, and a medical treatment simulator were 
included in the electronic network. Thus, the Mobile Combat Training 
Centre was the surveillance centre of the training exercise. Using this 
technology, trainers had a real-time overview of the exercise. The 
commander said enthusiastically that the system created an experience 
‘just like real war!’ and ‘soldiers can train as they fight.’ He explained that 
the soldiers have to act in the training exercise exactly as they would 
act in a real war, because they used real weapon systems and could 
really get hit. I realised that the system was a gigantic war simulator. If 
two opposing military units fired upon each other, all potential damage 
was transformed into harmless laser signals and invisible electronic 
data exchanges. The weapon systems’ computers could calculate the 
injuries to the soldiers and the damage to the vehicles. The soldiers were 
expected to behave as if they were ‘really’ hit and to stop their vehicle 
as if it was ‘really’ damaged. Every fire-exchange, communication and 
movement was recorded, analysed and evaluated by the trainers. When 
I asked the commander how he could claim that the training simulator 
provided ‘a realistic experience of war’ he looked at me gloomily and 
said ‘the system represents warfare in great detail’. Then he shut me off 
with: ‘you should talk with the project manager of the system!’ 
A few months later I had an appointment with the project manager of 
the system. He was responsible for the procurement and maintenance 
of the training system and had been involved with it since 1993. He was 
sitting in a small office in The Hague with piles of papers and souvenirs 
of the training system.  He was a big and very friendly fellow although 
he looked to be somewhat suspicious of me. He told me that the system 
was carefully selected from several options and that it was the best on 
the market, possibly better than its American counterpart known as 
MILES. I asked him: ‘What is a realistic experience of war?’ He told me 
that in the system ballistics and weapon behaviour are simulated in a 
very ‘realistic’ manner. The system is able to represent weapon ballistics 
accurately and can therefore provide the soldiers with very good 
feedback. The soldiers have to do exactly the same technical operations 
with the weapons as they would, if the weapons were not connected to 
the laser system. I asked him how this matches the harshness of military 
operations and the even worse conditions of war. 
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He pointed to a document from 1995 with the heading ‘Operational 
statement of need’ and said: ‘The system was required by the military 
staff, you should ask them.’ 
A few months later I sat at a kitchen table in a house in Apeldoorn 
with the retired officer who prepared the ‘Operational statement of 
need’. He was very accommodating in explaining to me all the work 
that was done to obtain the simulator for the Royal Armed Forces of 
the Netherlands. He told me about site visits in the United States and 
especially about the debates in the Dutch Army about whether the 
simulator was needed. I asked him if this system provides a realistic 
simulation of war. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘the infantry can now practice tactical 
manoeuvres much more realistically. Once this system was employed 
the soldiers finally acted as they should because they really could get 
hit’. When I asked if this is what realistic training entails, he answered: 
‘Yes, everything is exactly like it is in military operation, even the weather 
and environment conditions, although everyone knows that nobody 
can really get hurt. The politicians want the best quality training for the 
soldiers. The more realism that is offered in the training program, the 
better the soldiers are prepared for their job.’
In summary, I have described my visit to a training exercise in Alten 
Grabow, which used the training simulator ‘Mobile Combat Training 
Centre’. The commander pointed out that the system provides a 
‘realistic’ training. Second, I visited the office of the project manager who 
pointed out that the training simulator represents ballistics and weapon 
behaviour ‘accurately’. Finally, I spoke with the retired officer who was in 
charge of the ‘Operational statement of need’, who pointed out that the 
training simulator fits very well in a training structure because it forces 
soldiers to behave ‘realistically’. The professionals made, without any 
hesitations, connections between soldiers, training areas, training aims, 
weapon systems, computer screens, doctrines, the marketplace, industry, 
politics, environment, economy and war. Everything was connected 
and, I assumed, essential for the acceptance of the training simulator. 
Therefore I decided to investigate how one can establish whether the 
simulated ‘really’ matches the real. 
In this book I investigate how one can validate something that is 
inherently virtual. First, I will explain the ever-growing popularity of 
military training simulators. Second, I will discuss my concerns about 
military training simulators and argue that ‘reality’ is primarily an 
‘unobtainable object’ or, to put it differently, ‘inherently virtual’. The 
introduction will conclude with an overview of the book.
 
Proliferation of military training simulators
The ‘Mobile Combat Training Centre’ is just one of the many training 
simulators that are used by the Dutch Army and the Armed Forces 
worldwide. The global military simulation and virtual training market, 
despite the current economic decline, has grown rapidly. It is expected 
that it will grow from $3.5 billion in 2011 to $6.7 billion in 2021.2 This 
growth is the result of the U.S. military strategy that considers training 
simulation as a key technology for the successful use of its weapon 
systems (Boot, 2006). Many companies are trying to get a share of this 
market. The handbook titled Jane’s Simulation and Training Systems lists 
more than 700 companies that sell military training systems and new 
companies are added every year.3 Major players in the military training 
simulator industry come together every year at the Interservice/Industry 
Training, Simulation and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) in Orlando, 
Florida.4 Here industry and military can meet freely. A course by Roger 
Smith introduced me to this conference. Smith is a well-respected 
consultant and teaches the course Military Simulation: Techniques 
and Technology. In his course book one learns that it took some time 
before training simulators were accepted as a part of military training. 
The flight simulator developed by Ed Link became the first successful 
simulator (R. Smith, 2007b).5 It taught pilots to fly using the instruments 
in the cockpit rather than merely on sight and feel. During World War 
II more than 500,000 U.S. pilots were trained with the ‘blue box’ as the 
simulator became known (RMSC, 2000). Nowadays training simulators 
are for sale for almost every military task one can think of. Simulators 
can, just to give a few examples, train tank crews to cooperate with each 
other, train navy officers to execute tactical manoeuvres at sea, train 
marksman to hit distant targets and train medics to perform medical 
treatments. The military training simulators can be classified into three 
categories according to the U.S. Defence Science Board (Page & Smith, 
1998): constructive simulators (simulated people in simulated systems), 
virtual simulators (real people in a simulated environment) and live 
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simulators (real people that are operating real weapon systems). These 
categories still dominate the military world, but the boundaries are 
disappearing. Linking different types of simulators, which in the field 
is known as ‘interoperability’, makes it hard to maintain strict divisions. 
Much research effort is being put into linking live training simulators 
with constructive and virtual ones. It is, for example, possible to train 
F16 pilots who are actually flying in the air to fight a virtual squadron 
that is simulated on the pilots’ screens in the cockpit. This technology is 
called ‘VLC-simulation’, which stands for Virtual-Live-Constructive. VLC-
simulation makes it possible for different armies in different parts of the 
world to train together at relatively low costs. However, a new ‘disruptive 
technology’ (Bower & Christensen, 1995) also makes this categorization 
fuzzy. Although traditionally the industry for training simulators has 
consisted mainly of specialized high-tech niche companies, over the last 
few years these companies have suddenly been facing competition from 
creative game designers. After the introduction of the popular computer 
games America’s Army and Virtual Battle Space 2, military trainers have 
embraced this new technology. In a paper titled The Disruptive Potential 
of Game Technologies: Lessons Learned from its Impact on the Military 
Simulation Industry Roger Smith argues that the traditional simulation 
industry has often ‘over-served’ military needs (R. Smith, 2007a). 
Most military activities can be trained with much simpler tools than 
sophisticated training simulators. A computer game can be sufficient for 
training military skills. Game technology is much cheaper and, due to the 
rapid developments in visualisation technology, very flexible too. In the 
so-called ‘serious games’ modifications to weapon systems and virtual 
training areas are relatively easy to implement. 
Industry leaders are competing with each other by bringing ‘more 
realism’ into military training. They are making the simulations more 
realistic, for example, by improving the models, visualisation techniques, 
mock-ups and motion-platforms. Nowadays, the mature cinematic, 
computer and visualisation technologies are widely accepted for use 
in military training, which is not very surprising because the military 
funded much of the required research (Lenoir, 2000). The desire to 
have ‘realistic’ military training is eloquently explained by the retired 
lieutenant colonel Dave Grossman. He specialises in the psychology of 
killing, which he calls ‘killology’. In his work On Killing: The Psychological 
Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society he explains why military 
organizations are so interested in ‘realistic’ simulation. Throughout 
history many soldiers found themselves unable to kill when they could 
and should kill the enemy. However, he explains that many studies 
showed that ‘more realistic targets will raise the firing rate’ (see e.g. 
Holmes, 1986; Keegan, 1978; Marshall, 2000 (1947); Picq, 1921). This 
idea has impacted modern training techniques since the late 1960s. 
Thus, instead of shooting at a bull’s-eye on a target, ‘realistic’ silhouettes 
or photo-realistic figures and combat simulations are set up (Grossman, 
1996). The ‘realistic’ techniques used to train soldiers allow for ‘a 
precise replication of the stimulus that they will face and then extensive 
shaping of the desired response to that stimulus.’ This stimulus-response 
conditioning works even when soldiers are frightened during war 
situations. People trained in ‘realistic’ situations will find it easier to kill 
their enemies. Grossman is therefor very concerned about the diffusion 
of ‘realistic’ computer games in popular culture, as he believes that they 
can only result in lowering the threshold of killing and even massacres 
like the one at Columbine high school. The army, however, must utilise 
‘realistic’ means for training because, according to Grossman, soldiers 
are essential for the survival of Western society and its values. The 
observations by Grossman about the relation between gaming and 
violence are controversial in media studies (see e.g. Huntemann & 
Payne, 2009).
Concerns about the validity and ‘reality’
As early as the nineties the growing popularity of simulation technology 
was already raising concerns within the U.S. Congress. The House 
Committee on Armed Services requested, therefore, three reports 
from the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) regarding the caveats 
of military training simulators. Two studies were published in 1994 
and 1995 (U.S. Congress, 1994, 1995) and the third study was never 
completed due to budget cuts. The first report, Virtual Reality and 
Technologies for Combat Simulation (U.S. Congress, 1994), systematically 
discusses the caveats of simulation. It discusses the following ‘concerns’: 
validation, standardisation, scalability, flexibility, effectiveness, cost-
effectiveness, and infrastructure. Validation requirements are often 
waived because they are difficult and expensive to meet. The first report 
states that ‘In extremely complex and difficult modelling situations, the 
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requirements for comparing real world results and model results may be 
difficult, if not impossible, to meet … Ironically enough, it is this inability 
to replicate (or even to understand) the real world that drives one to 
the use of a model in the first place’ (p. 31). In the second report, titled 
Distributed interactive simulation of combat (U.S. Congress, 1995), the 
concepts of verification, validation and accreditation are discussed in 
more detail. The Department of Defence had developed guidelines 
and at the time was trying to implement them. It defined validation as 
‘the process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation 
is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective 
of the intended uses of the model or simulation’ (p. 35). Verification 
is defined as ‘the process of determining that a model or simulation 
implementation accurately represents the developer’s conceptual 
description and specifications’ (p. 35). Finally, accreditation is defined 
as ‘an official determination that a model or simulation is acceptable 
for a specific purpose’ (p. 35). The report discusses several examples of 
how computer models of combat should be validated, but most of the 
examples come down to critically assessing models by comparing actual 
outcomes with the outcomes of historical battles, training exercises or 
other simulations. 
 
However, validation is not without complications. According to OTA, 
validation of the simulation ‘has rested largely on users’ assertions that 
it “feels right”’ (p. 35). But sometimes some ‘re-configuring of the users’ 
(Woolgar, 1991) was required. Developers of simulations know that 
people are not easily fooled into believing that a simulator is the real 
thing. For this reason, they utilise a ‘selective fidelity approach’, in which 
only the details are replicated that are considered important for the job. 
It concentrates the attention of the user to specific features, or as the 
report states: ‘Users of [...] virtual reality systems almost universally report 
an initial dismay at the apparent lack of fidelity, followed by acceptance 
and a report that “it seemed so real” when they start to interact with the 
program and get a sense of involvement’ (p. 32). A ‘sketchy presentation 
of the interior of the tank’, for example, can be sufficient because the 
crew is already familiar with the tank from earlier training. The sketchy 
approach creates its own problem. The simulator may be suitable to 
train soldiers for a full-scale battle, but it may not be a good preparation 
for war because a soldier also has other tasks, such as the repair and 
maintenance of his equipment and himself. This may result in ‘negative 
learning’, meaning that soldiers learn the wrong things. For example, 
when in a simulator the hatch of the tank is always closed (because it 
cannot open). This may cause the soldier not to look outside the tank 
during a ‘real’ mission. This is not necessarily problematic because 
‘Dealing with corrections to skill sets is a fact of life with or without 
simulations; adaptability in combat is, itself, an essential skill’ (p. 34). 
Therefore, to establish the validity of training simulators the OTA advises 
a more systematic approach must be applied then merely seeing if ‘it 
feels right’. 
It was not only the OTA that had some concerns, but some scholars 
in modelling & simulation were concerned as well. The possible impact 
of training simulators on human behaviour makes validation an ethical 
question (Quinn, 2005). For example, the economical models of the 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) have far-reaching 
consequences for economical debates in Parliament (Elzas, 2000). The 
outcomes of the models can shape the political debate. The models are 
located somewhere between theory and the ‘real world’, and mediate in 
that sense between both (Grüne-Yanoff & Weirich, 2010). Simply picking 
the ‘correct’ theory and converting it into a model does not construct 
simulations. In fact, a lot of interpretative and creative work must be 
done to make a simulation ‘work’. It is thus not surprising that many 
authors have identified ‘hidden’ assumptions and effects in computer 
models (e.g. MacKenzie, 2006; Morgan & Morrison, 1999; Weisberg, 
2013). This gives validation an ethical dimension, to illustrate what it 
can lead to, I will discuss an example of the impact of assumptions in 
computer models that are used in specific war games. 
Since World War II many models have been developed to study 
conflict between two warring nations. Manuel DeLanda makes a 
distinction between two rather opposite methods of modelling war: 
the Jominian and the Clausewitzian method (DeLanda, 1991). Both 
methods work with a different set of assumptions. Jominian war games 
are computer models based on the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. This paradigm 
assumes that the two parties mistrust each other, making betrayal the 
only (safe) rational option. In war models this leads to the need to build 
(nuclear) arsenals, as the nations at war are prone to betray each other. 
It also produces the tendency to take the human ‘out of the loop’ in 
military decisions. Decisions are a matter of calculation. The assumptions 
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of the Prisoner’s Dilemma are well researched. An important point 
of critique is that it assumes that the choice between betrayal and 
cooperation is only made once with a single party. However, in real life 
the choice can be made several times in a relationship. In a real conflict 
many parties are involved and can be traded with. For DeLanda this 
is a very important insight because the development of war games is 
moving in the ‘exact opposite direction’. He argues that the decision-
making process of self-firing weapons and autonomic technology 
of war can be made into a purely technical, mathematical event. The 
human is moved out of the loop and responsibilities become unclear. 
DeLanda fears the rigidity of Jominian war games because the space for 
political manoeuvring disappears.6 At the other end of the spectrum is 
the Clausewitzian approach to war games, which emphasises the pre-
eminence of politics over warfare. It is necessary to include the enemy’s 
will as a variable in any strategic decision. Human decision makers 
should always stay in the loop to make negotiations and deliberations 
possible. These kinds of simulations are quite different as they often 
involve open-ended games in which different participants meet and 
discuss scenarios. 
The two different approaches—Jominian and Clausewitzian—lead to 
two different outcomes. This makes modelling war a difficult affair and 
one cannot know who is right. DeLanda gives three reasons for this. First, 
it is difficult to ‘think red’. Thinking red is the military term for to think like 
the enemy. But no one can know how the enemy will respond to certain 
actions. The models that predict enemy behaviour can only be based 
on historical data and the educated guesses of the modellers. Second, 
the data that the models are based upon are often corrupted. Data on 
the performance of weapon systems is often manipulated for budgetary 
and political reasons. The industry only presents ‘ideal’ numbers. 
The government does not want to make all technical data available 
to prevent the enemy from knowing the military’s ‘real’ capabilities. 
Third, war games can present a very convincing and seductive picture 
of the world. People tend believe their outcomes easily. DeLanda 
argues: ‘There is the danger of war games evolving from their “insight-
producing” role into a “crystal ball” role, where they are used to derive 
predictions about the future’ (p. 101). The idea that models change the 
world to their liking instead of merely describing the world is especially 
a great danger when the models are about war.  Hence, different 
assumptions about the world can have far-reaching implications for the 
development of military simulators.7 Moreover, there are not sufficient 
means to check the data upon which the models are based. 
Being unaware of these assumptions could cause problems. Ghamari-
Tabrizi (2000) points out that it is easy to forget to ask questions about 
the models. She has studied the development of the Clausewitzian 
and Jominian models and saw many similarities in how participants 
reacted to them. She argues that both types of simulations set-up 
stressful situations to which the participants have to engage creatively, 
but points out that no-one is sure about the ‘reality’ of the simulation. 
She formulates it thus: ‘However, given the importance of producing a 
realistic but challenging scenario, it was hard to know whether or not the 
simulation was adequate to an unobtainable, future referent’ (Ghamari-
Tabrizi, 2000, p. 188). She identified three elements which are essential 
for the success of a simulation: reproduction of an environment, stressful 
situations, and unexpected events. They create an immersive experience. 
Sherry Turkle argues that immersive experiences of simulations 
overwhelms players and disguises at the same time the empirical 
data on which the games are based. The players learn ‘to do, but not 
to doubt’ (Turkle, 2009). But, what should be doubted? According to 
Ghamari-Tabrizi, the answer is clear: one should doubt the modellers’ 
ability to translate the available data about war into an accurate model 
of future war for the simulation. Despite the uncertainties about the data, 
the modeller must ‘nevertheless construct a model as best as he can, 
where both the structure of the model and its numerical inputs may be 
based merely on intuitive insight and limited practical experience’ (p. 
188). Ghamari-Tabrizi concludes that intuition must take over normative 
rationality. The modellers utilise an ‘aesthetic idiom’ to understand 
war and translate it to a simulation. She links modelling to making art: 
‘Certainly, we can recognize a parallel between game scenarios and 
literary art. First, scenarios presented a world-picture. They could not be 
deracinated from the cultural and historical situation, and were oriented 
towards the totality. Second, [...] to capture the complexity of Cold War 
crises, scenarios ought not be simplified, quantified and rationalized. 
And finally, also like the novel, scenarios could delineate several streams 
of interaction simultaneously’ (p. 197). In other words: the world outside 
the model is fixed because it is impossible to implement all events in 
outside influences into the model. However, it is also clear that a major 
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war would change many aspects of everyday life. The realism of a game 
is therefore comparable with ‘a richly furnished world, but sealed off like 
a terrarium or a tableau in a paperweight. This snug little world, in which 
the totality could be grasped all at once, encompasses the universe of 
miniature life’ (p. 198). 
Thus, Ghamari-Tabrizi points out that, because the ‘object’ is 
unobtainable, literary creativity is needed to use the available data 
anyway. There will always be a gap between the data and reality. She is 
therefore very critical of the approaches modellers have tried to use to 
tackle ‘the problem of realism’. She describes how the gap between the 
model and ‘reality’ was addressed in the fifties and sixties. During the 
Michigan Conference on War Games in 1955, realism was pragmatically 
defined: ‘The approach to realism is to provide an environment that will 
elicit from the subject … the same response … as would be elicited by 
the corresponding real-world situation. Once this condition is satisfied … 
all useful realism (perhaps validity is a more appropriate term here) has 
been achieved’ (p. 198). In the next chapter I will discuss this method, 
which is known as the Turing Test, in more detail. The test was not 
satisfactory at all because the content of the model hardly seemed to 
matter. After the conference, Clayton Thomas wrote: ‘One is fascinated 
by the appearance of real events unfolding before one’s eyes, and 
may forget that the appearance does not in itself prove or disprove the 
reality or faithfulness of the representation’ (p. 199). Others proposed 
a more scientific approach: the model should capture the essence of 
the phenomena by applying analytical techniques. Ghamari-Tabrizi 
concludes that ‘literary realism’ is seen by many as a trap door that may 
give the players a false sense of security. So, simulations are regarded as 
a synthetic history and as laboratory experiments at the same time. 
The ‘trap door’ of literary realism in military training simulators 
deeply concerns Der Derian (Der Derian, 2009); he argues that ‘realism 
has become virtual’ because many assumptions about war, peace and 
politics have become ‘convenient fictions’. His argument is quite rich, 
but I will summarize it. Der Derian argues that the issues in war, peace 
and politics can be interpreted in so many different ways that is has 
become very difficult to maintain the idea that the ‘truth’ is out there. In 
social, political and historical sciences the ‘truth’ has already become a 
problematic concept, now the military world has to accept that too.  
In this sense, realism is becoming virtual. No one can speak for the truth 
and to make things worse new military technologies are challenging the 
nature of politics, think of unmanned weapons systems and surveillance 
technology. Theory and ethics are not keeping pace with these rapid 
developments. Der Derian explains that the military apparatus assumes 
too easily that someone living in, for example, Afghanistan has the 
same needs, values and perceptions as someone living in the United 
States. The context of knowledge is not seen as relevant. He refers 
to Walter Benjamin to make his point ‘By making ways of being and 
ways of knowing one and the same, Benjamin shows us how questions 
of violence have always been problems of identity. In the absence 
of alternative modes of knowing, when a whole people becomes a 
‘problem’, violent final solutions can result’ (p. 44). In case of simulations 
being identified as a friend or foe has become a matter of category, a 
label, based on abstract data. The label has nothing to do with actually 
knowing the person in person, being part of the same country and 
culture. 
From now on I will use the term simulationists to refer to the diverse 
group of mainly engineers that develop, program, test and use models 
& simulations. I will summarize my argument so far. Simulationists claim 
that simulations model some aspect of reality. To ascertain whether 
the simulation is accurate it must be validated, that is scrutinized with 
systematic test methods. DeLanda points out that the necessary models 
always embed certain assumptions about reality because political, social 
and historical factors. Ghamari-Tabrizi takes this argument a step further 
and claim that the development of models for a simulation should be 
considered as an art form. The makers must be creative to translate a 
theory into a working model. Turkle explains that it is easy to fool users, 
because it is difficult to be critical when immersed in a simulation. 
Der Derian points out that even the frame of reference for simulations 
(‘reality’) is fluid. Every description of something complex as war is 
problematic. One must especially be aware that a description (model, 
simulation, whatever) can become a ‘reality’ and embeds an ideology 
about technology, war and politics. Therefore, the act of validation must 
be carefully studied, scrutinized and critiqued. My aim is to contribute to 
a new—and I hope—more useful conception of validity. 
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Structure of the book
  
In this chapter I have explained why, despite the many concerns about 
the validity of military training simulators, it is a growing business.  
Simulationists tend to focus on the analytical methods that were 
mobilised to develop the models & simulation. However, I argue—in line 
with DeLanda, Ghamari-Tabrizi, Turkle and Der Derian —that we should 
ask questions about how ‘the reality’ is modelled and implemented. I set 


























Figure 1: Structure of the book
In chapter two I will summarise the scholarly debate regarding the 
validation of military training simulators. I introduce the standard view of 
simulationists on validation by discussing its vocabulary and methods. 
In this chapter I will also critique this standard view with concepts of the 
philosophy of sciences and conclude that not the ‘what’ of validation 
should be studied but the ‘how’. 
In chapter three I will discuss my research approach. I will position 
my study in the realm of Science and Technology Studies. Further, I will 
introduce the analytical vocabulary of Bruno Latour that will help me to 
analyse the process of validation. Latour sees human beings as ‘truth-
builders’ who construct facts to understand reality. This view gives me an 
approach to reconstruct the activities that were undertaken in order to 
get a training simulator accepted by the military apparatus. I will study 
the validation of a specific training simulation and explore what issues 
emerge and how they are resolved. This gives me deeper understanding 
of the context of validation in a ‘real’ organization. 
In chapters four to seven I present four aspects of my case study. All of 
these aspects contribute in some interesting - and often counter-intuitive 
- way to the ‘validity’ of a military training simulator, known as the Mobile 
Combat Training Centre (MCTC). Each aspect plays a specific role but 
shares a common ideology, as I will show in this study. The four  
aspects are:
In chapter four I explore the aspect ‘practical validation’. I explore 
how the military training simulator is used in a training exercise, so I can 
investigate how ‘reality’ is modelled and validated in practice. I will argue 
that ‘reality’ is not as stable as many simulationists think. Simulationists 
want to fix ‘reality’, model it, and then implement it. But doing so 
neglects the processes of configuration and accountability that take 
place at the same time. 
In chapter five I explore the aspect ‘industrial validation’. The standard 
method of fix ‘reality’ in simulations is by formulating requirements. 
Requirements play an important role in system development because 
they steer the efforts of many actors like purchasers, lawyers, salesman, 
engineers and users (to name a few). In this chapter I will demonstrate, 
by reinterpreting requirements of the military training simulator 
as ‘boundary objects’, that they are neither ‘objective’ nor ‘neutral’ 
descriptions of the features of the simulator, but are very much political. 
This way of understanding of requirements sheds new light on how to 
cope with validation. 
In chapter six I explore the aspect ‘military validation’. The military 
training simulator is developed and purchased with a specific purpose 
in mind. It should solve a specific problem. So, in this chapter, I explore 
the problem that should be solved. I describe how the intentions were 
shaped and influenced the design of the training simulator even years 
before it was built. In this chapter I try to figure out how it is possible that 
the intentions are still deemed relevant after twenty years.
In chapter seven I explore the aspect ‘political validation’. The Dutch 
Parliament began speaking about a policy on military training simulators 
years before the military training simulator that is the object of this study 
was purchased and developed. In this chapter I try to make a connection 
between the Parliamentary debate and the issues that are at stake during 
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the use, purchase and development of the military training simulator. 
I argue that this debate coined many issues that are still considered 
relevant today and still has an impact on how validity of military training 
simulators is conceived.
Chapters four to seven analyse in depth a certain claim about a 
specific military training simulator. In chapter eight I will bring this 
analysis back to the concept of validation. Focussing merely on 
validation in terms of ‘accurate representation’ does no justice to the 
richness of the concept. The claims that the simulator is functional, 
effective, realistic and so on should be treated with suspicion. Such 
claims do not describe an inherent property of the simulator but the 
status quo of the established network of interests. They disguise many 
assumptions about ‘reality’ and military organisation. Therefore the 
military technology should be validated in a much more inclusive and 
richer way.
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Chapter 2. What is Validation?
Introduction
What is validation? In the Oxford English Dictionary ‘validate’ has a 
number of meanings, most notable: ‘to confirm the validity of an act, 
contract, deed, etc.’, ‘to make valid or of good authority; to confirm or 
corroborate; to substantiate or support’ and interestingly ‘to examine 
for incorrectness or bias; to confirm or check the correctness of.’ The 
word ‘validation’ stems from the word ‘valid’. In Latin validus means 
strong, powerful, or effective. A valid mind is a strong mind and a valid 
argument is a ‘well founded and fully applicable to the particular matter 
or circumstances; sound and to the point; against which no objection 
can fairly be brought’ according to the same dictionary. Validation 
is thus defined as the strength of an argument. An argument that is 
upheld is validated. This book is about the validation of a military 
training simulator. So, what does it mean to validate a simulation? 
In this chapter I will discuss how simulationists claim to do this. I will 
critically examine their arguments and make some of their assumptions 
about validation explicit. I will further scrutinise these assumptions in 
my empirical case study about the Mobile Combat Training Centre. 
This chapter is structured in the following manner. First, I will explain 
how simulationists understand validation in the key literature. Second, 
I will discuss two examples of validation to explain how it works out 
according the simulationists. Third, I will discuss how simulationists 
conceive the authority that should ‘do’ the validation (in the field known 
as accreditation). Fourth, I will argue that the current conception of 
validation is flawed because validation is a social-political process and 
discuss how this idea shapes my empirical case study.
Standard view of simulationists  
At the foundation of the discipline of simulationists lie two concepts: 
modelling and simulation. In this paragraph I will briefly introduce these 
concepts and explain in more depth how it relates to validation.
In the discipline of modelling & simulation a body of knowledge, 
theory, and research methodology has been developed. The core 
concept is that the ‘models’ are understood as ‘approximations of 
the real-world’ (Sokolowski & Banks, 2009). More formally, a model 
is defined as a ‘representation of an event and/or thing that is real 
or contrived. It can be a representation of an actual system. It can be 
something used in lieu of the real thing to better understand a certain 
aspect about that thing’ (p. 5). Modelling and simulation is above all 
a methodology. The simplified model of the development process 
represents the ontology of the discipline in the classical sense: an 
overview of the entities that can be said to exist giving the domain its 
identity. The simplified model starts with the ‘problem entity’ of the 
domain. The problem entity is ‘the real system’ that should be analysed 
and modelled in a ‘conceptual model’. The conceptual model is a 
formal description of the phenomena that must be programmed and 
implemented to a ‘computerized model’. The computerized model is 
the computer program that can simulate the model. The results of the 
simulation (gathered via experimentation) can be compared with the 


























Figure 1: Simplified model of the model development process (Sargent, 2010)
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The discipline of modelling & simulation is inherently concerned about 
the relationship between reality, models, and simulation, hence about 
the question of validation. How can one establish whether the model 
or simulation correctly matches the ‘real phenomena’? With regard to 
military training simulators this question should not be taken lightly 
according to Roger Smith because invalid simulators ‘endanger the lives 
of soldiers who are incorrectly trained’ (R. Smith, 2007b, pp. 10-04). When 
constructing a simulation many things can go wrong. During the process 
of analysis and modelling aspects may be forgotten so the conceptual 
model does not cover the relevant features of the real or proposed system 
(problem entity). Or, during programming the program (computerised 
model) may not match the conceptual model, causing the program to be 
different from the model. Or, experiments with the program may show 
that the program does not have the same behaviour as the real system. 
In every instance there is also the problem of obtaining correct data; 
the model might be right, but the data that it uses may be wrong. For 
example, the model used to forecast the weather may be correct, but 
when the wrong data is entered the results will be wrong. Based on the 
simplified model of the model development process, Robert Sargent 
(Sargent, 2010) distinguishes four types of validation: (1) conceptual 
model validity, (2) computerised model verification, (3) operational validity 
and (4) data validity. Each of these types must be tested differently.
 
1. Conceptual model validity
Conceptual model validity involves testing the relationship between the 
problem entity and the conceptual model. It serves two purposes. First, 
it establishes whether the theory of the conceptual model is correct 
and, second, whether ‘the representation of the problem entity and 
the model’s structure, logic, and mathematical and causal relationships 
are “reasonable” for the intended purpose of the model’ (Sargent, 
2010, p. 173). Several techniques are available to test the theory of 
the conceptual model; preferably data on the problem entity is used 
for mathematical analysis and statistical methods. The data is analysed 
to test the assumptions of the conceptual model. For example, if the 
conceptual model assumes a relationship between two values, does that 
assumption comply with the data of the problem entity? As conceptual 
models often also consist of submodels, these should be evaluated too. 
Sargent explains that the methods of ‘face validation’ and ‘traces’ could 
be applied. In ‘face validation’ the experts of the problem entity evaluate 
the conceptual model to establish whether it is suitable for its purpose. 
The traces method involves studying the entities of the (sub)models to 
see how they influence the results of the overall model. This latter method 
is used establish whether the logic of the (sub)models is correct and 
accurate.
 
2. Computerized model verification
Computerized model verification tests the relationship between the 
conceptual model and the computerized model. Is the conceptual 
model implemented correctly in the computer program?  One should 
not speak about validation, but about verification. Verification is about 
checking the programming methods and procedures. Is an error-free 
program developed? Are the proper standards and procedures in 
software engineering followed? Sargent explains two approaches for 
testing simulation software: static testing and dynamic testing. In static 
testing the computer program is analysed with structured methods such 
as ‘walkthroughs’ (studying the program code), ‘correctness proofs’ 
(formal methods to check that certain input leads to certain output), and 
‘examining the structure properties of the program’ (establishing how 
properties are related to each other). In dynamic testing the computer 
program is executed and the output is used to establish whether the 
program is correct. The tests are performed on the working software. 
For example, values are entered into the program to see whether the 
expected results are produced.
 
3. Operational validity
The relationship between the computerized model and the problem 
entity is probably the most familiar part of validity. Sargent speaks of 
establishing the operational validity. Are the outcomes of the simulation 
sufficient ‘for the model’s intended purpose over the domain of the 
model’s intended applicability?’ (Sargent, 2010, p. 174) An extensive set 
of tools is available to answer this question. Sargent presents a matrix 
(see Figure 2) that distinguishes certain degrees of confidence. The 
validity of the simulator depends largely on the availability of data on the 
operational behaviour of the problem entity. A system can be validated 
when data on the actual behaviour of the problem entity can be collected. 
Thus validation entails here comparing the output of the system with 
the output of the problem entity. Sargent describes three methods: 
graphical comparison of data (data of the problem entity is visualized 
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for various sets of experiments and the results are compared with the 
data of the system), confidence intervals (statistical procedures are used 
to establish the range of accuracy of the model), and hypothesis testing 
(a hypothesis is formulated about the acceptable range of accuracy for 
the model’s intended purpose and that hypothesis is tested). Sargent 
prefers the ‘objective approaches’, i.e. approaches that use mathematical 
and statistical tests. Sargent also states that when insufficient data is 
available (as is the case with the ‘non-observable system’ - something 
that is unknown like future events or new theories) it is not possible to 
obtain a high degree of confidence in a simulation model and its results. 
To obtain a high degree of confidence different sets of experimental 
conditions should be satisfied. However, ‘the model output behaviour(s) 
should be explored as thoroughly as possible and comparisons made to 
other valid models whenever possible’ (Sargent, 2010, p. 174).
- Comparison Using Graphical Displays
- Explore Model Behaviour
- Explore Model Behaviour 






- Comparison Using Statistical Tests  
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  Statistical Tests
Figure 2: Operational Validity Classification (Sargent, 2010)
 
4. Data validity
Data validity can be seen as the core problem of validation. Data validity 
involves obtaining accurate, relevant and sufficient data. This data is 
needed for the development of the conceptual model as well as the 
validation of the model. To ascertain the validity of a model data of the 
model should be compared with the data of the real world. Sargent 
points out that ‘To build a conceptual model we must have sufficient 
data on the problem entity to develop theories that can be used to 
build the model, to develop mathematical and logical relationships 
for use in the model that will allow the model to adequately represent 
the problem entity for its intended purpose, and to test the model’s 
underlying assumptions’ (Sargent, 2010, p. 172). Despite the fact that 
obtaining correct data is the main challenge for validation there is not 
much that can be done to be certain that the data is correct. It requires 
procedures and so-called ‘trusted sources’. Setting up good procedures 
for collecting and maintaining data, testing the data on internal 
consistencies and screening the data for extreme values and testing 
whether these are correct, can only raise the confidence of the data 
source. It is seen as very costly affair to check this in detail.
I have just sketched four concepts of validation. In the Table 1 below 
I give an overview of testing methods discussed by Sargent. However, 
this list is only a selection of the methods available for validation. Osman 
Balci made an inventory of different validation methods in 1997 and 
came up with a list of more than seventy methods (Balci, 1997). Probably 
the list has grown ever since. 
Validation & Verification Tests
Conceptual model validity Formal: Mathematical analysis, Statistical methods
Informal: Face validation, Traces
Computerized model  
verification
Static testing (walkthrough, correctness proofs, structure proper-
ties) Dynamic testing
Operational validity Comparison, statistical tests, explorations
Data validity Procedures for collecting and maintaining data,  
consistencies, data-enrichment
Table 1: Overview of validation and testing methods
Simulationists see validation as a formal and technical activity. 
They distinguish it, for example, from the concept of quality. Quality 
is considered a much broader concept that includes factors such as 
efficiency, maintainability, portability, reusability and usability (Balci, 
1998). Validity should only focus on ‘representational accuracy’. 
Moreover, simulationists have a strong preference for ‘hard data’. Hard 
data is data that can be statistically analysed and compared with the 
data generated by the simulator. The problem is, however, that this 
data is often unobtainable because the phenomena that are modelled 
cannot be analysed with other means than simulation. This makes 
validation a specialist activity of doing the right test, with the right data, 
in the right way for a specific model. I will discuss two examples of how 
simulationists approach validation in their practices.
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Two examples: K-S test and Turing test
To make the methods of validation clearer I will discuss two examples 
of how claims regarding the validity of a training simulator are ‘proven’. 
Because of the diversity of possible methods, many examples can be 
given. I will discuss only two: a statistical method (the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test) and the Turing Test. After the discussion I will explain how a 
recent guideline for validation proposes to cope with the diversity of tests.
The first example I want to discuss involves Security Exercise 
Evaluation System version 2.0 (SEES 2.0) a so-called constructive 
simulator that ‘can simulate the behaviour of individuals in small units 
such as infantry squads, security police patrols, special forces units, or 
terrorists groups, under the supervision of squad or team leaders’ (U.S. 
Congress, 1995, p. 41). The data of the simulator was validated with 
the data that was obtained from a series of training exercises with live 
simulation. In other words, a number of force-on-force training exercises 
were conducted. Here the soldiers were required to fight each other 
using the simulation system known as MILES. In MILES all fire exchanges 
can be recorded.8 The validation test focussed on comparing the 
friendly-to-hostile ratio two minutes after the beginning of the hostilities 
from two datasets: the data of the live training generated by MILES and 
the data of the simulator SEES 2.0. For that the so-called two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was used. This is a statistical test that can 
help to decide whether two datasets are statistically equivalent. In this 
case, one sample consisted of 40 friendly-to-hostile ratios calculated 
by SEES. The other sample consisted of 20 hostile-to-friendly ratios of 
the force-on-force training exercise. In less mathematical terms, both 
samples contained the proportion of how many soldiers survived the 
encounter after a certain time. Based on the two-samples the following 
was concluded that it was not possible to distinguish both ratios with 
‘less than a 10-percent chance of error’ (U.S. Congress, 1995, p. 41). So 
both datasets were statically not the same, they were still a good match. 
It was later discovered that SEES 2.0 did not adequately model ambush 
situations. While it is clear that the models of SEES can be improved, 
the test itself can be criticised. First, the K-S test is only accurate for very 
large samples, not the small samples that are under consideration in this 
test (40 measurements). Second, the population of all the force ratios 
should consist of all possible outcomes. This can only be obtained by 
executing the training exercise an infinite number of times, which is 
practically impossible. Third, interestingly the models of SEES seemed 
to work better for other time points (i.e. time points other than two 
minutes), the report states: ‘For times at 30-second intervals from the 
start until seven minutes later (except for two minutes after start), the 
experimental and simulation samples were not so different statistically 
that the K-S test could reject the hypothesis that they were drawn from 
the same population with statistical significance better (i.e. less) than 
0.10’ (U.S. Congress, 1995, p. 43). Thus the quality of the validation test 
itself seems to be questionable. A statistically undesirable result causes 
designers to fine-tune the model to the values of the experimental 
dataset. This dataset serves therefore as a reference and is not doubted. 
But some degree of doubt would be appropriate. The data was 
gathered with several training exercises that were conducted using the 
training simulator MILES. Thus no ‘real’ combat was measured, nor were 
any ‘real’ weapons used (only lasers). The question remains: What does 
this data mean? Nobody knows. This observation also influences the 
statistical analysis. The statistical techniques do have certain underlying 
assumptions concerning how they should be applied. In this case the 
dataset is, according to experts, too small for reliable statistical analysis. 
In fact, Jack Kleijnen, who is an expert in statistics, is very concerned 
about the statistical knowledge of simulationists. He believes that they 
should be ‘warned’ that assumptions about statistical techniques might 
not be applicable for simulation, ‘[S]imulationists should be warned that 
in practice the assumptions of these statistical techniques might not 
hold!’ (Sargent et al., 2000, p. 3). He argues that statistical analysis only 
makes sense when ‘real-life data’ is available that can be used to validate 
simulation models. 
The second example I will discuss is the validation of the Semi-
Automated Forces (SAF) component of SIMNET. SIMNET is a simulator 
that tank crews use to practise tactical operations in a virtual world. The 
SAF component is part of the simulation and calculates the behaviour 
of tanks and helicopters that are not controlled by the participants 
(known as ‘autonomous battlefield entities’). The validation consisted 
of a so-called Turing Test. In this case two platoons of soldiers had to 
fight a battle against each other via a computer screen. But in reality 
they did not know whether they fought each other, or fought the SAF 
component (the component that simulated a platoon) or fought a 
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combination of the two. Twelve battles were fought in total. Each platoon 
fought two different battles against the three different forces. Before and 
during the experiment the two platoons did not have contact with each 
other outside the virtual battlefield. The soldiers were given the task 
to determine whether they fought a ‘human’ or ‘computer-generated’ 
enemy. The SAF component passed the test because: ‘When asked 
to identify their attackers after each battle, they were not able to do 
so at a rate significantly better than random chance’ (Petty, 2009, p. 
144). The Turing Test is a simple test with a simple question: Is there a 
recognisable difference between the behaviour of a computer and the 
behaviour of a human? The Turing Test is well accepted as a means of 
establishing the appearance of intelligence. However, it is also criticized 
because humans are easily to misled. For example, the chatbot known as 
Eliza can easily fool people by constantly asking questions. Therefore the 
Turing Test raises several issues. First, the reference for the Turing Test is 
human experience. The human ‘player’ formulates a judgement based 
on a ‘gut feeling’ about whether the system’s behaviour is similar to 
that of a human or not. Second, the technique is seen as a less rigorous 
than statistical tests. Although techniques such as face validation and 
the Turing Test ‘can provide useful insights, they are generally, in and of 
themselves, insufficient for assessing a model’s validity’ (Sargent et al., 
2000, p. 2). The results of the test are based on visible behaviour and the 
content of the models and the quality of the data seem hardly to matter. 
Therefore it is advised that the Turing Test be used together with an 
appropriate statistical test. 
Both examples clearly indicate that validation is considered a 
systematic method for testing simulations. Simulationists prefer formal 
statistical methods. However, the issues that are validated in our 
examples seem rather straightforward. The first example is focussed on 
the friendly-to-hostile ratio and the second example on the autonomous 
battlefield entities. Both simulators include many more models. What 
about the look-and-feel of the user interface? (i.e. visual representation) 
What about the interaction with other players? (i.e. behavioural 
representation) What about other virtual entities? (i.e. contextual 
representation) In practice many different claims are under inspection 
at the same time. For this reason Sargent believes that ‘it is impossible 
to verify and validate large-scale simulation models to a reasonable 
confidence level’ (Sargent et al., 2000, p. 5). According to him, formal 
validation methods cannot test every aspect of a simulation because the 
complexity is just too great. A separate model can be tested, but when it 
interacts with another model testing becomes much more difficult, even 
impossible. According to Sargent, fundamental new approaches should 
be developed that have more practical relevance. This complexity makes 
it hard to say whether a simulator is valid. But simulationists have found a 
way to work around that problem, using what they call ‘accreditation’.
Accreditation by a ‘responsible authority’
It is difficult to test and validate simulations, but it is not impossible, 
according to most simulationists. One can achieve a reasonable level 
of confidence in relation to the purpose of the training simulator (Cook 
& Skinner, 2005; Moraal & Meeteren, 1990; Pace, 2004; Roza, Voogd, & 
Sebalj, 2012). They separate validation testing from the decision about 
whether the simulation is appropriate for its purpose. This judgement is 
known as ‘accreditation’. Mikel Petty defines accreditation as ‘the official 
certification by a responsible authority that a model is acceptable for 
use for a specific purpose’ (Petty, 2009, p. 127). He sees accreditation 
as ‘nontechnical in nature, though it may be informed by technical data’ 
(p. 127). Accreditation is based on the findings of the verification and 
validation processes. The new SISO standard, Generic Methodology for 
Verification and Validation and Acceptance of Models, Simulations, and 
Data (GM-VV), describes how it should work (Roza, Voogd, Emmerik, 
& Lier, 2010; Roza et al., 2012; SISO, 2012, 2013). It introduces for that 
purpose the notion of ‘argumentation networks’. The argumentation 
network is the technological core of the method in which the 
stakeholders’ goals through building associating networks of evidences 
































Figure 3: Simplified V&V Goal Network (Roza et al., 2012)
Manfred Roza, Jeroen Voogd and Derek Sebalj (2012) explain how 
it should work: ‘Evidence and arguments underlying an acceptance 
recommendation should be developed in a structured manner using a 
format where the reasoning is transparent, traceable and reproducible.’ 
(p.6) In an example the authors discuss the validity of a driving simulator. 
It is a full-motion simulator that is able to simulate the movements of a 
car on the road. This simulator has been upgraded. The screen that the 
driver watches is now able to show the flashing lights of emergency 
services. The upgrade was done to research how drivers react when 
passing a crash site where emergency rescue workers are present. A 
goal network was developed (see Figure 3), showing the logic of the 
method. The context is ‘the flashing light off on location’, meaning 
that the emergency services have turned their flashing lights off in the 
scenario in which the driver passes a crash site. This scenario is shown 
on the screens of the driving simulator. Five components are seen as 
relevant for the simulator’s validity: motion and sound; vehicle model; 
traffic model; visual environment; and ‘flashing light representation’. In 
the figure we can see that the first, second, third and fourth components 
can be tested with legacy (historical) information and subjective methods.  
However, the fifth component, representation of flashing light, can only 
be tested with a subjective rating (like ‘face validation’). The figure shows 
how the simulator is divided into five components that have to be tested. 
It also shows that for most models legacy information, that is information 
from earlier test drives, must be used.
The problem with the article of Roza et al is that it hides all the work 
that is done to make the data ‘speak’. The processes of obtaining, 
preparing, and analysing the data are kept out of sight; only the 
procedure is laid-out. In this article validation becomes for simulationists 
a matter of comparison of one medium (data set, program, outcome) 
with another. Roza et al present validation as a scientific and technical 
activity, where the level of confidence can be ascertained in an 
‘objective’ manner.9 They assume that a ‘responsible authority’ is willing 
to judge the correctness of a training simulator. I think this perspective is 
rather naïve. In the next paragraph I will discuss the shortcomings of the 
conception of validation that I have just discussed.
Problems with the standard view  
Many authors in the world of military training simulators believe that 
comparing the input and output of the simulation models with the real 
world data is sufficient to determine the validity of the simulator (See 
e.g. Banks, 1998; A. M. Law & Kelton, 2000; Sargent, 1996, 1999, 2010; 
Sokolowski & Banks, 2009). Brian Cantwell Smith points out that in 
this perspective the ‘real world’ should be modelled and only features 
relevant to the study should be taken into account. After which the 
model is implemented on a computer or the simulation in our case  






Figure 4: Simplified perspective on modelling (B. C. Smith, 1985)
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Validation is about the ‘correctness’ of the representation of the ‘real 
world’ in the computer simulation. ‘The developers and users of these 
models, the decision maker using information obtained from the results 
of these models, and the individuals affected by decisions based on 
such models are rightly concerned with whether a model and its results 
is “correct”’ (Sargent, 2010, p. 166). The simulation is either correct or it 
is not.10 George Kleindorfer, Liam O’Neill and Ram Ganeshan identify the 
either/or position as the basic assumption of many simulationists. They 
explain that simulationists either say that there is empirical evidence 
for the validity of the model, or that the model is just a ‘speculative 
device from which no defensible answers can be obtained’ (Kleindorfer, 
O’Neill, & Ganeshan, 1998, p. 1088). If the data of the real system is 
not congruent with the data of the model, then the model is obviously 
flawed and is therefore not valid. 
This perspective on validation encapsulates many epistemological 
problems.11 I will summarize three of the most fundamental problems 
(Hofmann, 2013, p. 62):  
• There is never enough evidence that a model is correct. The restricted  
 set of evidence means that it is always possible to develop a counter- 
 model that would fit the data and at the same time would not be  
 similar to the model that is under investigation.
• Often simulations are developed especially for environments for  
 which it is just very difficult or even impossible to obtain empirical  
 data. These are known as ‘data-poor environments’. Therefore it does  
 not make sense to validate these simulations with empirical data.
• It is practically impossible to validate a complex simulation when  
 many models are involved. It is not possible to establish the impact of  
 an adjustment in one model on the input/outputs of the simulation as  
 a whole in a reasonable amount of time.
The overall problem is, of course, that ‘objective observation’ is 
only possible when one supports traditional epistemologies (realism, 
positivism, empiricism, etc.) also known as ‘foundationalist’ approaches. In 
other less conventional epistemologies validation is a different matter. The 
watershed between the different epistemologies involves the question 
of ‘induction’. How can one come from individual observations to a 
general theory? The classical example is to say: based on many separate 
observations that the swans that I have seen are white, I conclude that all 
swans must be white. As in this example, one moves from many particular 
observations to a general statement. How is that possible? Typically three 
approaches can be identified. First, the foundationalist approach seeks 
a neutral and objective foundation of knowledge. Second, the anti-
foundationalist approach acknowledges that conventions, psychological, 
sociological and historical factors play an important role. Third, in between 
these two approaches we can locate the instrumentalist approach. I use 
the seminal article of Kleindorfer et al as my guide. They refer extensively 
to Thomas Naylor, J. Finger and James McKenney (1967) to explain the 
foundationalist position and Yaman Barlas and Stanley Carpenter (1990) to 
explain the anti-foundationalist position. 
Foundationalists see the truth as something harmonic, permanent 
and neutral. This approach considers knowledge as something beyond 
personal experience that can be true objectively and independently 
from the human observer. The truth can be located in either experience, 
which is known as empiricism, or in rational thought, which is known as 
rationalism. Empiricists want to verify models using empirical observations 
or what simulationists would call ‘data’ or ‘evidence’. Rationalists will claim 
that the model must be logical and mathematically sound. Empiricists 
and rationalists will take the either/or position: either a model is valid or 
it is not. The involvement of human judgement or guesswork will make 
the model invalid. Kleindorfer et al quote Hans Reichenbach: ‘A sentence 
the truth of which cannot be determined from possible observations 
is meaningless’ (p. 1091). However, the foundationalist position has 
many problems; two of which are important for simulationists. First, it 
is impossible to go from individual observations to a general theory 
without making a noncircular argument. One is only able to see what 
one already knows. Even if one is able to do theory-less observations, 
one has to acknowledge that general statements are beyond the realm 
of that individual observation. One can only strive for confirmation 
of that which is already known. Second, the ‘truths’ in one era are the 
misunderstandings in the next era. The history of sciences knows many 
examples of shifts in human thinking. The classical example is the shift 
from Euclidian to non-Euclidian geometry (Churchman, 1973). Despite this 
criticism, one still finds many rationalist ideas in debates about validations, 
especially when mathematical, spatial, and temporal ordering is involved. 
The understanding of time and space is considered as a given, something 
that is beyond empirical testing. 
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Located somewhere in between the foundationalist and anti-
foundationalist positions is the instrumentalist approach. If one 
acknowledges that general statements are not possible from empiricist 
or rationalist arguments, then one could argue that only the ‘success’ 
of a theory counts. However, the judgement of success can only be a 
convention or a social agreement. As it is not possible to find a neutral 
basis upon which to establish the validity of a model, only the perceived 
effects of the model count. If the perceived effects comply with the idea of 
value, utility, elegance (or whatever), then the model is considered valid. 
The consequence of this position is that the content of the model hardly 
seems to matter. If the results of the model are considered valid, then the 
model acts as if the content is correct. Kleindorfer et al refer to economist 
Milton Friedman who stated that one should only be concerned with 
the predictions of the model and not its assumptions (Friedman, 1953). 
This instrumentalist argument creates many problems. First, it is most 
important to realise that predictions must be about something. This 
restricts the domain for which the model is relevant, which makes defining 
the domain the problem. If a prediction is wrong, it could be due to the 
definition of the domain. That does not make the discussion any clearer. 
Second, many models do not make any forecasts but must be seen as 
normative descriptions. The economic theory of Friedman, for example, 
cannot be validated by its own standards. Third, the idea that the content 
of the model is not relevant and only its effects count makes stockbrokers, 
scientists (they predict), and historians (they describe) irrelevant—as 
Kleindorfer et al ironically write.
Anti-foundationalist approaches cover a wide array of possibilities. 
Kleindorfer et al explain that in these approaches norms, prescriptions, 
and values can play a role in theory development. The approaches share 
the idea that theorizing is a human activity and should not be seen as 
something with a separate status. I will briefly discuss the approaches 
of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn as well as the Bayesian approach. Karl 
Popper developed the theory of methodological falsification. It is the 
idea that there is no solution for the problem of induction so theories 
can be developed from all sorts of sources: empirical, psychological, 
etc. His point is that theories should be tested empirically and 
conventions will inform us what is meant by an empirical test. Therefore 
propositions are always open for debate and are not neutral. However, 
the propositions must be formulated in such a way that they can be 
tested with agreed-upon empirical data. In this process, which is called 
falsification, validation means that a theory is validated when it resists 
critical tests. Statistical methods for modelling and simulation often 
take this route. A model is developed based on agreed-upon data and 
only when it fits certain observations it is then considered valid. When 
new data is obtained that is not congruent with the existing theory the 
model is modified until there is an agreed-upon result. Thomas Kuhn 
introduces the idea that scientific theory development can be located 
in a paradigm (Kuhn, 1970). Each paradigm represents a certain pattern 
that guides the organisation of data in such a way that a coherent theory 
is developed. This pattern is a social convention. The rules will develop 
over time and become more complex and explicit. A paradigm can be 
seen as an ecosystem of a scientific theory. The paradigm is formulated, 
accepted and verified. When too many anomalies appear, however, 
the theory may be rejected and a new paradigm may develop. In the 
terminology of Kuhn, validation is thus ‘a complex process with social, 
psychological and historical dimensions’ (Kleindorfer et al., 1998). This 
means that a model is accepted if it falls within the generally accepted 
way of understanding the world. Kuhn holds that the expert will accept 
the model if it fits his understanding of the phenomena. Many see 
this approach as rather relativistic, which makes validation impossible. 
According to Kuhn, that is taking the point too far; one can accept the 
paradigm without saying that anything goes. The Bayesian approach 
should not be omitted in a discussion about the validation of models. 
Many models are not deterministic, but probabilistic, meaning that 
outcomes do not contain empirically verifiable data, but instead just give 
a factor of chance that something is true. Probabilistic models makes 
validating the model with empirical means much harder. Probabilistic 
models are often accepted if they prove to be credible over time. 
The statistical methods used to analyse the data in order to develop 
a probabilistic model are also not above suspicion. Some see the 
statistical methods as a hidden foundationalism, but most practitioners 
will argue that the methods should be selected pragmatically. Validity, 
according to the Bayesian approach, means that the credibility of the 
model increases over time when outcomes are successful.
The debate between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists is an 
on-going debate in the Anglo-American philosophy of sciences. Many 
of the problems identified represent a continuing struggle between 
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objectivists (foundationalist) and relativists (anti-foundationalist). 
Richard Rorty noticed that this debate has reached a stalemate 
especially because ‘the philosophers who get called “relativists” are 
those who say that the grounds for choosing between opinions are 
less algorithmic than had been thought’ (Kleindorfer et al., 1998, p. 
1096). Interestingly, the fundamental questions raised by philosophers 
are hardly a controversy for simulationists. Kleindorfer et al argue that 
the simulatonists have ‘instinctively adopted a middle ground in this 
debate’ (p. 1098). The position of the simulationists seems to make the 
philosophical debate irrelevant. A quote credited to Richard Feynman, 
‘Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is 
to birds’, refers to this point (Crocker, 2012, p. 80). But I do not want to 
go that far. The philosophy of science makes clear that the ‘truths’ upon 
which simulationists base their claims are not as self-evident. Many 
fundamental issues should be raised and are simply ignored. Claims 
about the importance of the validity of models are easily formulated 
but none of these claims are explicitly embedded in an epistemology. 
However, it is not only the simulationists who are to blame, the 
philosophers of science have also incorrectly approached the topic. 
To quote Sergio Sismondo, ‘The philosophers of science completely 
neglected the processes involved in applying such theories’ (Sismondo, 
1999, p. 256). My contribution to this debate will be to focus on the 
socio-political processes involved when different aspects of the training 
simulator are validated. How simulationists validate the training simulator 
in practice will be the topic of this study.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the concept of validation, which 
is an inherent part of the discipline of modelling and simulation. 
Simulationists are forced to address questions about the correctness of 
their models’ and simulations’ representation. In this sense validation 
is necessary to build confidence in military training simulators. 
However, I have also explained why validating training simulators is not 
unproblematic. Especially in foundationalist approaches, many concerns 
can be raised about the possibility of a ‘valid’ simulator because validity 
is associated with ‘objective observations’ and ‘empirical data’. In this 
book I do not want to discuss the philosophical debate any further, but 
instead want to shift the focus on the practice of validation. I especially 
want to explore how simulationists - practitioners involved in the world 
of military training simulators - can claim that the simulator they use, buy 
or develop is - so they say - ‘valid’. In the next chapter I will elaborate 






Chapter 3. Research Approach
Introduction
In the previous chapter I mentioned that the concept of validation is an 
important issue in the world of military training simulators. I also explained 
that its execution is not without troubles. I concluded that I would focus 
on the ‘practice of validation’ instead of on the discussion of the related 
philosophical debates. In this chapter I will explain how I set up my study 
and elucidate the vocabulary that I will employ. First, I will position my 
study in the rich discipline of Science and Technology Studies. Second, I 
will discuss my ‘empirical turn’ using the vocabulary of Bruno Latour. Third, 
I will relate the structure of my case study to my ‘unit of analysis’.
Position in Science & Technology Studies
So far I have discussed why military training simulators have become 
very popular. This popularity led to some concerns in U.S. Congress. 
The concerns focussed mainly on the question of validation: Does the 
training simulator match reality? In this paragraph I want to position my 
research question in the field of Science and Technology Studies and 
explain what I would like my research to contribute to this discipline.
Science and Technology Studies (STS) is often described as an 
interdisciplinary field that is ‘the intersection of work by sociologists, 
historians, philosophers and anthropologists studying the processes 
and outcomes of science and technology’ (Sismondo, 2007, p. v). 
Military technology has often been an object of STS because of its 
‘inherent political nature’ (Winner, 1986). Military technology affects 
international relations and has geopolitical connections (Lehenkari, 
2000). In a systematic literature review Brian Rappert, Brian Balmer 
and John Stone (2008) state that the scholarly focus on military 
technology has changed over the past thirty years. Studies of military 
technology started as investigations into the dynamics of the Cold War. 
The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was 
an important motivator for many research initiatives and innovation 
processes. Themes of these studies included managing technological 
change, the organisation of military Research & Development, and the 
return of investments for civilian and military environments. It has only 
been since the nineties that ‘[STS] were seen as informing the manner in 
which distinctions were drawn between ‘civilian’, ‘military’, and ‘dual use’ 
technology as well as the compatibility of ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ ends’ 
(p. 721). It opened the door for new research questions. Historical case 
studies started to explore how the military world and the civilian world 
influence each other.
The social shaping of technological developments became the focus 
of many science and technology studies. Society, science and technology 
are considered parts of a ‘seamless web’ or a socio-technical network, 
rather than as distinct entities (p. 722). The detailed descriptions of how 
military technology is procured and developed challenged the idea of 
autonomous technology development trajectories. This gave rise to a 
body of theory that is known as the ‘social construction of technology’ 
(Bijker, 2006a, 2006b). This body of research concentrates on questions 
about co-evolution and co-production of society and technology. 
Technology shapes the social and the social shapes technology (see also 
Jasanoff, 2004). In these studies technological innovation is considered 
a human, social and cultural endeavour. To many technologists this 
perspective sounds a bit strange. Isn’t technology development 
something that is based on ‘hard facts’? Donald MacKenzie explains 
that technical facts are considered much ‘harder’ than political facts. A 
political fact, such as ‘Soviet threat’, can be discussed but a technical 
fact, such as ‘a single fix from an optimally located star will yield accuracy 
equivalent to a two-star fix’, seems to be much harder to have a debate 
about (MacKenzie, 1990, p. 417). But technologists claim too much 
power: they speak for the technology and decide what can be done and 
what cannot. But the ‘hardness’ of a technological fact is as much a social 
construction as a political fact. Technologists have controversies too. 
MacKenzie’s study clearly shows that uncertainties in mission accuracy 
will always be there. One of the problems is that facts cannot be made 
‘hard’. For example, it is not possible to test missiles by firing them at the 
Soviet Union. Domestic tests are also difficult because local people also 
resent having missiles flying over their backyards. Thus one of the options 
left is testing missiles with computer simulations, which shifts the debate 
to the validity of the computer models. MacKenzie points out that ‘the 
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gap’ between computer simulation and use is much greater than ‘the 
gap’ between testing and use. MacKenzie concludes with the remark 
that ‘[T]he inventors of accuracy have a problem. They possess all these 
resources. But, as we have seen, there is a sense in which they still require 
the world as their laboratory. And the world has yet to be persuaded that 
it should be used’ (MacKenzie, 1990, p. 423).  
The idea that facts cannot be made ‘hard’ is the key point of the 
debate between Rob Kling versus Keith Grint and Steve Woolgar 
(Grint & Woolgar, 1992). The latter scholars explain that many 
technologists – like Kling – believe that the human, social and cultural 
questions surrounding technology are like the layers of an onion 
that can be peeled off to reveal the inner core, something that must 
be a ‘technological fact’. Grint and Woolgar do not agree with this 
perspective. They explain that, for example, even in the situation where 
someone shoots someone, one cannot say with certainty that the gun of 
the shooter causes the bullet hole in the victim. They argue that there are 
only the accounts of the shooting. And these accounts do not so much 
reflect a situation but constitute one. In other words, our knowledge 
of the shooting involves ‘a complicated variety of factors, including 
our reading or listening to the accounts of others, our susceptibility to 
persuasion by authoritative sources, our willingness to credit claims 
to expertise, and so on’ (p. 371). The knowledge about the ‘effect’ of 
the shooting is just ‘the contingent outcome of reading (certain) other 
people’s reconstructions in a contextually specific way’ (p. 371). This 
perspective is not used to deny what has happened, rather its main 
purpose is to reveal how a specific ‘fact’ is accepted. Grint and Woolgar 
even take their point a step further. In their perspective, technology 
does not have any self-evident or indisputable ‘effects’. The gun is, for 
example, not just an ‘innocent tool’ in the hand of a killer. A shooting 
is a complex act where human (shooter) and technology (gun) merge. 
The two actors cannot be separated. The shooter without the gun 
cannot be a shooter. The gun without the shooter cannot fire (and is just 
an object). This relationship between the human and the technology 
creates the ‘effect’ of a killer. Therefore the existence of a self-evident 
and indisputable ‘technological fact’ is not possible; the fact will always 
merely be a position in a network of other ‘actors’. An account of it can 
only be (temporarily) accepted and seen as true. 
Interestingly, technology is not a ‘given’ but something that is constructed 
by humans. Not only is technology – a ‘thing’ – a temporary configuration, 
but also its effects are temporary. In Science and Technology Studies 
the case study is the dominant form of research to make the context of 
technology visible. It is seen as the ‘bread and butter of STS’ (Sismondo, 
2007). Some examples of case studies include the accuracy of ballistic 
missiles (MacKenzie, 1990), the history of the machinegun (Ellis, 1986), 
the identity of a never-built TSR2 aircraft (J. Law, 2002), the failure of 
the metro system ARAMIS (Latour, 1996), the acceptance of the electric 
refrigerator (Cowan, 1985), the business environment of the Trident 
submarine (Mort, 2002) and the identity of the human body in medicine 
(Mol, 2002). Many more examples can be listed. The case studies reflect 
a deep interest in the development of a new technology and the social 
processes that produced it. Most cases are reconstructed with archival 
materials, reports, newspaper articles, journal excerpts and sometimes 
interviews with people who were directly involved. There have not been 
many studies on military training simulators. 
Empirical turn to validation 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned why the concept of validation is 
quite problematic and that it is not my ambition to develop another 
philosophical argument on how validation should take place. Instead, 
I aim to investigate how practitioners work with validity. This shift away 
from theory toward practice is quite common in Science and Technology 
Studies and is known as the ‘empirical turn’ (Achterhuis, 2001; Brey, 
2010; Rip, Kroes, & Meijers, 2000). The empirical turn is generally used to 
express the shift in focus from abstract concepts to a specific technology 
in a specific context. In this paragraph I will explain my vocabulary and 
how I want to make that shift. 
Bruno Latour offers an interesting perspective on the practice of 
validation. His inspiration comes from many different sources. The 
most significant are Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, 
Gilles Deleuze’s conception of immanence, Michael Serres’ ontology of 
mediation, and Marc Augé’s anthropological research methods. For a 
detailed analysis see: (Blok & Jensen, 2011; Restivo, 2010). The central 
theme in Latour’s work is how communities produce ‘truth’ within their 
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worlds (which he calls ‘regimes’, see (Latour, 2013)). He has studied how 
scientists construct facts (Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1979); how 
engineers develop technology (Latour, 1996); how lawyers make law 
(Latour, 2010b); and how religious cults fabricate religious fetishes (Latour, 
2010c). His books such as Laboratory Life (Latour & Woolgar, 1979), 
Science in Action (Latour, 1987), The Pasteurization of France (Latour, 
1988) and Pandora’s Hope (Latour, 1999) offer a good introduction to his 
approach. I will summarize only the part of his extensive work that I find 
relevant for my study.12 
In Laboratory Life Latour follows, as an anthropologist, the activities 
of scientists in a well-respected biochemistry laboratory. His aim is to 
understand how scientists develop scientific theories. He literary follows 
the work of the scientists. Scientists apparently work with many resources 
like texts, people, materials, machines to bring order to a mess of data. 
They use machines that produce numbers and graphics. The numbers 
are written down, discussed and visualised for scholarly articles. Latour 
concludes that materials are organised and transported from one place to 
another. Creating scientific facts has much more to do with logistics than 
with epistemology. Science is hard work. Raw materials are constantly 
transformed into something else and only these transformations get the 
full attention of the scientists. Samples of stuff are put into machines that 
produce graphical figures. The graphical figures become the conversation 
topic of the scientists. The original samples are thrown away as waste. 
The combination of technicians and machines that transform a substance 
into a graphical representation is what Latour calls an ‘inscription device’. 
Inscription devices play an important role in the scientific process because 
they enable the scientists to incorporate their work into a scientific paper. 
Without an inscription device it is impossible to make observations. 
The inscription device, ‘is not merely a means to obtaining some 
independently given entity (...) It is not simply that phenomena depend on 
certain material instrumentation; rather, the phenomena are thoroughly 
constituted by the material setting of the laboratory’ (Latour & Woolgar, 
1979, p. 64). So, inscription devices not only produce a representation of 
a fact, but they also create the fact itself. Without inscription devices the 
original substance would mean nothing.
Therefore, if scientific facts are created in a laboratory, how is it possible 
that facts can be accepted outside the laboratory? In Science of Action 
Latour proposes an answer: the builders of facts have to struggle with 
sceptics to disseminate their ideas. It is hard work to get a new idea 
accepted. The idea should fit within a web of other interests. For example, 
one can say that Tim Berners-Lee is the inventor of the Internet, but that 
does not take into account all the effort that hardware and software 
specialists, users, and media companies had to put in to it. Latour points 
out that scientists have to build alliances and be able to transform their 
ideas in such a way that other parties become interested. The act of 
reformulating ideas so that other parties become involved, is what Latour 
calls translation (although in other works he talks about mediations and 
associations as well). If two parties do not agree, however, who will win the 
debate? The answer is quite simple: the one that is able to mobilise the 
largest number of loyal allies. Often the just-mentioned inscription devices 
play an important role here. An inscription device is a physical device that 
is used to convince others. It can be a printout of data, a figure, or model. 
Inscriptions are mobile, stable and can be held in one’s hands. So alliances 
do not only consist of people, but also of machines, materials and things. 
Inscription devices make alliances very powerful. When a fact is accepted 
by everyone it is, according to Latour, ‘black boxed’. Nobody debates, for 
example, the technical architecture of the Internet anymore, until a certain 
problem (e.g. a shortage of IP numbers) emerges and the black box must 
be opened. An important theme in the work of Latour is how alliances 
of people, machines, and materials are constructed and become black 
boxed. Therefore, in the perspective of Latour the truth of a scientific fact 
is not an intrinsic attribute, but merely the strength of the links between 
actors. However, truth is not determined by accurately describing the 
‘reality out there’; but instead, it is determined by the relations between 
different actors.
Such a ‘network of actors’ might sound like an abstract concept, but 
examples can be found everywhere. In my introduction I described 
an actor-network in its full glory. The Mobile Combat Training Centre 
consists of satellites, hills, trees, soldiers, commanders, trainers, 
observers, technologists, protocols, orders, maps, weapons, tanks, 
computers, transmitters, projectors, containers and so on. An actor-
network is just a temporary configuration of human and non-human 
actors, and when they stay together it can be considered stable. The 
Mobile Combat Training Centre can be seen as a stable actor-network. 
The soldiers accept the outcomes of the computers. The mechanics 
68 69
‘works’, so pulling a trigger activates the laser beam. The computers 
function due to the reliable power supply. All actors are doing the things 
they are expected to do. If they would not, the actor-network could not 
function the way it does and it would destabilize. Preserving this stability 
is not as effortless as it might seem. The strength of the network is 
constantly tested and must be maintained to prosper. New technologies 
come up and one must decide if they should be incorporated into the 
network. Budget cuts might threaten some actors. In this respect the 
network is only successful if it can maintain itself. It should be able to 
withstand these ‘trials of strengths’. If it remains stable the actor-network 
will remain black boxed (Latour, 1987). The black box metaphor refers 
to the idea that a successful technology hides all the work that was done 
to create the technology. If something works well people tend to only 
pay attention to its inputs and outputs, and not to its history. So Latour 
notices,  ‘Thus, paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, 
the more opaque and obscure they become’ (Latour, 1999, p. 304). 
Therefore a black box is something that takes the individual actors out of 
sight and creates a new, more powerful one. 
Latour also labels actor-networks as ‘hybrids’. The term hybrid is used 
to indicate that an actor-network consists of both ‘human’ and ‘non-
human’ actors. People and things have an equal status in actor-networks, 
although the actors do have very different qualities. The relationship 
between human and non-human actors is what Latour calls ‘symmetrical’. 
Let me illustrate this. In Aramis, or the love of technology the failure of 
a guided-transport system for Paris is investigated (Latour, 1996). The 
study develops in a remarkable direction. First, the narrative that is 
chosen is unusual for a scientific discourse. A professor and his student 
(the ‘I’ in the book) try to answer the question: Who killed Aramis? It 
reads like a detective novel in which the student grows to become 
a wise researcher. Second, the story is not a neat tale with a single 
wrongdoer. The combination of conversations between the student and 
his professor, extracts from interviews as well as documents and some 
theoretical reflections do not build up to one single explanation. Instead, 
most remarkably, in the end the technology (Aramis) itself explains what 
happened to it. Perspectives are constantly shifting to make it clear that 
there is no such thing as one final truth when one tries to understand 
the failure of a complex technology project. In a detective novel the 
murderer is always revealed in the end, but at the end of his book Latour 
leaves his readers perplexed and wondering: Who did it? The answer is: 
nobody knows, not even the researchers. Actor-network theory does not 
aim to create an overarching explanation. It ‘just’ tries to carefully map 
the complexities of the real world by appreciating rich concepts and 
social practices. The failure or success of the technology is just an effect 
of the actor-network, not the fault of one actor or another. 
In an interview, Latour explains that his long-term ambition is to 
investigate ‘truth-production sites’ that make up our modern civilisation 
in order to appreciate the diversity of reality (Crease, Ihde, Jensen, & 
Selinger, 2003). Blok & Jensen observe that Latour seeks to ‘... expand 
our sense of reality, to increase our respect for the diversity of realities, 
while refusing to acknowledge that ‘Reality’ (with a capital R) should 
count as a final, definitive statement. Here, reality is indeed political, 
since realities are constantly being created and re-created, and may 
thus potentially be practiced in novel ways’ (Blok & Jensen, 2011, p. 24). 
Latour reveals that it makes more sense to focus on practices in which 
‘truths’ are produced, for ultimately validation is a human activity. 
In this book I explore—with the help of Bruno Latour’s vocabulary—
how the historical, social and political context affects how military 
training simulators are validated. I want to examine how the training 
simulator becomes valid. 
Design of case study
For Latour, the validity of a military training simulator would be an 
‘effect’ of the actor-network. It is this, the making of validity, that I will 
investigate in this case study. Therefore I will rely on Latour’s vocabulary 
and approach (Latour, 2005). In this section I will discuss the design of 
my explorative case study. 
Latour’s research approach can be summarized into five guidelines: 
‘follow the connections’, ‘go slow’, ‘look close’, ‘don’t jump’ and ‘keep 
everything flat’ (Fioravanti & Velho, 2010). The rules indicate that there is 
not one single ‘good way’ to do research.13 Most importantly, a researcher 
must keep an open mind and follow the data that is presented by the 
actors. However, it is clear that the researcher should start by figuring 
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out who the actors are and how the actors are related to each other. 
The phrase ‘go slow’ means that this mapping process should be done 
carefully and that one should take the necessary time. Each actor is 
connected with other actors; some of them are highly visible while others 
are not. This is not a task to be taken lightly because the actor-network 
tends to grow exponentially. ‘Look close’ means that each actor has to 
be studied thoroughly. A detailed study of conceptual divisions helps 
the researcher to understand what is going on in the actor-network. 
One should especially focus on the concepts and instruments that the 
actor mobilizes and how the actor is maintaining its boundaries. The 
recommendations ‘don’t jump’ and ‘keep everything flat’ challenge the 
researcher to stay on a chosen path and not to jump from one actor to 
another. It is important to study each actor in a similar way, because in an 
actor-network one actor cannot be more important than another. Only 
the number of connections makes the actor ‘important’. There is no local 
or global level; there are only stronger and weaker connections. The 
strength of the connection determines the actual power and relevance 
of each actor. The actors that are more prominently present (i.e. many 
others point to them) are more powerful. Therefore, I started my research 
by carefully mapping actors and their relations. My point of departure 
was a training exercise where the Mobile Combat Training Centre was 
employed. I walked around, observed the training exercise and asked 
many people why the training simulator has taken its current shape and 
form. I followed the suggestions of the interviewees and met dozens 
of trainers, commanders, officers, manufacturers, procurement officers, 
managers, technicians and soldiers who have all played a role in the ‘life’ 
of the technical object. In this way I have investigated an interconnecting 
part of the military organisation. 
Central to my case study is the idea of exploration. The object of my 
study (the Mobile Combat Training Centre) is explored to find clues about 
how the validity of the training simulator is produced. This is especially 
interesting because the simulator’s referent is inherently virtual because 
‘hard data’ for comparison had to be constructed. During this exploration 
I noticed that the interviewees organized themselves in different ‘aspects’. 
Each aspect can be linked to a specific part of history of the training 
simulator. This history helped to shape my research approach. By 
following the actors it was inevitable that I would also work my way back 
in time. Opening one black box often results in finding another black box 
to crack. In chapters four to seven of this case study I explore four aspects 
of validation. First, I explore how trainers and soldiers ‘accept’ the training 
simulator, I call that ‘practical validation’ (chapter 4); Second, I explore 
how civil servants of the procurement department have selected the 
‘best’ training simulator, I call that ‘Industrial validation’ (chapter 5); Third, I 
explore the military operational staff has ‘fitted’ the training simulator into 
the military training programs, I call that ‘Military validation’ (chapter 6); 
and four, I explore the political arena where the ‘relevance’ of simulation 
technology was debated, I call that ‘Political validation’ (chapter 7). 
Each aspect has a somewhat different take on how the military training 
simulator represents ‘reality’, but the different representations are also 
closely related to each other. For example, issues that arose in one 
situation were often settled in another situation. This forced me to retell 
the story from an a-historic perspective. I worked my way backward in time 
by going from actor to actor. Key players were identified and interviewed, 
including the overall project manager and his team (see appendix 
three ‘Resources’ for a detailed overview). More than forty officials were 
interviewed. The interviews lasted 90 minutes on average. Some officials 
were interviewed more than once. Most interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. I used a ‘denaturalistic’ method for the transcriptions, which 
means that pauses, noise, and interruptions are removed and grammar 
is corrected (Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 2005). The transcriptions resulted 
in texts that could be indexed and analysed. During the interviews I 
focussed on stories about the value of the military training simulator. I 
noted how the interviewees explained the simulator to me, and why they 
felt the training simulator was ‘realistic’ and ‘necessary’. I also asked them 
for referrals to other informants so that I could follow the actors. In this 
way I expanded the actor-network of the training simulator known as the 
Mobile Combat Training Centre. This process can also be described as 
snowballing. For almost a year I tried to follow the actors and visited many 
places where the Mobile Combat Training Centre was deployed. I was 
invited for an acceptance ceremony of the ‘mid-life update’ in Amersfoort 
and a demonstration of a new system in Marnehuizen. I attended many 
workshops on the validation of training simulators and I visited relevant 
conferences on military training simulators. 
Not only did I speak with people and study the simulator in action, but 
I also collected many papers and digital documents (e.g. database-
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files, PowerPoint slides, digital movies, photos, correspondence, 
project documentation, requirements, usage reports, technical reports, 
annual reports and product information). There are thousands of 
pages in total. Relevant paper documents were scanned and indexed. 
Some digital documents were made available by the interviewees, 
but most studies and reports were collected at the national archive in 
The Hague. I screened the data on confidentiality issues. No technical 
information about weapon systems or commercial information about 
companies is published in this book except for when the information 
was already available in public sources (e.g. internet, military journals, 
national archive, parliamentary letters). A special mention deserves 
the magazine Militaire Spectator. This is a monthly magazine by the  – 
roughly translated – ‘Royal association to support the development of 
war studies’. It publishes articles written mostly by military officers and 
military scholars who contemplate over modern military technologies, 
new military methods and military history. Every high-ranking officer 
receives a free copy. It is probably the oldest magazine in the Dutch 
language while it was established in 1832. In every chapter I referred to 
one or more articles of this journal. I take it as reference for describing 
how certain topics are explained by soldiers to soldiers, or in Latours 
terminology as an inscription that can become an influential actor in the 
actor-network. I will explain that a bit further.
Documents have a special position in the work of Latour. He makes 
a distinction between inscriptions and representations. An inscription 
is a translation of a meaning from one medium to another or, to quote 
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, ‘an inscription device is any item of 
apparatus or particular configuration of such items which can transform 
a material substance into a figure or diagram which is directly usable 
by one of the members of the office space’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, 
p. 51). An inscription represents something; however, Latour’s point is 
that a representation can have many layers of inscription. He points to 
the process of making the inscription. For example, a simulation of an 
airplane can be considered a representation of an airplane. However, 
it took a lot of work to make this simulation, and many decisions were 
made along the way. Latour argues that one should try to understand 
how the representation is produced through its inscriptions.  
Many of the documents that I used (e.g. accountant reports, technical 
data, usage data) can be seen as inscription devices set up to support 
a certain argument. The inscription devices themselves can become 
important actors and they certainly were in my research. The inscriptions 
were often a starting point in my data analysis because the interviewees 
referred to them quite regularly. 
I should note that I am responsible for the translations of the 
documents and the transcripts from Dutch to English. In most cases I 
tried to translate the text in such a way that it would be understandable 
in English. I focussed on the meaning of the text instead of trying to 
translate it literally. If I used pictures or diagrams, I tried to use the 
version taken from the original document. These versions are mostly 
in Dutch, but I included the translation in the explanatory text or, when 
necessary, in a footnote.  
Conclusion
Latour encourages researchers to keep the actor-network flat and to 
avoid abstractions or vague concepts. Thus I try to develop insightful 
and interesting descriptions that should clarify how soldiers construct 
their world and produce ‘reality’. However, this approach has two major 
drawbacks that are typical for actor-network studies.
The first drawback is the question: Where does the network of actors 
end? For example, one of my interviewees mentioned that the Mobile 
Combat Training Centre could be linked with a sophisticated medical 
system. This opened the door for a new line of enquiry. I tried to find out 
more about the medical system: Who is responsible for it? What does it 
do? Who built it? And so on. As one can imagine, this line of questioning 
creates a large network. It is impossible to strive for completeness. 
Every black box seems to hide many other black boxes. Should the 
uniforms that soldiers wear be part of the analysis? Do the buildings 
where the interviews took place play a role in the network? Although 
both affect the actor-network, describing everything would make it 
impossible to complete the analysis. Some decisions, therefore, had to 
be made to define a border. This research project focuses on the Mobile 
Combat Training Centre. Every conversation, every document and every 
observation is part of that hybrid actor-network, consisting of people 
and things. 
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The second drawback involved determining how to map the ordering 
process of the actor-network. In other words, Where should I start? I 
decided to take the obvious way in and chose to use a chronological 
organisation. A time line is used to structure the ‘life cycle’ of the Mobile 
Combat Training Centre. Although time is a quite problematic concept in 
actor-networks (Latour, 1999, p. 145), it helps to make the configuration 
process explicit. The chronological approach of my study helped me to 
identify different sets of actors. Over a longer period of time new actors 
are introduced in the actor-network and other actors are disconnected. 
Once the ‘procurement phase’ was completed, the operational officers 
were ‘disenrolled’ and the engineers of the manufacturer were ‘enrolled’. 
This enrolment and disenrolment of actors is used to structure my study.
In Figure 1 I sketch the structure of the case studies. The figure presents 
a quick overview of the actors I studied, the resources I used, the research 
methods I mobilized and the components of the Mobile Combat Training 
Center that I scrutinized. This overview links this with the overall research 
question of each aspect of validation that is under consideration and 
provides an indication of the time-period when the actors were enrolled in 
the actor-network. The unit of analysis focuses on production of validity in 
these different time-periods. The introduction of each chapter will discuss 
these matters in more detail.
I will attempt to present the four aspects of validation as explorations. 
Thus, each chapter starts with an introduction, in which the scope and 
aim of the chapter is discussed. I will relate the case to a specific aspect 
of validation. Then I will explore the data and try to understand how 
‘validity’ is produced by this specific set of actors. In the analysis, I will 
relate my findings to the relevant body of literature. Thus I will try to keep 
my descriptions of practices separate from the analysis, a practice that 
is quite common in case studies in Science and Technology Studies, 
see for example: (Ganzevles, 2007; Steen, 2008). After I have discussed 
four aspects of validation, separately, I will analyse the four explorations 
together in chapter eight. This creates a cross-case study, in which I relate 
my findings to the concept of validation. 
Case Study: 
How actors  
inscribe interests 
and create truth?
Chapter 4 5 6 7
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Chapter 4. Practical Validation
Introduction
In the introduction, I explained that concerns about simulations are 
mainly focussed on the accuracy of the representation of the ‘real’ 
phenomena. Accuracy is important because inaccurate models can lead 
to wrong decisions and undesired effects. I wondered, however, how the 
accuracy of the representation is established without ‘hard data’ about 
the ‘real’ phenomena. In chapter two I also explained that simulationists 
currently understand validation mainly as making a statistically sound 
comparison between data of the ‘real’ phenomena and data of the 
model. If they match, within certain parameters, the simulation should be 
valid. I argued that this understanding of validity is rather problematic. 
Thereafter I proposed to study the validation of a training simulator in 
practice. 
In this chapter, I will zoom in on the place where soldiers, trainers 
and developers meet. One would expect that this is where the 
ultimate validation of the training simulator takes place. However, I will 
demonstrate that the training simulator enforces an ideology of ‘mastery 
and control’ that always can be improved. In that sense, the training 
simulator is in constant transformation, making the question of validation 
rather difficult to answer. I will even take the argument one step further. 
I believe that constant transformation is necessary for the stability of 
the actor-network, and this brings us to the conclusion that validation is 
not about checking the accuracy of the simulation (by comparing two 
sets of data), but about creating ‘realities’ to enforce specific behaviour. 
As I will explain the Mobile Combat Training Centre has already in its 
implementation been black boxed. I will gradually open that black box. 
For this chapter I rely mainly on interviews with the project manager, 
two commanders of the Mobile Combat Training Centre and two 
military medical specialists. I also spoke with two engineers from 
the company that builds and maintains the Mobile Combat Training 
Centre and its components. Further, I was present at a training exercise 
and a demonstration of the medical treatment simulator. I studied 
technical documentation and PowerPoint presentations about the 
medical treatment simulator, prepared in the period from 2000 to 2008. 
Appendix three contains an overview of all the resources I used in this 
research. I checked with the interviewees that no sensitive military or 
commercial data was published.
In this chapter I start with a brief introduction of the claim that the 
training simulator is considered to be a great success. Then I will present 
my data in three paragraphs, in which I will study a specific element 
of the Mobile Combat Training Centre that is known as the medical 
treatment simulator. The medical treatment simulator was selected 
because it can be seen as the crucial part of the overall Mobile Combat 
Training Centre, because it models how the body of the soldier can 
become injured and should be treated. In this chapter I will discuss 
how the medical treatment simulator was originally conceived and how 
it was modified (model 1, 2 and 3). I will analyse this data by relating 
the modifications of the medical treatment simulator with its aim of 
improving the simulator’s ‘realistic circumstances’. Finally, I will explain 
what this discussion means for our conception of validation.
Successful introduction of the Mobile Combat  
Training Centre 
The new Mobile Combat Training Centre was received as a great success 
because it could provide more realistic military training. Its introduction 
was portrayed in two important news outlets of the Ministry of Defence: 
the monthly magazine of the 13 Mechanized Brigade De Bizon and the 
weekly newspaper of the communication department of the Ministry of 
Defence Defensiekrant. The success of the new training simulator was 
presented as a matter of fact: Mobile Combat Training Centre replaces 
MILES14 (“Combat Manoevre Training Centre (MCTC) vervangt Miles,” 
2003) and The Mobile Combat Training Centre is ready for deployment 
(Twigt, 2003). The magazine De Bizon had the scoop because the 13 
Mechanized Brigade was involved in the final test of the training simulator 
and could therefore write about their experiences as first ‘users’. The 
Defensiekrant focussed mainly on the official ‘signing ceremony’. In the 
signing ceremony, the manufacturer Saab Training Systems symbolically 
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handed the system over to the Training Centre for Manoeuvre.15 
Interestingly, both articles compared the features of the new Mobile 
Combat Training Centre with the Combat Manoeuvre Training Centre 
(CMTC) of the U.S. Army located in Hohenfels, Germany.16 Both articles 
emphasised that the Mobile Combat Training Centre was a much more 
advanced system than its American counterpart. Many arguments were 
given, but I will discuss only three.
First, the Dutch simulator can employ more types of weapon systems. 
In De Bizon Captain De Jong, the commander of the new training 
simulator, explains this feature: ‘MCTC consists of computer chips 
that are physically connected with the weapon systems. The chips are 
programmed with the specific capabilities of the weapon systems on 
which they are mounted. The soldier with a long distance rifle will be 
effective up to a 1000 meters, whereas a soldier with a Diemaco rifle 
strikes effectively up to 400 meters.’17 De Jong points out that every 
weapon type can be configured in the new system separately. The 
‘real’ capabilities of each weapon can be modelled, not only the small 
weapons but also the heavy armoury like the tanks. The new simulator 
enables the tank crew, for example, to choose between two types of 
ammunition: the brisance grenades for soft targets (non-armoured) and 
the high-energy shells for hard targets (armoured). The software of the 
training simulator makes this possible. Therefore, the representation of 
the weapons is, according to the articles, much more realistic. Second, 
the Mobile Combat Training Centre can define features of a specific 
weapon system and specify effects of the weapon systems in detail. In 
CMTC, every hit has the same effect. With MCTC, however, the exact 
location of the hit can be determined and its effect can be calculated. 
This is called a vulnerability model. The embedded software is able to 
establish whether a vehicle is terminated based on the precise location 
of the hit and the kind of ammunition. Therefore, whether a tank would 
be undamaged by a hit or taken out completely can now be established. 
CMTC was not able make that distinction, which is crucial especially 
for heavy weapon systems. The new features are presented as an 
improvement. The system does much more justice to the reality of war. 
Third, the system is also different for the dismounted soldier. CMTC lets 
the soldier know whether s/he is hit with a beeping sound. In the new 
system a female voice tells the soldier the nature of his injury.18 In CMTC 
the soldier was merely ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the training exercise.19 Now the 
injury can be much more differentiated. This differentiation is related 
to the vulnerability model of the weapon systems. The soldier is now 
someone who can be wounded and can undergo medical treatment. 
The new simulator not only trains military manoeuvres but medical 
activities as well. This is an important improvement and it is implied in 
the articles that this representation of battle is much more realistic.
The crucial claim is that the new training simulator models events 
in the battlefield in much more detail than a training exercise without 
the training simulator. Gunners in the tank can use different types of 
shells. The damage to the vehicle depends on the exact location of 
the hit. The simulator establishes the injury of the soldier. An accurate 
representation of the effects that weapons have is considered important 
for a meaningful evaluation of the training. During the training 
exercise the trainers in the so-called Tactical Analysis Facility (TAF) can 
follow every person and vehicle that is wirelessly connected with the 
central computer on a computer screen. This should make it possible 
to see whether the platoon makes the right decisions and whether 
the communication was effective. De Jong states that: ‘This system 
communicates with each and every individual. The system decides what 
actually happened. The system is relentless, so no more disagreements 
with the trainers [about the outcomes of a fight], which were common 
with MILES.’20 A good representation of the capabilities of the different 
weapons is seen as essential for a fair fight. The simulator calculates 
the outcomes of the battle and the trainers can use that information 
for the after-action reviews. The underlying assumption is that the 
training simulator must exactly model the events that occur in war. The 
positive assessment of the simulator is not debated in the articles. In 
the Defensiekrant of March 2008 General Middendorp explains that 
the Mobile Combat Training Centre, ‘… sees to it that military personal 
at all levels are confronted with a mirror. It doesn’t leave any room 
for discussions either. All activities are registered and shortcomings 
uncovered ruthlessly’21 (Santegoeds, 2008). The training simulator is 
considered a great success, but let’s take a closer look.
In the next three paragraphs I will explore in more depth an important 
feature of the training simulator: the medical treatment simulator. As 
I have explained the training simulator aims to simulate weapons and 
their effects. An effect of a weapon is that it can injure a soldier. So the 
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Mobile Combat Training Centre incorporates a model that simulates 
the vulnerability of the human body and how it can be treated. This 
component is one of the most celebrated components of the Mobile 
Combat Training Centre. In other words, soldiers can really shoot each 
other and the simulator ‘calculates’ who was hit and what injury s/he has. 
In this paragraph I open the first black box by tracing the development 
of the medical treatment simulator, which makes it possible for injured 
soldiers to receive medical treatment during the training exercise. 
Model 1: Treatment of the human body (Dec. 1999)
It is unclear where the idea for the medical treatment simulator came 
from but it received a most welcome reception by the military medical 
staff. The medical staff sometimes felt their expertise neglected in large 
military training exercises. In their opinion most commanders do not 
want to practice medical skills during large training exercises because 
they prefer to train tactical skills. When too many soldiers become 
wounded during a training exercise it puts high constraints on the 
prepared tactical military training scenario.
Figure 1: The soldier is outfitted with the instrumentation22 
(This image is reproduced with permission from Saab AB.)
Figure 1 is a photograph from a PowerPoint presentation used by the 
first commander of the Mobile Combat Training Centre.23 He used it 
to introduce the system to the troops. The photograph shows a soldier 
whom has a component of the simulator mounted to the end of his rifle. 
The rifle is loaded with blanks. When the soldier fires, the sound of the 
blank will trigger the component on the gun and send a laser signal. The 
photograph also shows that each of the soldiers is covered with detectors, 
16 detectors in total. The detectors are attached to the soldiers’ vest and 
helmet. Three areas on the body have detectors: the head (6 detectors), 
upper torso (6 detectors) and lower torso (4 detectors). If one of the 
detectors receives a clear laser signal, it will be registered as a hit. The 
information is sent automatically to the central computer in the Tactical 
Analysis Facility (TAF) somewhere in the training area. The following 
information is registered: who shot whom; the exact GPS location in the 
training area; the time of the event; the type of weapon that was used; the 
inflicted injury; and the radio communication of the troops. In an interview 
on June 4, 2008, the manufacturer explained to me that the footprint of 
the laser is typically a constant 0.5 metres for distances between 5 metres 
and the maximum range of the weapon, meaning that the hit of a laser 
light is typically a field with a radius of 0.5 metres.24 This field is a bit larger 
than the radium of a bullet (app. 0.5 cm) but ensures that the laser signal 








Figure 2: Treatment of wounded soldiers in training simulator
Figure 2 describes the information exchange process in more detail. 
It shows how a soldier becomes a patient and how patients should be 
handled. This figure is adapted from another PowerPoint slide from the 
DetectorLaser transmitter
84 85
same presentation as Figure 1. The vest that the soldier wears is the core 
of the system. The vest is approximately three kilograms in weight and 
it is known as the ‘personal detection device’ (PDD). The vest contains 
sophisticated microelectronics, a battery pack to power the systems, the 
detectors for the laser signals, a speaker for sending pre-programmed 
voice messages to the carrier, a system controller, a radio controller to 
exchange information with the tactical analysis facility in the training area 
and a GPS receiver to identify the soldier’s exact geographical location. 
The system controller is able to calculate the seriousness of the injury 
after a laser signal is detected. The outcome—the ‘state’ the soldier is in—is 
communicated to the soldier via a pre-recorded voice message. If the 
soldier is ‘hit’ s/he is unable to participate in the battle anymore because 
the laser transmitter on the rifle is automatically disabled. A timer starts to 
run and if the soldier does not receive any treatment within one hour his/
her status will change to ‘kill’. 
How is the injury calculated? To answer that question I have to dig 
even deeper in the controller. The Dutch Army is supposed to provide the 
software designer with information about the lethality rate of the weapons 
according to their manufacturers’ technical specification. An example of 
the kind of information that would be provided is shown in Table 1 below. 
If the laser mounted on a semi-automatic rifle (5.56mm) hits the detectors 
on the vest of an opponent, it will result in a 20% chance that the soldier 
will be ‘killed’ in action. In this case, there is an 80% chance that the shot 
will result in an injury. The specific injury is selected randomly from a list 
based on statistics provided by the Dutch Army, but it must fall within one 
of three categories: Wounded Walking, Wounded Sitting and Wounded 
Laying. The probabilities of the injuries are rather randomly configured 
(and should be provided by the Army according to Saab), but the logic 
is simple: a bigger bullet means a bigger change for a ‘kill’. Exact data 
based on statistical datasets is lacking but, according a medical specialist, 
they do not matter for the training of medical skills. The injury should just 
activate the medical treatment (Interview July 15th, 2009).
Ammunition Kill Probability Wounded Probability
5.56mm 20% 80%
7.62mm 30% 70%
Table 1: Vulnerability table for one-way simulator25 
Saab Training Systems facilitates fellow soldiers with the task of combat 
lifesaver (the right soldier in Figure 2), by giving them a handheld or 
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) that  communicates with the vest of the 
injured soldier. The combat lifesaver has additional training in medical 
treatment. If the combat lifesaver selects the correct treatment, then the 
status of the soldier will change from ‘wounded’ to ‘wounded treated’ 
(‘treatment 1’ in Figure 2). The combat lifesaver should also role-play the 
treatment on the patient with his medical kit (‘treatment 2’ in Figure 2). 
The idea of the developers was that if during a training exercise a soldier 
was shot the injured soldier would be treated two times. First s/he 
would select the appropriate treatment on the personal digital assistant 
and then s/he would perform the treatment on the wounded soldier 
by role-playing. Here we find a simulation (training simulator) within a 
simulation (role-playing) within a simulation (training exercise). That was 
the proposal of the manufacturer, but did the medical trainers accept it?
Model 2: Dynamics of the injured body (March 2005)
After the organizational unit responsible for medical training became 
involved in the development of the training simulator in 2002, they 
argued that the proposal of the developers hardly seemed to do justice 
to the complexities of medical treatment. In reality, the status of a patient 
is not fixed but is in constant flux. It changes over time and different 
medical treatments have different effects. Moreover, it is seldom the 
case that the combat lifesaver has just one patient. S/he must constantly 
move from one wounded soldier to another and set priorities. In 2002 
the medical trainers formulated a statement in which they emphasized 
the relevance of the ‘medical treatment simulator’ and a ‘dynamic patient 
model’. I will start with a short excerpt of the (draft) statement of need of 
the Medical treatment simulator, dated October 8th, 2002 (Ministerie van 
Defensie, 2002).
‘The purpose of the MCTC is to support training sessions in such a way 
that commanders are confronted, as realistically as possible, with the 
results of the execution of their assignment. The imitation of reality is 
obtained by the use of advanced means based on a certain standards. 
An average effect on personnel and/or material is generated by these 
means. The operational medical appearance within the battalion 
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must be carried out as realistically as possible. Besides the individual 
qualities in the field of partial acts, such as applying a specific 
bandage or administering medication, the coherence of the complete 
treatment of injured people is of primary importance in the military 
medical care system. A system to achieve this is necessary; it should 
include a patient model so that decisions can be made about medical 
examinations and treatments. It should also be possible to take the 
patient model to the next echelon. This model should have realistic 
values based on the medical acts carried out.’26
The statement expresses the importance of having soldiers do the 
medical treatments in way that is as realistic as possible. It also explains 
that the individual medical treatment is just a small part of the whole 
military medical story. The full story involves the logistics of the wounded 
patients. For example, as different helpers will probably treat a patient, 
s/he should be transferable from helper to helper. The document 
mentioned above includes a scheme that I have simplified for the 
purpose of this chapter in Figure 3. This scheme lays out the process 
for treating wounded soldiers. I will explain it briefly. In the picture on 
the left, a soldier is injured in battle. First and foremost, the soldier is 
trained to help himself (first aid). However, if the soldier is not able to 
treat himself sufficiently a colleague is supposed to help. At least one of 
his teammates—the combat lifesaver—has additional medical training and 
the means to help the injured soldier. That moment is labelled as ‘role 
0’ in the military health care system. If the injury is serious, the wounded 
soldier has to be called in, and this must happen within 15 minutes. The 
logistical system aims to have the (seriously) wounded soldier treated 
within an hour by a special military assistant from the medical transport 
unit (‘role 1’). This hour is called ‘the golden hour’ because military 
experience dictates that receiving medical attention within this period is 










Figure 3: Roles in military health care system in battle
All sorts of information about the patient and different treatments 
needed therefore to be built into the simulator. The injury is randomly 
generated from a limited list of possible injuries: wounded walking 
becomes, for example, ‘deep cut in right hand’. The handheld (PDA) 
provides standard information about the health status of the patient and 
based on this information the combat lifesaver can decide what to do. 
The possible options in the menu of the handheld (PDA) include further 
examination or treatment. The combat lifesaver selects a treatment, and 
the program communicates the new status to the vest of the wounded 
soldier. The time that the treatment takes is determined by the system 
so that the combat lifesaver can perform the treatment on the wounded 
soldier physically (e.g. put the bandages on). The idea is that a medical 
trainer oversees the treatment so that later it can be established whether 
the treatment was performed correctly. If the combat lifesaver performs 
the right treatment, the soldier will receive the status ‘wound treated’, 
but will not be able to continue with the training exercise. If wrong 
treatments are selected, then the soldier will eventually receive the 
message ‘killed’. A virtual ‘medical kit’ was included in the program, 
restricting the number of treatments that can be done, to simulate the 
constraints in a ‘real’ war. 
If the patient is wounded severely and cannot be treated by the 
combat lifesaver, the transport team should be called in within 15 
minutes (role 1). The transport team should attend to the patient within 
an hour. The transport team can perform more advanced medical 
treatments than the combat lifesaver and take the patient to the 
medical field post (role 2) and/or field hospital (role 3). In both roles, 
additional medical facilities are present and at the field hospital a medical 
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doctor is also present. Thus the military medical trainers are trying to 
address not only the treatment of the individual wounded soldiers, 
but also the logistics of treating numerous wounded soldiers and the 
coordination between different roles. This is the logistical perspective 
on the wounded soldiers. The dynamic patient model enforced the 
military medical staff to work with the changing conditions of the 
soldiers. Therefore in their proposal, military medical staff emphasised 
the ‘representation of realistic values’ for effective training. But how did 
these modifications work out?
Retired captain De Jong told me that the training simulator was 
very positively received by its potential users. In fact, he states, ‘When 
I presented the functionalities of the duel simulator everybody was 
impressed, but when I demonstrated the medical treatment simulator 
everyone was stunned. This system was fantastic!’27 At the beginning 
of 2003 a total of 120 handhelds were prepared for a training exercise. 
The military medical trainers were convinced that effective training for 
medical treatment was only possible with a dynamic patient model. 
Without this model, the combat lifesaver and other medical specialists 
would not receive the same feedback as they would when a ‘real’ 
patient was treated. Mistakes in treatments would now become visible. 
The dynamic patient model offered the military medical trainers a new 
tool. Training for medical skills was often not really integrated into large 
training exercises because of the organizational difficulty they involve; 
commanders were not willing to set aside many soldiers because that 
would harm the training for the tactical operations. Moreover, many 
believe that the soldiers do not learn anything when they are ‘wounded’ 
and waiting for treatment. A non-commissioned medical officer stated 
on May 29th, 2008, ‘We are always an unwelcome party. Manoeuvre 
wants to do its own things and does not want to pay too much attention 
to medical issues. But thankfully this attitude is changing slowly, 
especially since we have participated in quite a few military missions 
abroad.’28  
Now let’s look at the statistics. The usage of the military training 
simulator is well documented. I studied the progress reports from 2003 
to 2008 and I found only one instance in which the medical training 
simulator was used. The manufacturer wrote in the quarterly progress 
report of the first quarter in 2005: 
‘For the first time the Medical Treatment Simulator (MTS) was issued 
during an exercise. In total 29 MTSs were issued and the usage was 
then monitored by a team of Medic OTs. When interviewing the OTs 
after the exercise they were in general positive and were also happy 
to see that they actually could track injuries and the corresponding 
treatments all the way up in EXCON. The observations lead to a 
list of proposed changes that they would like to discuss. One of 
them is to be able to see all examinations performed by the MTS in 
EXCON.’29
Apparently, the medical trainers have pointed out to the manufacturer 
that they would like to be able to trace the selected treatments from 
a distance at the Tactical Analysis Facility (i.e. EXCON). The medical 
trainers would like to know what the soldiers are doing without actually 
being physically there. According to the progress reports, after this 
rather positive result, the medical treatment simulator was not used 
anymore. As happy as the medical trainers seemed to be with the new 
system, the ‘real’ users did not use the system in training exercises. Here 
we see a difference in interests becoming visible between ‘trainers’ and 
‘users’. It soon became clear that in the reality of the military training, the 
medical treatment simulator did not achieve what the trainers intended. 
A non-commissioned medical officer stated on May 29th, 2008: 
‘During the training exercise it was cold and snowing. The combat 
lifesaver and the wounded soldier sought a nice warm place in the 
car to do the treatment. That was not what we wanted. We wanted 
to ‘train as you fight’. We wanted people to do medical things. We 
wanted the treatment to be done, as it should be. We wanted that 
they applied first aid, to act as they would in reality. Now we had this 
sophisticated medical system, but it didn’t work in practice.’30 
From a distant computer screen (in TAF) it looked like the patient was 
receiving the proper treatment, but it was not visible that the patient 
and the combat lifesaver (a fellow soldier) had moved to the comfort 
of a warm vehicle and were simply pressing buttons. Moreover, some 
technical issues did not help either. There were problems involving the 
connectivity of the handheld (PDA) with the vest. The handheld (PDA) is 
a wireless system that should be held close to the vest when a treatment 
is selected (see Figure 4). The handheld (PDA) did not work as easily 
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as everyone had expected. It was very difficult to transfer the data after 
each step. There were other problems involving the handheld (PDA) 
itself. It was a great toy and could be used for playing computer games 
during the long waits that often happen when participating in a training 
exercise. Thus when the handheld (PDA) was needed the battery was 
often empty. 
Figure 4: The handheld (PDA) in action31  
(This image is reproduced with permission from Saab AB.)
It took the unit responsible for medical training some time to figure 
out what had gone wrong. The soldiers just behaved like soldiers, but 
that was not what was desired of them. The soldiers required further 
‘configuration’ (Grint & Woolgar, 1997). The soldiers needed some 
disciplining by pointing to their professional attitude and they needed to 
be watched more closely. The medical trainers also figured out that there 
was an ‘inscribed’ design flaw in the system. ‘Inscribed’ means that the 
tool enforces a certain perspective, which is - in this case - not desirable to 
achieve the overall training aims. The current system trains the individual 
soldier to administer a medical treatment. However, the purpose of the 
overarching training simulator Mobile Combat Training Centre is to train 
different units in a company and/or battalion to work together. It is mainly 
focussed on training soldiers in tactical operations and command & 
control.32 From a military perspective, these are two different skillsets. The 
medical treatment simulator is too much oriented to teaching individual 
skills. While the Mobile Combat Training Center’s main focus is to train 
tactical operations: so tactical movements of troops and in this case the 
logistics of wounded soldiers should have been much more prominent. 
Thus the unit responsible for medical training, proposed a new medical 
treatment simulator that was primarily focussed on the logistical aspect. 
The focus was no longer on the individual medical treatment itself but 
instead on starting medical treatment and tracking the logistics of the 
wounded soldiers. The current system was clearly not ‘working’, but what 
should the new system look like?
Model 3: Logistics of the injured bodies (May 2008)
In a PowerPoint presentation regarding the difficulties of the current 
medical treatment simulator, which was given by a medical officer in 
May 29th, 2008, a new approach was proposed.33 Now the detailed 
dynamic patient model was seen as a problem. The software was 
suited for use in classrooms. It was too sophisticated. Perhaps the 
dynamic representation of the patient was too complex for usage on 
the battlefield. Too often information had to be exchanged between 
the vest of the soldier and the handheld (PDA). The restrictions created 
by the virtual medical kit were also problematic. Refilling disturbs the 
medical activities. But more importantly, the duration of the treatment 
and the time that a wounded soldier was attended by a medical official 
was not visible in the Tactical Analysis Facility. A drastic redesign was 
proposed. The dynamic patient model and the virtual medical kit had 
to be discarded. The new system should focus on the logistics of the 
wounded soldier. It must show how much time it takes to attend to a 
wounded soldier, how long it takes the medical transport troops to 
arrive, and so on. The information should be available for the medical 
analyst’s evaluation in the Tactical Analysis Facility. Table 2 shows what 
should be visible for each event.
PEL GNKAFVGP BHP
CLS/PTLS PTLS/AMV AMV/ARTS
Wie: Tijd gw: start stop start stop start stop
Naam, (eenheid) 08:20 08:25 08:35 08:35 09:00 09:15 10:00
Table 2: Medical information for each event (source: presentation May 29th, 2008, slide 11)
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The table represents the logistics of wounded soldiers as discussed in 
Figure 3. It ensures that as many soldiers are treated as possible. The 
process begins when a soldier is hit and gets the status ‘wounded’. In the 
table, this occurs at 8.20 hours. A ‘life clock’ starts running and the patient 
should be treated within a certain time. The first responsibility of the 
soldier is to help himself. If he is not able to do that, the combat lifesaver 
(CLS) will attend his wound. In the table one can see that the CLS arrives 
at 8.25 and completes the treatment at 8.35 when the medical support 
team arrives. The medical support team (GNKAFVGP) starts treating the 
wounded soldier at 8.35 and takes him to a medical field post where they 
arrive at 9.00. After a wait of 15 minutes (9.15) the nurse (AMV) or doctor 
(ARTS) attends the wounded soldier and treats him for 45 minutes (10.00). 
As one can see, the main focus in the new system is obtaining information 
about the flow of patients in the medical health care system. For 
evaluation purposes it should now be possible to generate information 
such as the number of soldiers killed in action, the number of wounded 
soldiers, and the number of soldiers who have died while in the military 
health care system. 
The proposed medical treatment simulator is a tool to activate medical 
treatment and measure the performance of the medical logistical chain. 
The efficiency of the chain can be tracked in real-time from a distance 
at the Tactical Analysis Facility (by the medical analyst). The central unit 
monitors the whole training exercise and prepares the after-action 
reviews. Not only has the distance from the patients grown, but also the 
distance from the medics. As the commander of the MCTC puts it: 
‘MTS has now – more or less – become a system of control procedures. 
The system was developed for the Combat Life Saver. He had to enter 
his actions in the system after which the chap could be stabilized. In 
case he would not follow the proper procedure the patient would 
be proclaimed dead after an hour. For certain reasons we have 
abandoned the initial procedure.  From the patient first contact with 
the CLS we can check the measure taken and follow the procedure 
whether he will be on the doctors table in time. We can follow that 
process entirely. The system is extended with photos of the most 
frightful wounds inflicted upon a person. The system determines the 
nature of the wound involved and shows a photo relevant for the 
wound to treated.’34 
This is a rather significant shift from the perspective of system design. 
Model 2 trained soldiers to select the correct medical treatment. Model 
3 focussed on tracking the wounded soldier in the military health care 
system. The notion of a realistic medical system shifted from realistic 
patient behaviour to realistic behaviour of medical logistics. The 
manufacturer of the training simulator now offers both systems for sale, 
explaining that: ‘The MTS is based on a medical treatment database that 
allows the software to determine the seriousness of a soldier’s wound 
from the hit location and ammunition type. There is also a version that 
takes into consideration the time from being wounded to examination’ 
(SAAB, 2013).35 
Analysis
Above I have sketched the development of the medical treatment 
simulator. First, a medical treatment simulator was proposed that could 
‘reset’ the injured soldier when the proper cure was selected on a 
handheld computer (model 1). The trainers did not accept this system 
because it was not sufficiently ‘realistic’. A modification was developed: a 
dynamic patient model that could respond immediately to the treatment 
of the patient (model 2). The soldiers did not accept this system because 
it involved too much hassle. Therefore, a third model was proposed. The 
dynamic patient model was replaced with a tracking & tracing system 
(model 3). Now every wounded soldier can be followed from a distance 
using the Tactical Analysis Facility. According to the medical trainer in an 
interview on May 29th, 2008, every model ‘comes closer to the reality’ of 
the military medical training. The first model allowed a hit to trigger the 
medical treatment. The second model trained the soldiers in individual 
medical treatment. The third and current model trains soldiers in the 
logistics involved with wounded soldiers on the battlefield. The medical 
treatment simulator encapsulates many choices about what should be 
modelled and what should not. Latour would say that actors ‘inscribed’ 
or ‘delegated’ their interests in the medical treatment simulator. 
Madeleine Akrich would talk about ‘scripts’ that enforce specific human 
behaviour (Akrich, 1992). Arie Rip and Harro van Lente would mention 
‘prospective structure’, technology ‘[i]t is the content of orientations 
and scripts which pulls actors together and which, when they enact 
appropriate strategies, generates a structure which shapes further 
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actions’ (Lente & Rip, 1998, p. 204). The common idea is that technology 
embeds certain choices and perspectives that are not easily to see. Let 
me discuss the interests that were inscribed and the aspects that were 
silenced.
Modern technology emphasises ‘immediacy of use, constant 
availability and the easing of effort. Modern technology re-presents 
actions in space and time according to an economics of mastery and 
control’ (Cooper, 1993). The economics of mastery and control refer to 
Michel Foucault’s conception of the panopticum. The panopticum is a 
design of a prison where the entire inmate population can be watched 
from a central tower. Because the prisoners do not know when they are 
watched, they behave as they should. Foucault calls this the power of 
self-disciplining. The training simulator has a comparable effect. The 
trainers can watch—from a distance—the soldiers doing their work. The 
soldiers do not know when they are being watched, but they do know 
that everything is recorded and can be watched whenever the trainers 
see fit. Thus the technology of the training simulator is also a technology 
for mastery and control. This technology for mastery and control also 
brings great responsibility. Simon Lilley, Geoff Lightfoot and Paulo Amaral 
argue that failure to achieve the desired mastery and control is clearly 
either a problem for the developer and/or for the user (Lilley, Lightfoot, & 
Amaral, 2004, p. 103). At least one of them should be held accountable for 
achieving it. Therefore, two kinds of accountabilities should be identified: 
the developer is accountable for establishing the potential for mastery 
and control. The user is responsible for realizing that potential (emphasis 
by Lilley et al). This brings us to the following question: How can these two 
kinds of accountability explain how the training simulator becomes ‘valid’? 
Let’s take a look at model 1. The proposal of the developers presents 
a representation of injuries per type of bullet (Table 1). The developers 
claimed that this is a realistic representation of the cause of soldiers’ 
injuries. The Dutch Army were to provide the ‘real’ data. But it is not clear 
whether this data actually existed. Table 1 only shows a relation between 
the type of bullet and the chance of suffering an injury. This is a highly 
idealized notion of injuries. Where the bullet strikes the human body, for 
example, does not seem to matter. The distance and angle from where 
the bullet is shot is also not relevant in this model. Last but not least, the 
model disregards the pain the injury would cause the soldier. The trainers 
tell me, however, that the ‘real’ cause of the injury does not matter at all. 
‘At that moment the wounded soldier is only an aid to learning, a tool 
to let management data come to the surface, to put it disrespectfully. 
A tool to generate management data and nothing more. Just like a 
blackboard or whatever ... It sounds disrespectful ... but it is nothing 
more than a tool to acquire information.’36
According to the trainer, the injured soldier should activate another 
soldier to treat him or her, promptly. In this way, the soldiers learn to 
trust the military health care system. In the same interview the trainer 
states: ‘If the soldiers did not trust the military health care system they 
will not go on missions’.37 Soldiers must believe that they are in control 
otherwise they will not go into combat. They must learn that it is possible 
to ‘complete a mission’ and ‘win’ (Blackmore, 2005, p. 16). Therefore, 
in military training, the medical complexity must be reduced to such 
an extent that the soldier can believe that he/she is in control. The 
representation of the injury is simplified greatly in Table 1. For example, 
in 1990 general practitioner Crucq published an article in the Military 
Spectator on the injuries that can be caused by bullets. His aim was 
to develop a ‘stochastic computer model of wound ballistics’ (Crucq, 
1990). In his article he describes in great detail the entry of a bullet into 
human flesh: ‘That’s why a tensity in the tissue where the bullet entered 
the body will be developed which may lead to a rupture when a certain 
threshold is crossed. It will be clear that organs with a greater elasticity 
such as muscle tissue, will be in a better position to endure the bullet’s 
change of location than the less elastic, for example, liver or spleen.’38 
The more harmful effects of bullets are caused by some additional 
mechanics, such as deformation of the tip of the bullet, or fragmentation 
in which the bullet splinters into small pieces.39 The representation 
of the injury in Table 1, however, is just a matter of chance, implicitly 
introducing a distinction between ‘non-treatable’ and ‘treatable’ injuries. 
Treatable injuries are preferred in order to develop the soldiers’ medical 
skills. More importantly the cleanliness of the laser takes away the cruelty 
of war and enforces the idea of control. But that was not enough.
The trainers liked the idea of staying in control. The training simulator 
would generate injured soldiers, which would offer rich opportunities 
to improve medical training. However, the mastery and control of the 
training was not sufficient. The soldiers were able to treat each other with 
the new system, but the medical trainers found the representation of 
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the injured soldier to be ‘unrealistic’. They pointed out that the training 
hardly does justice to the complexities of military medical treatment. 
The developers assumed that any medical treatment would be okay, but 
they did not count on the harsh military conditions in which a soldier 
has to be treated. The combat lifesaver (the soldier with some additional 
medical skills) is not just treating one wounded soldier, but often more 
than one at the same time at different locations. Moreover, the medical 
supplies are very restricted and the soldiers must communicate with 
the medical support team, somewhere in the training area. The medical 
trainers wanted to factor these aspects into the medical training as 
well. The proposed modifications resulted in model 2. In this model the 
injured soldier becomes a patient that responds to medical treatments. 
The patient can be cured or—if he/she does not receive the proper 
treatment—the medical condition will worsen. In model 2, the medical 
treatment simulator takes over the role of the trainer. The soldier selects 
a medical test and after that a treatment, the system responds by updating 
the injured soldier’s medical condition (e.g. stable, better or worse). This 
can be seen as the delegation of medical training from the trainer to the 
handheld (PDA). Now the medical trainer can be everywhere the handheld 
(PDA) is. The treatment activities that are selected on the handheld (PDA) 
are recorded and can be evaluated later. The soldier was expected to not 
only select the treatment on the handheld (PDA), but also perform the 
‘real’ treatment on the wounded soldier by role-playing. Here we find a 
simulation (training simulator) within a simulation (role-playing) within a 
simulation (training exercise). This is a nice illustration of Jean Baudrillard’s 
remark that ‘Simulations will always be by-passed, confounded and 
exceeded by practical experience’ ((Baudrillard, 1995b) quoted by (Lilley et 
al., 2004, p. 107)).
Model 2 gave the trainers the opportunity to virtually multiply 
themselves in the training. Every handheld (PDA) was a surrogate trainer. 
However, the soldiers had to play along and often they didn’t. The soldiers 
are powerful actors too. Here again we see a clash between the potential 
for mastery and control and the realization of it. The trainers see the non-
use of the handheld (PDA) as their problem, and no longer the problem 
of the developers of the system. The developers promised the potential 
of mastery and control. They delivered the system. Now it is the task of 
the trainers to realize that potential. The developers saw the trainers as 
spokespersons for the military organization. The soldiers, however, were 
not as easy to handle. They needed some ‘configuration’ (Woolgar, 1991). 
Steve Woolgar had noticed that developers have certain expectations 
of ‘users’ of information systems. The users are not just ‘themselves’ but 
should behave according to some guidelines. For example, they should 
read the user’s manual carefully, or they should be serious when performing 
a task. Trainers (and developers) have a similar set of expectations of the 
soldiers. The trainers were very surprised when the soldiers did not act 
‘professionally’ and when they used the handheld (PDA) to play computer 
games. The soldiers even sought a warm place in a car to so-called treat the 
wounded: ‘That was not what we wanted.’40 Not only did the soldiers require 
additional configuration, but the handheld (PDA) also needed adjustment, 
as it was not very cooperative either. The wireless communication with the 
vest (processor) of the (wounded) soldier did not work as seamlessly as 
the trainers envisioned. The technology resisted, so to speak. The trainers’ 
mastery and control of the soldiers and technology (and therefore the 
training exercise) had apparently reached a limit. A new configuration was 
required that mobilized even more actors. 
Model 3 focused on the logistics of the wounded soldiers or, as 
the trainers called it, the military health care system. Many more actors 
become visible: the medical transport, the different health facilities, 
the procedures for treating the wounded and the compliance to these 
procedures. Now the commander (of the soldiers) who is in charge 
of the training exercise receives feedback on how well his units take 
care of the wounded. It was not about the skills of the individual 
soldier anymore, but about the skills of the commander to manage 
the logistics of wounded soldiers. The potential of mastery and control 
had now extended from the individual medical skills of the soldiers to 
the management skills of the commander who should make proper 
arrangements for wounded soldiers.41 





Model 2 - 3
Figure 5: Transfer of interests
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In Figure 5 I sketch how accountability was transferred from one actor to 
another. The developers were able to promise the trainers mastery and 
control (model 1). The trainers negotiated about the proposed system 
before accepting this accountability (model 2). However, after accepting 
accountability, they discovered that adjustments were necessary. These 
adjustments were negotiated with the soldiers that resulted in model 3, 
which enrolled even more actors (among them: commanding officers). 
The potential and realization of mastery and control can be understood 
as a relay race of accountability. Every actor tries to involve another and 
make it (partly) responsible for the realization of mastery and control. 
Conclusion
In this chapter I explored the development of the medical treatment 
simulator, which is a component of the Mobile Combat Training Centre. 
I have given an account of how this component was validated. My 
analysis suggests that validation is not ‘just’ an either/or judgement 
as I explained in chapter two. Validation is, in this case, typically the 
result of a negotiation between the actor that - in this case - promises 
mastery and control and the actor that is responsible for the realization 
of mastery and control. It is important to notice the seductive power 
of mastery and control. When the training simulator did not provide 
mastery and control, the training simulator was deemed ‘unrealistic’. It 
was not able to present a true picture of military medical treatments. This 
was considered an opportunity for further ‘improvement’. 
To use the terminology of Latour, I witnessed the expansion of an 
actor-network until it reached a temporary closure (black box). The 
actor-network is a hybrid because it enrols human and non-human 
actors. One dominant actor, the medical trainers, struggled to inscribe 
its interests in the actor-network. The trainers mobilized the developers 
to make new technologies available that are able to ‘configure’ the 
soldier (to train medical skills even when the trainers are not present). 
The new technology mediates between the soldier who is wounded and 
the soldier who administers the treatment. When this mediation did not 
result in the desired configuration, the medical trainers attempted to 
mobilise another powerful actor, the commander of the soldiers. One 
can say that the interests of the medical trainers did not survive the ‘trails 
of strength’ completely. The actor-network stayed partly in place, due to 
the prescribed configuration of the training exercise, but not all of the 
medical trainers’ interests (e.g. training medical skills) were adopted by 
the other actors. Mobilizing the commander of the soldiers seems to 
make sense because the commander’s interests connect well with the 
overall architecture of the training simulator (Mobile Combat Training 
Centre). Technology - a non-human actor - is a powerful ally to have.  
Especially because the training simulator is already seen as a ‘great 
success’ by the military organization because of the way it is embedded 
into military training exercises. In conclusion, the validity of the medical 
treatment simulator is an effect of a stable actor-network. As soon as the 
new configuration (model 3) is accepted by the actors, the logistics of 
the wounded soldier became ‘realistic’.42 
From this process of validation simulationists can learn that they 
should not focus on the purpose (or ‘intended use’) of the model. 
Validity is not an attribute of the model, but an attribute of the 
development process. For example, model 1 would be valid if it was 
perceived to force soldiers to perform exactly the same treatments as 
they should perform in battle situations. Our exploration of the medical 
treatment simulator showed that its purpose constantly shifted to 
achieve (better) ‘mastery and control’. It is in the (many) modifications 
of the medical treatment simulator that the simulation of the medical 
treatments became valid and ‘realistic’. In the next chapter, I will explore 
how the purpose (or ‘intended use’) is defined and can change during 






Chapter 5. Industrial Validation
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I have touched upon the relationship between 
validation and accountability. I argued that the validity of the training 
simulator is the result of a process of transformation and modification. 
Constant changes make validity not a feature of a given model, but 
the result of realization of interests. Thus a model only becomes valid 
after it has sufficiently enrolled the interests of the developers, trainers 
and soldiers, to mention just a few of the actors. Therefore a training 
simulator is not deemed ‘realistic’ because it is a copy of some original, 
but because it fits very well with the training structure, skills and 
technologies already accepted by the actors. 
In this chapter, I explore a new black box: the procurement 
department of the Ministry of Defence. Military procurement involves 
many sensitive activities in which the military organization buys items 
from civilian companies while preserving national interests at the 
same time. Much work is required to keep the boundary between the 
military and civil worlds in place. The challenge is to create a stable 
actor-network of military engineers and civil engineers. I describe the 
procurement of the Mobile Combat Training Centre that took place from 
1995 to 2000. During its procurement, the working name for this system 
was ‘duel simulator and instrumented training area’ or ‘duel simulator’ 
for short. I will use this name in this and the following chapters. The 
name expresses the type of training simulator that was desired. The 
requirement documents serve an important role in the procurement 
activity. They describe in high detail what the simulator should be able 
to do and thus they serve as a foundation for the military industry to 
develop their proposals. I will interpret the requirement documents as 
a ‘boundary object’ (Bowker & Star, 2000); that is, a special actor that 
is located in between the military and civil worlds. The requirement 
document is constantly renegotiated and has many functions: 
describing, prescribing, judging and auditing. I will explore how the 
requirements of the training simulator were validated. 
To gather information for this chapter, I have interviewed many employees 
in the procurement department and engineers working in the military 
industry (Saab Training Systems). I have also studied letters to Parliament 
about the procurement of the duel simulator, the underlying so-called 
DMP documents, and minutes of the committee preparing the documents 
(especially ACGOLM on April 17th, 1997) from 1995 to 2000. Appendix 
three contains a list of my informants at the procurement department 
(DMO) and operational units (CLAS). Digital libraries and the national 
archive publicly disclose the data I used.43
This chapter is divided into five parts. It starts with a rough sketch 
of the procurement procedure, explaining how it works and how it is 
executed according the Ministry of Defence. The second, third and fourth 
paragraphs explore how the core asset of the duel simulator, that is the 
requirements about ballistics, was developed in three stages. The fourth 
paragraph investigates the context of the three stages of requirements 
in more depth. In the conclusion of this chapter I will discuss how this 
exploration is relevant to my understanding of validation.
Selecting the best duel simulator
In this paragraph, I will discuss how the Ministry of Defence described 
the procurement procedure of the ‘duel simulator with instrumented 
training area’, which was the name of the procurement project. This project 
eventually led to the procurement of the system we know as the Mobile 
Combat Training Centre. I will use the more generic term ‘duel simulator’ 
throughout this and the next chapters for the purpose of readability. 
My aim is to explain the procurement procedure in some detail so I 
can discuss the representation of ballistics in depth in the next three 
paragraphs (versions 1, 2 and 3). The Defence Materiel-selection Process 
lays out how Parliament can control the expenditure of military funds 
by dividing the procurement into separate phases (Ministry of Defence, 
2007). In the case of the procurement of the duel simulator, the Defence 
Materiel-selection Process was divided into three phases: DMP A, DMP 
B/C and DMP D (Ministerie van Defensie, 1995a, 1998, 2000). 
DMP A. The first letter to Parliament was sent on March 25th, 1996 
on behalf of the State Secretary J.C. Gmelich Meijling (Kamerstuk II, 
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1995/96). It finalises the DMP-A phase. The letter described why a new 
training simulator was necessary. A working group that I will discuss in 
the next chapter had prepared this description. The letter states that, for 
example, ‘To achieve the degree of operational readiness, it’s essential 
for the military forces to train personnel as realistically as possible 
by using, among other things, simulators.’44 It is explained that the 
Army uses several of its own training simulators, but none of these are 
suitable to reproduce all the circumstances of battle. It is, for example, 
impossible to practise situations in which different weapon systems 
have to work together. However, new technological possibilities make it 
possible to train these aspects more realistically. New training simulators 
work with laser signals that can be linked with other technologies in 
the training area. This enables the simulation of the effects of artillery, 
biological, nuclear and chemical weapons and makes it possible to 
record the whole exercise. The duel simulator is needed for basic 
training and much more. The quantity of the equipment should be 
sufficient to outfit two teams (or companies) and their ‘enemy’. Numbers 
are not mentioned in the letter, but this means that approximately three 
thousand soldiers would need to be outfitted. The Ministry of Defence 
expects that the duel simulators will become more affordable in two 
years time, due to technological progress. The letter emphasises that 
these kinds of training simulators have led to drastic improvements 
in operational readiness of militaries in other countries. Thus, the first 
letter to Parliament makes it clear that a duel simulator is necessary 
for the Army. This argument was sufficient to satisfy the parliamentary 
committee on defence affairs. It did not require additional information so 
the State Secretary gave the ministry permission to start the next phase 
in the procurement. The project manager told me on June 16th, 2008 
that it seldom happens that a request of the Ministry of Defence for new 
material is refused at this stage.
DMP B/C. The second letter from the Ministry of Defence was sent 
two years later, on  September 1st, 1998 on behalf of the State Secretary 
H.A.L. Van Hoof (Kamerstuk II, 1997/98). This letter reiterates the 
purpose of the procurement project: increasing the readiness of the 
army by procuring a training simulator that is able to reproduce combat 
situations. Foreign countries experienced improvements in their armies’ 
military skills when they trained with a duel simulator. The letter informs 
the Parliament about the results of the DMP B/C phase, also known as 
the ‘study phase’. I will summarize three issues: 1) the number of sets 
that are required, 2) the availability of the training simulator on the 
marketplace and 3) international cooperation. 
It is argued that it would be wiser to put the duel simulator under 
the control of one central training facility instead of two operational 
organizational units.45 This would have great advantages for the 
management and maintenance of the training simulator. Only one 
complete set of instrumentation would be needed and not—as stated in 
the first letter—two sets. It is emphasized that this would not change the 
number of soldiers that can be trained with the simulator; its use would 
just be much more intensified. This reduction from two sets (equipment 
for app. 3,000 soldiers) to one set (equipment for app. 1,500 soldiers) 
would nevertheless not affect the estimated costs of the duel simulator. 
The cost of a single set is much higher than was estimated previously, so 
the required budget would remain unaffected. 
Another issue in the letter is the availability of the training simulator 
in ‘the marketplace’. If the marketplace cannot sell the required system, 
the Ministry of Defence cannot procure it. Therefore in the procurement 
procedure it is assessed whether the product is available, or as the 
project manager told me on June 16th, 2008, ‘One can say I need 
something that can dance, but if you do a feasibility study and cannot 
find a manufacturer to build such a thing, it isn’t realistic.’46 Therefore 
the letter explicitly mentions that the equipment can be obtained ‘off 
the shelf’ from at least nine companies. Further, the letter explains that 
two types of duel simulators are sold on the market: one-way and two-
way systems. Both systems will be taken into consideration because the 
technical differences do not seem to greatly affect the effectiveness of 
military training. Nine companies were able to submit an estimate of the 
costs. Three companies asked a much higher price than the budget of 
the project  could cover. Six companies offered a solution that was within 
the range of the budget, so the budget of 100 million guilders (app. 45 
million euro) could be sustained. It was still necessary to compare the 
costs of the exploitation of the simulator, the so-called life-cycle costs. 
Those are the costs that occur during its use. Not all of the companies 
had made this information available, yet. 
Unfortunately, international cooperation for the procurement did not 
seem feasible. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom did not have 
any surplus capacity available for the Dutch Army; therefore the Dutch 
Army must acquire sufficient equipment for training on a team level 
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(company-size) for itself. Training exercises on higher levels (battalion 
and up) could only be executed by hiring additional equipment. Only 
Norway and Canada were in the process of buying a duel simulator 
and were willing to exchange information. This cooperation was to be 
formalised in a memorandum of understanding. Belgium might take part 
in the procurement procedure but that would be a topic addressed in 
the next phase (DMP D).  Dutch industry could not deliver the required 
duel simulation but it could contribute certain parts of it. This would also 
be taken into account in the next phase. 
The second letter was sent to Parliament and, as usual in these 
matters, it did not raise any concerns. The State Secretary concluded that 
adequate technical and commercial possibilities are present to realise 
the project. The first deliverables can be expected in 2000. He gave 
permission to continue the procurement project.  
DMP D. Eighteen months later, the third and final letter was sent 
to Parliament on behalf of State Secretary H.A.L. Van Hoof on April 
14th, 2000 (Kamerstuk II, 1999/2000a). This letter completed the 
procurement phase. It restated that the duel simulator made it possible 
to practise under realistic circumstances and that it would improve the 
readiness of the Army. Organisational changes in the Army had led to 
the expectation that the duel simulator would be in high demand and 
that no surplus capacity would be left for other countries to use. The 
newly formed organizational unit ‘opleidings- en trainingscommando’ 
(OTC) would be responsible for the exploitation and maintenance 
of the simulator. Six companies were requested to submit a detailed 
proposal to deliver the duel simulator. The German company STN 
Atlas was, upon its own request, added to the list. The Israeli company 
Rafael did not submit a proposal. The six proposals were evaluated 
based on technical, commercial and financial aspects. The accountancy 
office of the Ministry of Defence was involved in the evaluation as 
well as the Dutch research institute TNO/FEL. The proposals of Saab 
Training Systems from Sweden and OSCMAR from New Zealand met 
all requirements and stayed within budget. The other companies: STN 
Atlas (GE), Lockheed Martin (US), Cubic Defence Systems (US) and 
Science Applications International Corporation (US) were either not 
able to meet all requirements or not able to do so within budget. The 
previous letter the Ministry of Defence had also promised to investigate 
international cooperation for the procurement of the duel simulator. 
Information was exchanged with Belgium, Canada, Finland and Norway. 
However, a memorandum of understanding was not signed because the 
procurement trajectory was delayed in the other countries. International 
cooperation did not go further than the exchange of information. It 
was proposed that the logistical support of the duel simulator would 
be outsourced. That means that transport of the duel simulator to the 
training area, its installation and maintenance, would be done by the 
industry (and not by the Army). Saab Training Systems’ proposal had 
the lowest investment costs (86 million guilders or app. 39 million euro) 
and also the lowest life-cycle costs (85 million guilders) for a period of 
five to ten years. Although the Dutch industry could not deliver such a 
training simulator, it would be involved in developing certain parts of 
the system. The Dutch companies Telpro+, Tedopres, Cap Gemini and 
Uniteam Transport Technology would participate. Logistical support 
would be provided by a Dutch subsidiary of Saab Training Systems 
b.v. and Schreiner Components b.v. The Ministry of Economical Affairs 
agreed to the proposals for financial compensation from Saab Training 
Systems. This means that Saab Training Systems had agreed to invest 
the same amount of money in the Dutch economy as it received from 
the contract with the Dutch Government. The State Secretary concluded 
that he would procure the duel simulator of Saab Training Systems and 
expected the first deliverables in 2001.
The account of the Ministry of Defence rationalised the decisions that 
were made about the training simulator and presented them as ‘settled’ 
or ‘a fait accompli’. The necessity of the training simulator became a ‘fact’ 
for the procurement department when the ‘statement of need’ written 
by the military staff was accepted by the State Secretary. Controversies 
amongst the military staff about the simulator were formally settled and 
taken out of sight. This is what Wiebe Bijker calls ‘closure’ (Bijker, 2006b) 
and Latour calls ‘black boxing’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1979). On April 21st, 
2008 the project manager of the procurement project told me that the 
operational need is ‘the trigger’ of the procurement project.47 Now the 
military training simulator was seen as a ‘thing’ that has to be bought. 
The procurement department within the Ministry of Defence became 
the leading actor—or in terms of Latour, the ‘spokesperson’—with the 
responsibility to come up with proposals from industry to deliver the 
desired system. The department had to follow a procedure that is laid 
out in the ‘Defence Materiel-selection Process’ (DMP) and documented 
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for industry in: (Ministry of Defence, 2007). This procedure is meant to 
make the purchase of new products ‘transparent’ and ‘controllable’ for 
Parliament. It contains safeguards to strengthen the national defence 
industry, preventing accusations of favouritism. The underlying idea is that 
tax money that is spent on military investments should flow back to the 
national economy and create jobs (Eekelen, 2005; Fuior & Born, 2006). 
Specifying requirements 
In the previous paragraph I have summarized the account of the 
procurement process from 1995 to 2000 given in the letters to Parliament 
by the Ministry of Defence. It is clear that Parliament did not raise any 
concerns about using simulation as a training tool. Parliament agrees 
that simulation offers an adequate representation of reality to be useful 
in training and that simulation improves military readiness. However, 
the three letters to Parliament are not just letters. They are the outcomes 
of complex processes occurring within the Ministry of Defence. Much 
work was done to prepare these letters. A lot of resources, people and 
knowledge were mobilized. In that sense the letters can be seen as 
inscriptions and they become actors in their own right. My brief summary 
reveals that many actors were involved in the process: people from 
industry, military staff, civil servants, the minister, accountants, foreign 
armies, procedures, training tools, technical standards, and organisational 
structures, just to name a few. Many different interests were brought 
together (aligned) in one letter. I will discuss one aspect in more depth: 
How was a ‘realistic’ training simulator technically specified while at the 
same time getting ‘value for money’?
Preparing the specification of requirements and checking whether 
the industry can deliver is the core business of the procurement process. 
According to the project manager, the requirements in this project 
focussed on the issues of project management, quality control, software 
development, configuration management, technology, time and money.48 
I will study the development of the requirements in more detail. The 
requirements were formulated in three steps. First, a preliminary list of 
requirements was formulated in the statement of need (DMP A). This list 
was elaborated and further specified for the ‘Request for Information’ 
and sent to industry to get a first impression about whether the system 
could be delivered within the budget (DMP B/C). After the estimates 
(and comments) from the industry were received, the requirements were 
finalized and sent out to a selection of relevant companies for a ‘Request 
for Quotation’ (DMP D). This procedure is schematically sketched in Figure 
1. In the figure, the Ministry of Defence is located between Parliament and 
the military industry. This perspective summarizes how the Ministry sees 
its role: a mediator between industry (that should tell them tools) and the 
Parliament (that requires certain military capabilities). To keep a distance 
between the ministry and the industry, contacts are strictly formalized with 
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Figure 1: Overview DMP and development requirements
The development of the requirements can be seen as the tip of the 
iceberg. Many people were involved in developing the requirements 
but only the end-result is visible. The requirements describe in great 
detail the desired training simulator. For my analysis I will utilize 
three documents: (1) the appendix of the DMP-A document that 
contains an initial list of requirements, dated September, 1995; (2) 
the Request for Information on the Mobile Combat Training Centre 
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& Instrumentation System dated November 5th, 1996 and (3) the 
Program of Requirements dated March 31st, 1999 (Ministerie van 
Defensie, 1995a; Ministry of Defence, 1996, 1999). If I compare the 
three documents, I see a difference in size, layout and structure. The 
first document is actually the appendix of DMP A and contains only 
four pages. The second document, the official Request for Information, 
had grown to seventy-three pages, about half of which consists of an 
appendix with photographs and pictures of relevant military material. 
The third document, the official Program of Requirements (enclosed 
within the Request for Quotation), had grown to eighty-two pages and 
is well formatted (without an appendix). In my analysis, I focus on the 
representation of ballistics. This was seen as the core technology of the 
duel simulator. A duel simulator that simulates gunfire must be able to 
do that correctly. But was the simulator able to exactly represent how the 
weapon systems would ‘really’ behave? All three documents describe 
the requirements of the same duel simulator and explain how a real 
weapon should behave. Let’s look a bit closer and compare the structure 
of the documents and what they say about ballistics.
Version 1: Vulnerability model (September 1995)
The appendix of the DMP-A document contained a list of statements 
about the new duel simulator. This list played a key role in the 
procurement procedure. The first version of the requirements is only 
four pages. It is the shortest version by far. The manager in charge of the 
purchase told me on June 16th, 2008 that the initial requirements were 
mainly based on observations and site visits at the American Army: ‘As 
a matter of course we’ve looked around and considered the demands 
made by the Americans, Canadians, Germans and Norwegians. After 
that we looked into the matter to judge whether all this was applicable 
to the Dutch situation.’49 In response to my request for more information 
about the difference(s) between the systems, he told me, ‘That’s 
too long ago, I don’t remember. You are talking of 10 years back. In 
general differences, in details.’50 Many requirements addressed the 
preconditions of transport, handling, maintenance, staffing, and so on. 
The DMP A document divided the duel simulator in six categories that 
described the functionalities of the duel simulator, I translated it into 
English:51 
(1) Instrumentation 
(2) Instrumentation of relevant combat data
(3) Instrumentation for trainers including AAR 
(4) Area weapon effects 
(5) Duel simulators 
(6) General
The category ‘Instrumentation’ described functionalities concerning 
the setting-up and mobility of the system. ‘Instrumentation of relevant 
combat data’ explained what data must be logged, calculated and 
exchanged. The category ‘Instrumentation for trainers including AAR’ 
defined what information should be available for the analysis of the 
training and after-action reviews. ‘Area Weapon effects’ contained 
information on certain systems that must be included in the simulator, 
especially artillery, mines, NBC and a medical system. The category 
‘duel simulator’ described functionalities that were expected for 
using ballistics and operating the weapon systems. The final category 
‘general’ contained information about the flexibility of the system and 
how the system should behave during training exercises. I selected for 
this chapter only the requirements that address the representation of 
ballistics.52
 
2.d. It should be possible for the appropriate weapon to 
set a variable ‘flight time’ based on the inserted distance.
2.e. It should be possible that wearing a protective vest 
is processed in an adaptable vulnerability model.
4.e.1. The soldiers’ injuries should depend on the type of 
weapon they are hit with. The injury should be assigned at 
random by the vulnerability model of the system.
5.k. It is necessary that the hit-and kill probability 
corresponds with the simulated weapon.
5.l. The ballistic behaviour of real ammunition should be 
simulated as realistically as possible.
5.m. The use of duel simulators should require as little 
action as possible that deviates from the normal operations 
of the weapon (system).
6.n. Duel simulators should be usable in realistic 
settings, including situations with reduced visibility.
6.aa. The time required for loading, firing and reloading 
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must be realistic.
6.ab. Duel simulators should have a hierarchy related 
to specific weapon types. For example, a Diemaco rifle 
cannot disable a Leopard-2 tank, but a TOW can do that. A 
Leopard-2 tank can kill a soldier with a Diemaco rifle. 
6.ac. The duel simulator should be able to categorise hits 
into seven rubrics: (1) catastrophic kill (total kill); (2) 
weapon kill (only the weapon is disabled); (3) mobility 
kill (only the propulsion system is disabled); (4) radio 
kill (only the communication system is disabled); (5) 
fratricide; (6) hit without damage (random 4%); and (7) 
near miss. The hit should correlate with the weapon system, 
ammunition, direction, angle of the impact and location of 
the impact.
It is important to notice that the items are based on the Master plan 
Duel Simulators written by a project team active from 1992 to 1995 
(Ministerie van Defensie, 1995b). It executed the preliminary field-
research for the procurement and made many technical decisions 
about the new simulator. Two items in my selection (2.e. and 4.e.1.) 
mention a ‘vulnerability model’. This is a model that represents the 
possible damage in relation to the type of weapon. Item 6.ac. gives a 
good explanation: ‘The hit should correlate with the weapon system, 
ammunition, direction, angle of the impact and location of the impact.’53 
The vulnerability model should calculate the damage that was caused 
by the hit. It should also contain information about the hierarchy of the 
weapons (see item 6.ab.). These expectations are based on the idea of 
how a duel simulator should work. The list of requirements showed how 
simulated behaviour should be understood, that is as something that 
should match certain behaviours of a real weapon system. Apparently 
a weapon system has certain effects that depend on a definable 
number of factors. For a non-technical reader this may already look very 
detailed; however, the current level of detail was not sufficient for the 
military industry. The industry needed much more specific information. 
Every detail about the weapon systems, types of ammunition, size of 
containers and quality of the systems had also to be specified.  Defining 
every aspect of the duel simulator was the main purpose of the DMP B/C 
document.
Version 2: Real ballistics (November 1996)
On November 5th, 1996 the so-called ‘Request for Information on the 
Mobile Combat Training Centre & Instrumentation System’ was sent 
out to the military industry (Ministry of Defence, 1996).54 The name of 
the project was changed to emphasise that a unique system was being 
procured for the Dutch Army.55 According to European guidelines, it was 
also published on the forum of the European Defence Agency (EDA) 
to inform the military industry in Europe. The document was written 
in English to make the bid more easily accessible for an international 
audience. The contract manager told me that putting the document in 
English was quite an innovation, for until then requirements were mostly 
published in Dutch. This often caused confusion because international 
industry had to translate the documents themselves, which gave rise 
to technical misunderstandings. He told me on September 25th, 2008, 
‘So you have a number of translations of Dutch text in front of me. After 
arriving I start to negotiate. In Germany, Sweden, America and New 
Zealand I speak English. That’s an agreement, our medium is English. 
So I start negotiating with a supplier about an article in the contract, 
which I have in Dutch in front of me, and he in English. In the end we 
come to the conclusion that he may have translated it wrongly.’56 So the 
requirements were written in English.
The purpose of the Request for Information was stated in the 
document: ‘The Royal Netherlands Army would like to improve their 
Tactical training efficiency for manoeuvre units. Therefore there is 
a need for laser engagement simulators for infantry/tank units. The 
plan is to establish two complete Mobile Combat Training Centres & 
Instrumentation Systems (MCTC&IS) for the Royal Netherlands Army 
at company level. Both systems will be used in Europe’ (Ministry of 
Defence, 1996, p. 6). Further, ‘This overall capability of the MCTC&IS is to 
provide the most realistic training environment, where participants are 
able to simulate force-on-force exercises and gather data for Operational 
Analysis’ (Ministry of Defence, 1996, p. 7). Industry was requested to 
define the final system operational requirements, develop a system 
maintenance concept, and to identify a system configuration. As it would 
be unwieldy to discuss all twenty-four pages of requirements, I have 
selected the ones that focussed on the representation of ballistics and 
the vulnerability model. 
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The structure of the document, on the one hand, specifies what 
functionalities are to be expected of the duel simulator. On the other 
hand, it also contains information about the procurement procedure, 
how much staff would be needed to set the system up, what 
maintenance activities are to be expected and what the life-cycle-costs 
will be. In the beginning of the document, on page 11, a structure for the 
new simulator is proposed.57
The MCTC & IS program is built up in the following 
sections:
Section 1: Laser engagement simulators to be used stand 
alone (without instrumentation).
Section 2: Laser engagement simulators to be used with the 
instrumentation system.
a) Laser engagement simulators, tactical engagement 
simulators for:
•	 Man-worn systems; Man-worn laser detectors and 
laser transmitters on guns.
•	 Weapon platform/vehicle systems; laser detector 
belts and laser transmitters.
•	 Vehicles systems, laser detector belts only.
b) Instrumentation system, consists of the following:
•	 Add-on instrumentation to the laser engagement 
systems, two-way data link communication and G.P.S.:
•	 Exercise control System, EXCON.
•	 Data collection system.
•	 Area weapon effect simulation (AWES).
•	 Communication system.
c) After-Action Review (AAR) facilities.
d) Observer/Controllers (O/C)
e) Fire-markers.
The ‘principle of the MCTC & IS structure’ was presented on page 12 of 
the document (see Figure 2). What does this all mean? In comparison 
with the first version, we see that new actors have emerged. Now EXCON, 
GPS, Observer/Controllers and Fire-markers have suddenly appeared 
on the scene. Further, if we also analyse the figure, we can also clearly 
see that the relations between those actors are gathered around a relay 
station. EXCON is the exercise control centre, the central command 
centre from where the trainer is able to follow the training exercise. This 
is where all the information comes together. The relay station takes care 
of the data exchange. As soldiers and vehicles could be located many 
kilometres away from the command post of the trainers, antennas have 
to be set up to ‘cover’ the whole training area to ensure that the soldiers 
and their weapons systems can be traced. The figure also differentiates 
between soldiers, vehicles with a weapon and vehicles without a weapon. 
The individual soldiers apparently require a different ‘laser engagement 
simulator’ than the vehicles with a weapon. Vehicles without a weapon do 
not need a laser engagement simulator, but a detector should be present.
 
Figure 2: Principle of the MCTC & IS Structure
A figure like this makes components, subcomponents and structure 
visible, but hides the content. Where are the technologies for ballistics 
in this figure? The requirements of each component are formulated and 
the information the duel simulator must record is described in detail. On 




All events shall be recorded with their time code 
information.
Identification code:
All weapon systems and players shall have their own 
individual identification code. The identification code used 
shall be in accordance with the normally used call sign 
(relation between call sign and player ID).
An ‘event’ is an exchange between ‘players’. For example, when a shot 
is fired, soldiers and weapon systems become players that generate 
data. It must be possible to trace all data back to the individual weapon 
system and the player. According to Figure 2, when a shot is fired and 
it hits a detector, the laser engagement simulators of each of the two 
parties (the one that is hit and the one that made the shot) send a signal 
to a relay station. The relay station sends that data to EXCON. The data 
is collected in a database and is available for the after-action review. 
Exactly what data will be sent is specified in the event codes. That data 
is stored so that it can be individually traced back to show who has hit 
whom with the laser signal.
5.6 DETECTION SYSTEM (WEAPON PLATFORMS AND NON-WEAPON 
PLATFORMS).
Detection parameters.
The detection system shall be able to detect (in case of a 
hit) the following:
a. The weapon system that fired the hit.
b. Kind of ammunition.
c. Angle of impact (aspect angle).
d. Location of the hit.
A specific system – the detection system – is responsible for receiving 
signals (p. 17). It must be able to identify the weapon system, kind of 
ammunition, angle of impact and location of the hit. Of course, this is 
information sent by a laser and no ‘real’ ammunition will be present. The 
bullet is a virtual one that is exchanged between ‘real’ weapon systems 
that are equipped with a detection system.
5.7 TRIGGER.
A laser beam shall fire when the actual weapon is fired by 
a blank or trigger pull. The system shall be protected 
against false trigger impulses.
As it is necessary for the soldiers to train with ‘real weapons’, the laser-
signal can only be triggered when the weapon is correctly activated 
(p. 18). The laser signal is activated when a blank is shot, which sets the 
simulation model in motion. 
5.10 CHEATING.
The laser engagement simulators shall be developed in such 
a way that they are ‘cheat free’.
5.11 HIT-KILL PROBABILITY.
The hit-kill probability shall be the same as the 
corresponding weapon system.
5.12 BALLISTICS.
Real ballistics shall be implemented into the simulation 
system (distance to the target shall be taken in account).
Effective range shall be taken into account. Even various 
ammunition for the same weapon system shall be simulated. 
It shall be possible to add new ammunition types into 
the simulator during the LOT. The simulation of the firing 
speed and the time of flight shall be taken into account 
(especially for anti tank weapons). For wire-guided 
missiles there shall be an indication for the shooter of 
the ‘end of flight rocket’.
However, ‘players’ cannot be trusted completely and cheating must 
be prevented (p. 18). How to do that is not specified in the document 
but instead it is framed as a technical problem. Moreover, it is stated 
explicitly that the probability and ballistics must match the behaviour 
of the ‘corresponding weapon system’. The firing speed, flight time 
and effective range of the ammunition must be implemented based on 
the ‘real ballistics’. The necessity of implementing ‘realistic behaviour’ 
was emphasised. The ‘vulnerability model’, however, has become less 
prominent. 
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The second version of the requirements was largely based on site 
visits of training exercises, demonstrations of duel simulators, technical 
documents from the industry, and information from foreign nations. 
Information from Norway was especially helpful. It was quite unique that 
the Request for Information was sent out to the industry with this high 
level of detail and presented as a draft that the industry could comment 
on. The contract manager told me on September 25th, 2008: ‘It was rather 
unique then. I still try to promote it myself. I think it improves the usability 
of offers you get after that. Look, we’ll never be able to break  through 
a brick wall, we know a lot, but at the same time we can write down 
certain requirements which are simply impossible, or we can describe 
requirements in such a way that they’re going to create enormous cost-
drivers, which you could avoid in a smart way. The danger exists that if you 
write something down that is unique for company A, that company B will 
be discriminated against. That danger, however, is a company’s security at 
the same time, because we’re aware never to write only to one supplier, 
to avoid the risk of being strung up in the tallest tree. In itself it’s a very 
nice game, but it requires the capacity to enter into what matters and you 
must know whether what you ask for is technically feasible or not. But by 
playing by the rules, you know for sure, that at the moment you inquire for 
an offer with the definite program of requirements, that you are asking for 
something of which the industry has already said: Yes, in that way it will be 
possible.’58 
Version 3: Negotiated ballistics (March 1999)
The final program of requirements negotiated with the military industry 
was titled ‘Mobile Combat Training Centre - Program of Requirements - 
30 March 1999’ (Ministry of Defence, 1999). Suggestions based on the 
second version were implemented and many requirements were specified 
even further. The project manager explained to me on April 21st, 2008 that 
the Army should just describe what it wants and industry should comply 
with that. In any case, the industry has to help to make the requirements 
clearer. In the final document, the MCTC, is divided into the following sub-
systems:59
•	 DFWES (Direct Fire Weapon Effects System)
•	 EXCON (EXercise CONtrol) 
•	 AWES (Area Weapon Effects Simulation)
•	 AAR (After-Action Review) system 
•	 O/C (Observer/Controller) system 
•	 F/M (Fire-marker) system
•	 CLSS (‘Combat Life Saver’) system
•	 Communication system
•	 Power supply system (generators)
•	 Warehouse system
As we can see, some new actors have appeared. Many of the subsystems 
are already familiar but the ‘combat life saver’ system, the communication 
system, the power supply system, and the warehouse system are now 
specified separately. It does not mean that a totally new system is desired, 
but some systems have required (received) special attention. Let’s focus 
on the representation of weapon systems and ballistics again. What 
happened here? Most noticeably, the word ‘ballistics’ has disappeared 
completely and the word ‘realistic’ has become negotiable.
3.3.2 Programmability 
General requirements for vulnerability and damage 
calculation. There must be a possibility to select up 
to 30 different vulnerability tables per vehicle or 
weapon system.  No field programming shall be required. 
Vulnerability must be worked out by the customer and the 
contractor.
It shall be possible to re-program any vehicle system 
parameters to simulate another type of vehicle (but not 
during operation).
3.3.3 Simulated Weapon and Target Effects 
The weapons shall have an actual or simulated signature to 
permit other personnel to detect the firing action from a 
normal personnel viewing distance.
The effect of a hit on a target must be simulated, also for 
IR sights, in a safe way by means of relevant sound, flash, 
or smoke, in a manner that is perceived as near realistic 
by personnel. In addition, the vehicles shall be equipped 
with a flashing strobe light, visible at a minimum of 1.5 
kilometres in the common European weather conditions in all 
directions, during day and night.
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In this version, we hear a completely different voice in comparison with 
the two earlier versions. The sentences ‘Vulnerability must be worked 
out by the customer and the contractor’ (3.3.2) and ‘The effect of a 
hit on a target must be simulated (…) in a manner that is perceived as 
nearly realistic by personnel’ (3.3.3) clearly demonstrate that in the final 
document there is space for interpretation and negotiating. 
3.3.6 Common DFWES Performance Requirements
3.3.6.1 Operation, Realism and Fidelity 
•	 It shall be possible to engage targets correctly at 
distances which are realistic for the applicable 
weapon, ammunition and sights combination being 
used (within the limitations of laser simulation). 
•	 The simulated weapons shall be designed in a manner 
that permits normal operation by the soldiers 
and preserve normal functionality in all normal 
European weather conditions.
•	 All simulated weapons shall have near realistic 
performance (apply correct procedures), at a level 
sufficient to ensure that the tactical training 
becomes effective.
•	 It shall not be possible to fire the mounted laser 
transmitters on the weapons without the use of 
blanks or simulated ammunition, as applicable.
3.3.6.2 Technical Performance
All weapon simulators shall have an effective range 
comparable to the actual weapons (see ANNEX: I).
•	 All weapon simulators shall have comparable 
probability of hit as the actual weapons.
•	 The probability of kill shall replicate the damage 
that a particular weapon can inflict on a particular 
target. 
•	 The simulated weapons should have near the same 
capacity for use in reduced sight conditions and 
during darkness as real, live weapons (within the 
limitations of laser simulation). 
 
Now in 3.3.6.1 and 3.3.6.2 the remark ‘within the limitations of laser 
simulation’ is added. But what is more important is the requirement that 
‘all simulated weapons shall have nearly realistic performance (…) at 
a level sufficient to ensure that the tactical training becomes effective’ 
(3.3.6.1). The requirements have shifted from in version 2: ‘Real ballistics 
shall be implemented into the simulation system (distance to the target 
shall be taken in account).’ This shift denotes that simulation may have 
limitations and that the duel simulator is about the effectiveness of 
tactical training. A civil servant responsible for contracting told me that 
the requirements were formulated eloquently and in ‘functional terms’. 
He stated on September 25th, 2008 ‘If you look at the software part of the 
project you’ll find room for interpretation. It is dependent on the level 
of abstraction on which verdict is passed. So underneath a requirement, 
a whole world of experience exists, but as long as you cover the 
requirements on top-level [everything should be okay]. I thought this 
was a rather strong element in the case of MCTC, the program of 
requirements was put very functionally.’60 
In this case we see that in version 1 and in version 2, all social factors 
and all controversies were removed from the foreground. Requirements 
were stated as ‘neutral facts’. It was not to be expected that these facts 
could be doubted and that it would be foolish to open up  controversies 
once text had been agreed upon. However, in version 3, some limitations 
are suddenly acknowledged. What has happened here? To answer that 
question we have to open up the black box of the Ministry of Defence and 
explain what debate was going on inside and how it was settled.
Analysis
In this paragraph, I propose an explanation of the changes in the 
different versions of the requirements and link this explanation with 
the discussion about validation. In the previous paragraphs, I have 
traced the document trails of the procurement procedure of the duel 
simulator on two levels. First, I have described the documents made 
available to the Parliament about the procurement. Second, I dug a 
little deeper and described how specific, underlying requirements 
changed over time. These changes were only visible for the industry. 
It is clear that requirements fulfil an important role in hardware and 
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software-development. Requirements are generally defined as ‘a 
statement identifying a capability, physical characteristic, or quality 
factor that bounds a product or process need for which a solution will 
be pursued’ (Wiedemann, Fichtinger, & Pautz, 2007, p. 2). In other 
words, requirements define what the system should be able to do. 
The requirements of the duel simulator were developed over time: 
the number of requirements grew from four pages (version 1), to forty 
pages plus an appendix (version 2), to eighty-two pages (version 3). This 
is common practice; ‘[i]n the course of a project, they [requirements] 
become more concrete, more detailed and also more complex’ 
(Hoffmann, Kuhn, Weber, & Bittner, 2004). However, requirements have 
to be usable for different communities. To explain this, I introduce the 
concept of ‘boundary object’ (Bowker & Star, 2000). In my analysis I 
treat requirements as boundary objects that make it possible to bring 
several meanings of social groups (actors) within the Ministry of Defence 
together to define the desired training simulator. Boundary objects can 
be defined as ‘… objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local 
needs and constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust 
enough to maintain a common identity across sites’ (Star & Griesemer, 
1989). Mostly boundary objects are structured in such way that they can 
create coherence between different social worlds. I will now explore 
which roles the boundary object fulfilled in the procurement of the duel 
simulator. I will especially focus on two boundaries: (1) cavalry versus 
infantry and (2) Ministry of Defence versus military industry. 
My description of the DMP procedure shows that the account of the 
Ministry of Defence was focussed on the necessity of the new training 
simulator and the carefulness of the selection of the manufacturer. As I 
have mentioned, a very important aspect of the procurement procedure 
was kept out of sight. The account conceals how the requirements 
were developed and why certain choices were made. The shift from 
the ‘vulnerability model’ (version 1), and ‘real ballistics’ (version 2), to a 
fundamentally different approach ‘negotiated ballistics’ (version 3), can 
only be understood in the context of a discussion between cavalry and 
infantry. Besides technical, legal and financial experts, the project team 
also included members of different military branches. The officer from 
the infantry and the officer from the cavalry were the two most influential 
players. They acted as spokespersons for the operational units that 
required the new duel simulator and would be the ‘users’ of it.  
In an interview on September 29th, 2008 the former officer of the cavalry 
explained to me how the cavalry’s perspective on training simulators 
differed from that of the infantry. Infantry soldiers did not require much 
equipment, according to him. They primarily rely on equipment that 
they can carry themselves, which meant that simulation technology 
was not really necessary for them. Their training exercises did not 
require much terrain and the safety precautions did not have as much 
environmental impact as they did for the cavalry. Cavalry soldiers were 
a completely different kind of soldier. They relied completely on heavy 
equipment, without it the soldier was nothing. The mobility and reach 
of these heavy weapons are much greater. To practise with a tank, 
however, one needs a large amount of terrain to drive around and much 
more space is required for firing exercises. The cavalry was therefore by 
necessity an early adopter of training simulators. The officer concluded 
that the infantry and the cavalry had completely different perspectives 
on training. 
This difference in mind-set regarding training became especially 
visible in a discussion about the ballistics of the duel simulator. How 
accurate should the representation of the trajectory of the bullet 
be? Duel simulators come in two types: one-way and two-way. The 
requirements did not specify what type of duel simulator was required. 
However, version 1 and version 2 of the requirements mention a 
‘vulnerability model’ and ‘real ballistics’. This implied a very accurate 
representation of ballistics and therefore a two-way duel simulator. I will 
explain why. DMP B/C explains the difference between one-way and 
two-way duel simulators: 
‘A one-way system transmits a pulse. The receiving system defines 
whether the target has been hit on the basis of a hit probability 
calculation. This system does not take ballistics into account. A two-
way system transmits a pulse as well. The receiving system reflects the 
pulse through which the distance is measured. Ballistics are introduced 
now, through which a more accurate hit calculation will take place. In 
one-way systems minor negative learning effects may occur which, 
however, have never been quantified. These negative learning effects 
restrict themselves and lead to a different behaviour of the soldier 
necessary to be able to shoot. Should this negative behaviour already 
be taught, then this can always be corrected afterwards by paying 
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more attention to either the shooting or training in a firesimulator. For 
the rest these negative learning effects are only recognized among 
tank- and TOW gunners.’61 
I have also included Figure 3 from the annual report of Saab Training 
Systems to explain the differences between the two systems. The picture 
on the left shows that the laser light follows a straight line and the right 
picture shows that by exchanging information the simulator can take the 
movement of the target into account.
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Graphic simulation – standardization 
or specialized solutions
Graphic simulators, which project a
simulated reality on a real weapon’s
sights, are often used in firing practice
by individual soldiers or small units.
This market sector is characterized by a
diversity of local players with no clear-
cut global market leader.
In this area, Training Systems has
developed the BT61, which utilizes
authentic photographic environments
and can simulate moving three-dimen-
sional targets, ammunition trajectories
and weather conditions. By being a
more general product, BT61 differs from
the specialized solutions that dominate
the market. It offers significant cost
advantages, but limits the opportunity
to meet all the requirements customers
may have. BT61 also offers the advan-
tage of being able to simulate different
weapon systems.
BT61 complements and strengthens
the rest of Training Systems’ product
range, allowing it to offer existing cus-
tomers a turn-key solution for gunnery
and tactical training.
GAMER – a new dimension in simulation
Modern computer, laser, communication
and positioning technology have made
it possible to combine several different
simulation solutions in an overall system.
Battle command, tactics and strategy can
be practiced, at the same time that the
units involved train with their weapons. 
With the GAMER (Gunnery and
Maneuver Exercise) system, Training
Systems has developed a concept that
has attracted great interest. The partici-
pating units in GAMER exercises, which
can range up to brigade size, are
equipped with BT46 and BT47 laser
simulators. Wireless communication and
GPS technology link the units with a
training center. Exercise commanders
can therefore change the conditions of an
ongoing exercise. All data is stored, and
immediately afterwards the participants
can analyze and evaluate each action.
GAMER is compact, mobile and can
be operated without fixed equipment 
and contractor support. The units con-
ducting the training can easily assembly,
handle and adapt the system themselves
for different exercises and needs. It is
easy to add new terrain data in order to
practice in foreign environments. This
allows for advanced exercises that pre-
pare units for new situations and condi-
tions, as well as continuous training for
units stationed offshore for long periods.
Both of these situations are becoming
increasingly important in today’s more
internationalized military forces.
Interest in GAMER and the potential
it offers are significant, and its success
also promotes the sale of the BT46 and
BT47. In 1999 the first system was
delivered to the U.S. army, an impor-
tant breakthrough in the NATO market.
Future outlook
The BT46 and GAMER, in particular,
give Training Systems a product range
well-suited to the market’s expected 
development, i.e. a broad-scale intro-
duction of two-way simulators and
instrumented training systems.
The market for full Combat Maneuver
Training Centres (CMTC), where the
supplier takes on a full responsibility,
delivers all simulation equipment and
on site manages all technical support
during exercises, is anticipating dra-
matic growth. Training Systems is active
in this segment of the market and is well
prepared for its future development.
HIGHLIGHTS DURING THE YEAR
• GAMER receives a breakthrough order
in the U.S. market
• Austria orders the BT47 small arms 
simulator
• BT46 receives a breakthrough order in
the French market
• Major contract with the Spanish army 
to supply mobile tank targets
• Acquisition of signature management
specialist Barracuda Technologies
What is a two-way simulator?
Two-way simulators such as the BT46 solve 
this by combining laser technology with 
advanced optics and computer power to 
simulate real conditions. Participants have to 
take into account their weapon's behavior as 
well as the target's position and movements.
A laser is fired at the speed of 
light. A conventional one-way 
simulator registers hits or misses 
in the same instance as the shot 
is fired and therefore cannot 
simulate distances, trajectories, 
weather conditions or a target's 
movements.
Sensor








Figure 3: What is a two-way simulator? (SAAB, 1999, p. 22) 
(This image is reproduced with permission from Saab AB.)
A one-way laser syste  s nds a laser signal to a detector mounted on 
its target. The mi roprocessor connected with the detect r determines 
which weapon was used and calculates the damage that was caused. If the 
damage is considerable, a flashing light and sound signal are activated. 
The time that it takes to reach the target is the same for every shot (the 
laser signal moves at the speed of light) and the shot travels in a straight 
line. A tank equipped with a two-way laser system sends a laser signal to a 
detector mounted on a target, but this time the receiver reflects the signal 
back to its sender. The sender of the laser signal can now calculate the 
exact distance with the information of the reflection. It becomes possible 
to calculate the ballistic trajectory of the projectile, indicating the time 
that a projectile is in the air and a precise location of the ‘hit’. The two-way 
laser makes it possible to use the duel simulator for precision gunnery 
training for heavy weapon systems. The two-way system requires more 
sophisticated computers and communication network and is therefore 
more expensive. The retired senior officer from the cavalry told me on 
October 17th, 2008 that the infantry made a distinction between gunnery 
training and tactical training, but the cavalry did not agree with that 
distinction. The cavalry trains soldiers to work with tanks and to do tactical 
operations at the same time. Therefore the one-way laser just had too 
many disadvantages for them. For example, the shells did not follow a 
ballistic trajectory, but instead they just followed a straight line of laser 
light. The one-way system could not make a distinction between different 
types of shells. Soldiers could not use the automatic targeting system 
for moving targets. Moreover, the one-way laser taught soldiers to point 
directly at the target, in a direct line. A real shell, however, would behave 
rather differently and the soldier should aim at just before the moving 
target. Thus with the one-way laser system the soldier learned the wrong 
behaviour. Another problem involved the anti-tank weapons TOW and 
Dragon, which have an effective range of fire of three and one kilometre 
respectively. Both are so-called ‘fire by wire’ weapons. When a soldier fires 
the ‘real’ TOW he has to stand up in the field and direct the projectile to 
its target. The weapon was connected with a wire to guide the projectile 
to the target, so reaching its target could take fourteen or fifteen seconds. 
During that time, the soldier was very vulnerable. With the one-way laser 
system, however, the soldiers knew immediately, whether he had hit the 
target. It took just a second for the laser to reach its target as it travelled 
at the speed of light. According to the retired senior officer ‘What was 
then simulated by a one-way laser system was a shot at the speed of light, 
covering a distance. That is a negative learning moment, it’s a totally 
wrong shooting technique. I was overwhelmed with astonishment that 
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this issue had been completely ignored.’62 Despite the many concerns 
raised by the officer of the cavalry, the project team was willing to settle 
for the one-way training simulator, just because the two-way system was 
much more expensive. The team accepted the ‘negative learning’ for the 
cavalry because the cavalry already possessed many training simulators 
that could compensate for it. The new duel simulator was a chance for 
the infantry to get a sophisticated training simulator that could support 
them achieving their training aims according to the minutes of the 
meeting of the advisory committee on advanced educational tools 
(ACGOLM) on April 17th, 1997 as preparation for DMP B/C (that was 
completed January, 1998). Although the requirements seemed to be 
‘plastic’ enough to keep both options open (one-way or two-way), a strict 
interpretation seemed to be in favour of a two-way system. This worried 
the infantry because they were afraid that such a system would be 
unaffordable and they would end-up with nothing at all, as an officer told 
me on October 23rd, 2008: 
‘... From a financial point of view we must choose one. For this size, 
it will become the one-way system. Or, should we have some more 
money it may become the two-way system, because then we can use 
it for shooting training. But it has been one of the arguments in the 
beginning, that it is a tactical trainer to practise tactical situations 
in the field. In that case the shooting technique is secondary to the 
tactical technique approach.’63 
In this quote it is possible to see the different perspectives on military 
training by two actors who have to cooperate during military missions. 
The requirements revealed a boundary between cavalry and infantry while 
they tried to overcome this boundary at the same time. 
The cavalry and infantry were not the only two disciplines that had to 
be brought together by an boundary object. The relationship between 
the ministry and the military industry also had to be attended to. The 
Ministry of Defence—as well as the military industry itself—was convinced 
that two-way duel simulators were much more expensive than one-way 
duel simulators. The director of Saab Training Systems initially refused to 
submit a proposal for a two-way duel simulator because he was convinced 
that it could not compete with one-way systems pricewise. In effect, Saab 
Training Systems knew very well that it was the only party that could 
deliver a duel simulator able to ‘realistically’ simulate ballistics using its 
patented optics and laser technology (SAAB, 1999, p. 22). The project 
manager told me: 
‘Why did the Saab Training Systems manager say that? Because he 
had the feeling that two-way systems always are more expensive than 
one-way systems. Which needs not to be true. Look, Saab Training 
System had a certain image of the two-way system  (...) I said: you 
should consider it in the light of what your competitors offer. You 
realize that you are in competition. If your competitor does not make 
an offer of a certain element and you do indeed, in spite of our 
competitor meets our demands, you are not acting wisely. You just 
have to leave that element out.’64 
The manager of Saab Training Systems had his vision on military training 
simulation written down in a full-colour booklet and envisioned much 
more functionalities than the Dutch Army requested (Saab Training 
Systems, 1991). For example, although the company was able to develop 
special devices, like the ‘laser obscuration device’ to block the view of 
the gunner when firing a shell, this expensive piece of equipment was 
not required by the Dutch Armed Forces. The company thought that 
it should be included to improve the ‘realistic experience’ for the tank 
gunner. However, if other companies did not include such technology 
their proposals would look much cheaper. Therefore Saab was requested 
to develop a proposal based on the requirements and nothing more. After 
the initial refusal of Saab Training Systems, the project manager opened 
negotiations. These adjustments were very important for the Ministry of 
Defence. If the company did not submit a proposal, there would not be 
any proposals for a two-way simulator and thus there would be no chance 
for the ministry to procure a two-way simulator. 
Other companies had opposite concerns. They thought that the 
requirements (version 2) focused too much on a correct ‘vulnerability 
models’ and ‘real ballistics’. They had to be convinced that the ‘whole 
proposal’ would be taken into consideration and not only ballistics 
(interview April 28th, 2008). Thus, after some persuasion, nine companies 
submitted their feedback on the request for information (version 2). It 
quickly became clear that most of the duel simulators—one-way and two-
way—were more expensive than expected.  
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Therefore the project team had to re-define their requirements again, not 
only regarding the quality but also the quantity.65 See Table 1. 






Laser for rifles 3565 1630 1630
Laser for Dragon/TOW 156 63 63
Vests 3180 1450 1450
Lasers for Leopard tank 64 56 42
Detectors for vehicle 244 245 195
Instrumentation 1 2 1
AAR facilities 2 2 2
Table 1: Abstract from appendix A of DMP B/C (Ministerie van Defensie, 1998)
The duel simulator can be divided into different components, such as 
laser modules for the rifles, detectors for the vehicles, and so on. For a 
typical training exercise an X number of soldiers, trainers, vehicles, etc., 
have to be equipped with these components. The table compares the 
numbers of components mentioned in version 1, with the number that 
was specified in the proposal to the industry (version 2), with the numbers 
that were considered feasible after the feedback from the industry (version 
3). It is important to notice that the original idea was to be able to have 
two complete duel simulators that would be located at two of the army’s 
training locations (thus 3565 lasers for the rifles in version 1). However, it 
was expected that this would be too costly and would not fit within the 
new organizational structure of the army, which emphasised centralized 
training facilities. So only one duel simulator would be required and a 
specialized unit would be responsible for its deployment, maintenance 
and management. Thus in the request for information the necessary 
equipment was scaled down (thus 1630 lasers for the rifles in version 2). 
However, the proposals by the industry were still a bit too expensive, so 
further reductions were implemented. Further cost savings were realized 
in the categories ‘detectors for vehicles’ and ‘instrumentation’. This is 
equipment that has to be mounted on vehicles or respectively set up in 
the training area to monitor the training exercise. Merely by reducing it 
to one set of instrumentation, costs were further reduced, making a duel 
simulator financially feasible.
Once the duel simulator became financially feasible, even more care 
for the formulation of the requirements was necessary. The boundary 
objects not only had to mediate between the Ministry of Defence and 
the military industry, but it also had to mediate between the companies 
that could manufacture one-way duel simulators and the companies 
that could manufacture two-way duel simulators. It was important to 
keep both categories of companies interested to develop a detailed 
proposal for the next phase of procurement. Otherwise the procurement 
procedure could fail. The DMP B/C phase is all about guarantying that 
the new duel simulator can be purchased in an open competition for 
a competitive price. Thus if it became known that the army preferred a 
two-way training simulator, the (only) company that was able to provide 
it would have a de facto monopoly. This would put the Ministry of 
Defence in a very undesirable position for a monopolist can ask whatever 
it desires. Therefore the requirements had to be reformulated in such 
a way that a sufficient number of companies were able to submit a 
reasonable proposal (for either a one-way or two-way duel simulator) so 
that negotiations over quality and price would make sense. The project 
manager told me on April 21st, 2008: 
‘At that moment there was only one manufacturer capable of supplying 
a two-way system. Which was SAAB. In a tender you try to prevent 
dealing with a monopolist, for in that case you just have to pay the asking 
price. That is the game and it also had to do with the technological 
developments at the time. SAAB, for example, did have two-way 
systems, but not for all weapons. SAAB did not have a solution for, 
among other things, hand firearms, because a two-way system cannot 
be mounted on it on account of its size. Every manufacturer had its 
own problems. Actually that was the reason for not using both the one-
way and two-way system as a decisive answer. We had to formulate 
the requirements in such a way that we could achieve our general 
aim to train soldiers as realistically as possible in such a way that they 
could receive a valuable After-Action Review. As a matter of course 
that is the higher aim. One-way or two-way is a technical discussion, 
not an operational one. We only wanted to say: This is what we want. 
Please develop a proposal for that. One-way or two-way is not really 
interesting.’66 
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The project team decided that the final the program of requirements 
(version 3) could not mention ‘realistic ballistics’ anymore because that 
would automatically make the two-way simulator superior. Other aspects 
of the simulator were emphasised instead. For example, the document 
stresses that the simulator must aim for effective tactical training. This 
effectively shifted the attention away from ‘realistic ballistics’ by bringing 
other criteria to the foreground. The Ministry of Defence emphasised this 
aim (requirement 3.3.6.1 in version 3). This shift transformed technical 
issues into operational military issues. The phrase ‘realistic ballistics’ was 
removed from the requirements and became negotiable. By making 
the specific requirements for ballistics invisible, training effectiveness 
became the main criteria for the selection of the duel simulator. But 
implicitly when military officers thought about effective training, they 
assumed that the ballistics and weapon behaviour was ‘accurate’. As I 
have mentioned, it was especially the cavalry that argued that realistic 
ballistics is important for realistic training. Realistic training, however, 
could be achieved in many different ways. The technical solution that 
was proposed by Saab Training Systems can be viewed as a compromise 
between the two military branches. I will explain this compromise using 
Figure 4 below. 
1-way 2-way Software
Rifle Heavy gun ArtilleryShot
A B C D
Figure 4: One-way, two-way and AWES
Saab Training Systems proposed to combine three types of 
simulations. The compromise respected the different identities of the 
military units. The infantry – the soldiers with light armoury – will use a 
one-way simulator. They mainly operate at short range and the straight 
line of a laser should not be very different from the trajectory that an 
ordinary bullet travels (a to b in figure 4). The cavalry – heavy armoury – 
would have a sophisticated two-way laser that can cover longer ranges 
and can calculate ballistics accurately (a to c in figure 4). Both simulators 
would be compatible with each other. Thus when a rifle shoots at a tank 
the tank would not be harmed, but the result would be different the 
other way around. The artillery (very long range weapons) and engineers 
(mines) would not work with laser technology, but instead would work 
directly with the software that drives the duel simulator (EXCON). The 
software could recognise which soldiers and vehicles entered a specific 
area and could calculate whether artillery or mines harmed them (a to 
d in figure 4). The soldiers that are killed by mines or artillery would 
receive an audible message from their vest. Saab Training Systems’  
proposed duel simulator incorporated the interests of different military 
actors, but at the same time it disenrolled many industrial actors (those 
who cannot deliver the two-way simulator). However, as I have explained 
regarding the parliamentary letter of April 14th, 2000 (26800X, nr. 
37), the criteria for the selection of the manufacturer did not focus on 
ballistics. Other issues seemed to be more important. In parliamentary 
debate, the involvement of Dutch industry is traditionally an important 
issue. Saab Training Systems was able to devise a plan that involved 
Dutch companies. This plan made the case for Saab Training Systems’ 
proposal much more attractive because now the Ministry of Economical 
Affairs became directly involved. The candidate that could best simulate 
‘real ballistics’ was eventually selected to manufacture the system, but 
not explicitly on the grounds of what it could do best (simulate ballistics). 
The arguments in favour of purchasing the ‘solution’ from Saab 
Training Systems focused on low costs, low risks and the best chance 
for involvement of the Dutch industry. Of course, not every company 
was happy with the conclusion. The German company STN Atlas even 
tried to open the debate by sending letters to Parliament (Kamerstuk II, 
1999/2000b). At that point, however, the choice had been made and the 
black box was closed. In 2000 the official signing ceremony took place 
in Amersfoort, the location where the warehouse of the Mobile Combat 
Training Centre would be based. 
In this analysis I have sketched the development of the requirements. 
I started this chapter by discussing the Parliamentary letters regarding 
the purchase of the training simulators. Then I explained that DMP 
documents underlie these letters. The DMP documents are in turn based 
on requirement documents. Although the requirement documents 
seemed to ‘prescribe’ the desired training simulator, I was able to 
show how they actively enrols and disenrols the interests of different 
actors. During my exploration it became clear that the requirements 
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are inscribed in many different layers. I concentrated on two layers: 
ideas about how military training should look (one-way or two-way) 
and ideas about the open military marketplace. Different communities 
within the military and the industry had to work closely together to refine 
the requirement documents and keep the tender competitive. The 
main challenge was to eliminate the requirement of ‘realistic’ ballistics 
because including this aspect would focus the debate on accuracy. 
Eliminating this requirement was desirable for both the army and the 
industry. The Army could focus on other issues (i.e. effective training) and 
the industry was able to submit proposals for one-way duel simulators. 
Version 3 of the requirements provided enough ‘plasticity’ (Bowker & 
Star, 2000) or ‘interpretive flexibility’ (Bijker, 2010) for companies to 
think that they had a fair chance. Thus version 3 kept the market open 
and the military was able to collect several proposals. Requirements are 
therefore not rigid, but as boundary objects they are necessary ‘to keep 
things moving along’ (Bowker & Star, 2000, p. 313). 
Conclusion
In this chapter I have sketched a brief overview of the procurement 
process of the Mobile Combat Training Centre. My overview is based 
on the highly idealized account that is given by the Ministry of Defence 
in public letters. These letters, however, hide all the work that was 
done and seem to take the ‘functionality’ (and thus validity) of the 
training simulator for granted. I have explored some of the underlying 
assumptions of this ‘master narrative’. The interviews and archival 
documents revealed that the procurement of a ‘realistic’ training 
simulator did not come without a struggle. It seems that the realistic 
training simulator was created in the marketplace and not in the 
battlefield, as the Ministry of Defence had to settle for the ‘negotiable 
ballistics’ because incorporating ‘real ballistics’ into the requirements of 
the simulator was impossible.
In this analysis I focussed on the ‘solution’ provided by Saab Training 
System. It looks like - in hindsight - that the Ministry of Defence did 
not have a ‘better’ alternative. This might be true. But my point is that 
Saab Training Systems was able to connect more actors than the other 
companies were able to do to the actor-network that the Ministry of 
Defence had set-up. The effect was that the solution Saab Training 
System proposed is considered the most ‘realistic’ solution for the Dutch 
Army. Let’s now imagine for a second that the actor-network that the 
Ministry of Defence had set-up would focus less on ‘realistic ballistics’ 
and more on ‘cooperation with European Armed Forces’ than the 
proposed solution of the Swedish company Saab Training System would 
not be that evident. Suddenly the German company STN Atlas would 
gain power. This because the German company is traditionally well 
connected with the armed forces in their country making international 
cooperation easier. Why the actor-network was shaped as it did will be 
the topic of the next chapter.
This analysis sheds new light on the selection procedure of the 
military training simulator. Although the proposed training simulator may 
not have been the best option, it became the best option because it was 
able to gain the support of the most actors. It was able to built a large 
actor-network, consisting of different branches from the Army, money, 
training areas and even industry. The Ministry of Defence was a powerful 
actor but it had to redefine its interests to mobilise other actors. This 
process shows that the requirement document is not a ‘rigid checklist’ 
with which the industry has to comply, but rather a coordinated effort 
for mutual benefit. Bijker would call this a ‘co-production’ (Bijker, 2006b, 
2010) in which the Ministry of Defence redefines its aims together with 
the industry that developed the simulation technology. The promise of 
‘realistic ballistics’ brought all the actors together in the first place, but 
had later to be redefined to keep them together (‘stable’).  
My analysis also sheds new light on the concept of validation 
as discussed in chapter two. With regard to validation neither the 
representational accuracy of the military training simulator nor the 
realization of some ‘intended use’ is involved. No, in order to make 
a claim about the validity of the training simulator it must fit in an 
established actor-network. For that reason validity is always about 
relevance. Latour made this point in his earlier work on the relationship 
between science and politics when he wrote, ‘There are not two 
problems, one on the side of scientific representation and the other 
on the side of political representation, but a single problem’ (Latour, 
2004a, p. 70). The procurement department establishes itself as a 
‘centre of calculation’ – in terms of Latour – authorized to decide 
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which actors are deemed relevant and which are not. Therefore the 
procurement department needs the plasticity of the boundary object 
to be in a position to negotiate. The conclusion can be drawn that 
the procurement of the Mobile Combat Training Centre is a constant 






Chapter 6. Military Validation
Introduction
In the previous chapter I have opened the black box of the procurement 
department of the Ministry of Defence a little. I traced the development 
of the requirements of the duel simulator and discussed some layers 
of inscription. The requirements were not only descriptive, but also 
constitutive making validation an on-going process. Validation is therefore 
not a final judgment about the quality of a representation, but a process in 
which the interests of actors become inscribed in the training simulator.
In this chapter I continue my analysis by trying to answer the question: 
Why did the Ministry of Defence want the duel simulator in the first 
place? To do so I have to move on to another scene. I have to move from 
the procurement department to the (high-ranking) staff officers of the 
Army who support the commander-in-chief. The staff set up a project 
team to formulate a policy on training simulators. Next this policy on 
training simulators led to the establishment of another project team that 
prepared the purchase of the duel simulator. In this chapter I focus on 
the work of both project teams. The biggest challenge for the project 
team that formulated the policy for training simulators was to change the 
military organization in such a way that training simulators would fit in 
or ‘configure’ (Woolgar, 1991) the organisation. The team developed an 
appropriate vocabulary that would become the ‘reality’ of military training. 
I will discuss this vocabulary in detail to show how it is used to ‘prove’ that 
a new training simulator was ‘needed’. I conclude that the U.S. Army in 
particular was able to articulate the ‘reality’ that military training, and thus a 
training simulator, tries to imitate. 
The data of this chapter comes from the national archive and the 
defence archive. I especially focussed on the documentation, minutes and 
reports that the project teams have produced in the period from 1992 
to 1995.67 I conducted many interviews with people who were directly 
and indirectly involved to gather information about the context of the 
documents. Informative interviews were transcribed and analysed. In 
appendix three a list of my interviews.
This chapter is divided into five parts. It starts with a rough sketch of 
the policy on military training simulators and especially the vocabulary 
that was developed to define ‘the need’ for the new military training 
simulator. Then, in the next two paragraphs, I focus on two arguments that 
were given to ‘prove’ that the new duel simulator was necessary. In the 
analysis I explore the argumentation and try to determine what was kept 
silent. In the conclusion of this chapter I will discuss the relevance of this 
exploration to my understanding of validation.
Enabling realistic military training
In this paragraph I focus on the vocabulary that was used to define the 
value of military training simulators in the organization. I take as point of 
departure the study on advanced educational tools that was submitted 
on October 12th, 1993 by the Project team Simulatoren KL to the Army 
board.68 In this study the Army foresaw for itself a new role in the world. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had precipitated many reforms in 
military training. These would gradually lead to the conversion of an army 
with mainly conscripts to an army with only professional soldiers. This 
army would require a totally different training structure. The new situation 
together with educational technological developments was addressed in 
the study on Advanced education tools (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993a). 
In the text I will refer to it as the ‘study on GOLM’. The report consisted 
of more than ninety pages. According to the minutes of the Army board 
dated November 2nd, 1993, it was accepted without many amendments.69  
The study proposed many new training simulators, but decisions about 
their procurement were postponed.
The study on GOLM starts with the acknowledgement that a reform 
in military training was necessary. In the near future the Army would 
become a modern organisation with peace enforcement tasks everywhere 
in the world. Therefore soldiers should be trained differently because 
they would operate in unknown terrains and in new circumstances. 
They needed more combat experience and should learn more about 
manoeuvre and tactical operations. The training tools that were currently 
available would not suffice to meet that challenge. The existing training 
tools were the result of an internal policy report titled Geautomatiseerde 
leermiddelen en simulatoren in de KL from 1985 which had influenced 
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the procurement and development of many new systems.70  However, the 
existing collection of training tools lacked consistency. The Army knew that 
new developments should be taken into account and a more systematic 
perspective on training should be developed. In order to achieve a 
coherent skill-set, various military skills should be trained stepwise 
separately as well as collectively. 
‘The all important aspect of the actions by manoeuvre units is the 
interaction between fire and movement, which means executing 
complete understanding of movement, observation and fire. Skills 
such as moving in the area of exercise as unnoticed and undamaged 
as possible is equally important as the effective firing.’71 (Ministerie van 
Defensie, 1993a, p. 47) 
However, another argument was also put forward. The document stated 
that the U.S. Army had extensive experience with indoor simulators 
(SIMNET) and duel simulators (DUELSIM).72 Frequent training with 
SIMNET would result in achieving the required level of skills much faster. 
More importantly, SIMNET and DUELSIM seemed to complement each 
other. The U.S. Army had discovered that units that were trained with 
SIMNET scored much better in field exercises with duel-simulators than 
those without that preparation. That idea was represented in the figure 
below, where the stadia of training are labelled as crawling, walking and 
running. The training simulators are placed in the figure in such way that 
they become means to improve the efficiency of training (Ministerie van 
Defensie, 1993a, p. 49). 
 
Figure 1: Stages of learning (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993a, p. 49)
The learning curve of a soldier (‘individuele opleiding’) is sketched in 
terms of crawling (‘kruipen’), walking (‘lopen’) and running (‘rennen’). The 
suggestion is that SIMNET would allow a soldier to achieve the stage 
of running much faster than s/he would without it. The duel simulators 
raise the level of running even further. The experiences of the U.S. Army 
are taken for granted; no sources are cited and no research data is 
presented. An association is made between the indoor training simulator 
SIMNET and the outdoor training duel-simulator DUELSIM. Before I can 
explain the position of SIMNET and DUELSIM in more depth, I need to 
say something about the structure of the study on GOLM. 
The study on GOLM presents a long list of different training 
simulators that were being used by the Royal Dutch Army. The list is 
structured in terms of levels of training, which is a system that is used 
by the U.S. Army. Five levels of training are identified (Ministerie van 
Defensie, 1993a, p. 27):
1. Level of individual skills. In this level trainees follow a specific 
educational program. For this purpose very specific learning tools 
are used. For example, an individual learns to drive a vehicle with a 
special-purpose driving-simulator.
2. Level of system skills. In this level individuals have to work together 
to use a certain weapon system. For example, whereas in level 1 
the individual learns to drive a vehicle, in level 2 another individual 
learns to load the gun and another one learns to aim and shoot. 
Together they form a crew for a single tank team and learn in level 2 
to work together.
3. Level of platoon skills. In this level the different weapons systems 
have to learn to cooperate according to military doctrine. In our 
example they learn about cooperating with other tanks to execute 
a specific mission. In order to be able to do that, the commander 
of the platoon has to follow the right procedures for command and 
control (in the Army this is known as C2).  
4. Level of team/company skills. In this level several platoons have 
to work together to execute specific missions. For example, four 
platoons of four tanks each have to coordinate their actions. Using 
C2 and following the correct procedures, tactics and techniques is a 
major challenge. 
5. Level of battalion. In this level commanders have to learn to make 
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the right decisions and use their (restricted) resources wisely. A 
company of tanks is just one of the many resources. Commanders 
can also use, for example, artillery or Special Forces. The 
commander can put a number of different teams with different skills 
into the battle. A battalion can consist of more than 1,200 soldiers.   
 
The five levels are used to map the application of the current military 
training simulators. The study on GOLM presents a list of training 
simulators and categorises them according to the appropriate levels 
of training. The driving simulator (‘rijsim’) trains skills on the first level. 
The small arms simulator (‘KKW-Sim’) trains skills on the first and second 
level. Computer-supported education (‘COO’) trains on the first level. 
Simulators for specific parts of weapon systems (‘deelsim’) are used for 
skills on the first, second and third level. INTACT, a virtual tactical trainer, 
is mainly used to train skills in the fourth level. The fire control trainer 
for platoons (‘PVT’) trains the second and third level. The duel-simulator 
(‘duelsim’) is used for training the third and fourth level skills. KIBOWI, 
a constructive trainer for commanders, is mainly used for training on 
the fifth level. The figure below represents the relations between the 
simulators and their position in the training (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Available training simulators (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993a, p. 6)
However, the current situation (‘ist’)—as pictured in Figure 2—was not 
ideal. The project team identified many bottlenecks. The training 
simulators INTACT and Duelsim received the most attention in the 
analysis. INTACT is a so-called indoor training simulator that can train 
different tank crews to manoeuvre and shoot. However, the simulator 
was old and could not be maintained anymore according to the study. 
The focus on team level was problematic with the simulators that could 
only train parts of weapon systems. The proposal was to develop a 
new simulator called TACTIS that would allow certain specific weapons 
systems simulators to be integrated (so those systems would not have 
to be procured separately anymore).73   The duel-simulator received 
a lot of attention as well. The current equipment was unsuitable to 
obtain combat experience.74 It did not offer facilities for evaluation. 
The designated training area for the duel simulator in the North of the 
Netherlands—Marnewaard—was unsuited for training on levels four and 
five. It had no instrumentation for tracking the geographical positions 
of the units and the vehicles. Moreover, certain biological, chemical 
and nuclear weapon effects could not be simulated. Pushed by new 
technological developments a new structure was proposed  
(see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Desired training simulators (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993a, p. 68)
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The new proposed structure was called the ‘soll situation’. In the soll 
situation TACTIS and Duelsim have a central position in training. 
TACTIS replaces INTACT and some partial simulators (‘deelsim’). The 
functionalities of the duel-simulator (‘duelsim’) were extended and could 
serve more training purposes on four different levels. I will focus the rest 
of my discussion on the duel simulator now covering levels one to five.
‘A bottleneck will always be how to simulate a potential operational 
situation as real as possible. Practising with duel simulators and using 
an instrumented exercise area provides the opportunity to practise 
in operational circumstances which have been simulated optimally. 
Only aspects such as fear of being either wounded or killed in battle 
cannot be simulated. The usefulness of duel simulators needs no 
further argument.’75 (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993a, p. 56)
But further explanation was given. The duel simulator would be very 
helpful to train complex battle operations. The battalion is the lowest 
level in which battles are fought. Thus, the allocation of means should be 
trained accordingly. For example, soldiers can learn to handle requests 
for fire support, gathering intelligence, utilising military engineers, 
distributing supplies and providing medical assistance. Training a 
battalion brings the many different capabilities of the Army together.
‘Since the probability of putting professionals (BBT-units) into service 
has grown in comparison with the era of compulsory military service, 
it’s absolutely necessary that BBT-units are trained optimally to achieve 
a maximal degree of professionalism. Only in this way particular care 
can be taken as to the execution of not only the qualitative tasks 
but the quantative completion at the highest level as well. The self-
confidence required must be acquired by practising with a complete 
manoeuvre battalion in duel situations against a highly professional 
enemy. The use of duel simulators in relation with battalions in an 
instumented practice area (as tested at Hohenfels at the moment) 
is for both education and training of a regular army an almost 
essential condition for taking part in a mission  in behalf of peace-
enforcement.’76 (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993a, p. 57) 
Almost five pages are written about the value of duel simulation, which 
should be extended with additional functionalities for tracking soldiers 
and vehicles, evaluation of training and the possibility to execute 
scenarios in different training areas. The study on advanced learning 
tools recommended that the American training area in Hohenfels, 
Germany should be rented to experiment with the duel simulator and 
instrumentation that is available there. It was also recommended that the 
duel simulators work group should make an inventory of the quantitative 
and qualitative requirements to prepare a formal procurement 
procedure.77  
The study convincingly characterised two (new) training simulators 
as pivotal for the training of soldiers. Training simulators were no longer 
autonomous systems but stations in a trajectory to achieve the best 
possible military skills. The duel simulator was important because it 
made field exercises ‘more realistic’ and trained skills that are essential 
for executing peace-enforcement missions. 


































The picture on the front page of the study on advanced educational 
tools summarised the proposed policy. A variant of this picture can 
still be found in many presentations about training simulators.79  
It shows how soldiers climb up to the top of the pyramid due to 
training. On the lowest level the tools for computer-supported 
education (‘computer ondersteund onderwijs’) are mentioned. The 
next level shows the simulators for learning how to handle equipment 
(‘bedieningssimulatoren’). On top of that are the specific driving 
simulators (‘rijsimulatoren’). This is followed by simulators for practicing 
shooting skills (‘schiet simulatoren’). Then the simulators that I have just 
discussed follow: the tactical indoor simulators (‘Tactische “indoor” simn’, 
this is TACTIS), duel simulators (‘duelsimulatoren’) and the instrumented 
training areas (‘geinstrumenteerd oefenterreinen’). On the top of the 
pyramid we find INTACT (a tactical trainer for commanders) and KIBOWI 
(a constructive trainer for commanders). On the level of duel simulators 
a circle is drawn to explain that this simulator is used outside with 
real weapons and vehicles. The soldier has to cope with ammunition 
(‘munitie’), weather conditions (‘weer’), equipment (‘organiek materieel’) 
and terrain (‘terrein’). The arrows point to the top to explain that the first 
three steps of the pyramid are about individual training (‘individueel’), 
the next three steps about training crews (‘bemanning’), and the last 
steps about training commanders (‘commandanten’). This picture 
represents in a nutshell the training philosophy of the modern soldier.  
The project team had developed a new vocabulary. It was able to 
systematically link training simulators with levels in training. However, 
the team also knew that neat argumentation and a nice picture were 
not enough. Practical evidence was needed. The team thought that it 
was best to construct this evidence by setting up a demonstration. The 
demonstration should make the enormous value of a duel simulator 
visible. The training exercise ‘Laser Fuselier’ was framed to do exactly 
that (exhibit 1). The evaluation of the training exercise could serve as 
the foundation of an operational statement of need (exhibit 2), which 
would be needed to start the procedure for the procurement of the 
duel simulator. The development of both exhibits were exactly the two 
activities that were recommended in the study on GOLM.80
Exhibit 1: Training Exercise Laser Fuselier (June 1993)
The first ‘proof’ of the value of the duel simulator had to be constructed 
in a military training exercise. The project team wanted to convince their 
colleagues that the purchase of this high-tech duel simulator was really 
necessary. The U.S. Army possessed a special training area in Hohenfels, 
Germany known as the Combat Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC).81 
The training area was outfitted with a duel simulator, evaluation facilities 
and—most importantly—a large military unit that could operate as an 
opposing force. This set-up was exactly like the vision described in the 
study on GOLM. The terrain with its facilities was hired from the U.S. 
Army for the training exercise ‘Laser Fuselier’ from June 28 to July 10, 
1993. This training exercise became an important showcase. Failure 
would make many high-ranking officers even more sceptical about this 
fancy training system and put pressure on the financial budget. As a 
retired senior officer who was involved with the evaluation told me on 
October 23rd, 2008 that there is always a group of sceptics inside the 
army, especially when it is about computers and lasers. This group  
grew up without these tools and did not see the value of them. He said: 
‘At the moment that you are formulating requirements for a new 
weapon system, those who do that are somewhat higher up in the 
organization. They had their elementary education some 15-20 years 
ago and were in fact shaped by the former generation. And now they 
try to develop something new for something the present generation 
has to work with. If you approach them with technical more modern 
ideas the older generation displays a different attitude.’82 
Not everyone within the military staff wanted a high-tech training 
simulator. Some felt that military training exercises had to be conducted 
in the field using real equipment. Proponents thus used exactly this 
argument, claiming the duel simulation used real weapons in a real 
training exercise. Therefore it was important to demonstrate the benefits 
of the technology. 
The training exercise ‘Laser Fuselier’ was carefully documented. 
A full colour Reference Guide Laser Fuselier dated August 24th, 1993 
and an internal memorandum Training report Laser Fuselier dated 
November 17th, 1993 were widely distributed (Ministerie van Defensie, 
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1993b, 1993c).83 Both reports provide unique insight into the events 
that occurred during the training exercise. They emphasise that this was 
the Dutch Army’s first opportunity to train with a training simulator on 
the battalion level. The Dutch Army had some experience on the lower 
training levels (esp. three and four), but that experience was quite recent. 
The reference guide states prominently, ‘Actually, it was not until mid-
1992 that the Dutch Army carefully began to exercise with MILES on 
a platoon and team level’84 (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993b, p. 2). The 
Combat Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) was outfitted with Multiple 
Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES). MILES was at that time the 
standard duel simulator of the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army had been using 
MILES since 1981, but only after the fall of the Berlin Wall had they made 
it possible for NATO partners to hire the equipment with the terrain.85 
The documentation elaborately discusses the technology and set-up of 
the training system. It explains that live ammunition was replaced with 
laser signals. All the weapon systems were extended with a transmitter 
to send laser codes. Firing a blank cartridge activated the transmitter to 
send a weapon-specific laser code. If a sensor received this laser signal 
from an opponent, then a beep will sound. Only a special device in the 
possession of the military trainers could stop this sound signal. If hit, the 
soldier could no longer fire his/her gun and should be treated as if s/he 
were wounded. When an armoured vehicle—equipped with special laser 
receivers—is hit, the laser signal is decoded to determine whether the 
weapon was actually able to damage the vehicle. If so, a flashing light 
on the vehicle is activated to indicate to the shooter (and others) that the 
target has been eliminated. Designers also paid close attention to the 
behavioural aspects of the training simulator:
‘During the exercise Laser Fuselier and the preparatory exercises, it 
has become abundantly clear that MILES has a very positive effect on 
the behavior of every individual soldier. The so-called ‘small jobs’ are 
carried out almost automatically. In exercises with MILES, aspects such 
as correct positions on the terrain or proper deployment of weapons 
occur as a matter of course and without permanent supervision and 
correction by (career) officers.’86 (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993b, p. 8) 
 
The training exercise Laser Fuselier had the following configuration:
• An exercise terrain that was large enough for executing tactical  
 operations with heavy armoury (i.e. tanks).
• A set of ‘rules of engagement’ for executing the exercise fairly.  
 Everyone knew, for example, what to do when a laser hit him and his  
 vest responded. The basic rule was: ‘let MILES rule the game’.
• An ‘observer-controller organisation’. The observer-controllers  
 monitored the soldiers. Did the soldiers comply with the ‘rules of  
 engagement’? How did they perform? The observer-controllers  
 evaluated the training exercise with the commanders. For the Dutch  
 Army this combination of tasks was new. Previously, the Dutch Army  
 had only used the ‘auxiliary leaders’, who were a kind of arbiter,  
 making the decisions about who was killed and who was not. Now  
 they merely had to observe and evaluate the events later on. 
• Facilities for evaluation. All events during battle were recorded and  
 made available for evaluation. In Hohenfels the evaluation facilities  
 were located in a separate building from the facilities for ‘tactical  
 analysis and feedback’. Moreover, special teams recorded videos of  
 important situations to be discussed later in the evaluations. 
• A ‘well-schooled training partner’ also known as the ‘opposing force’  
 or ‘OPFOR’ was present. The U.S. Army had a permanent opposing  
 force that knew the terrain very well. They did not use the standard  
 U.S. Army vehicles because they wanted to model a (non-Western)  
 enemy.  
It was a rather large training exercise, certainly for the Dutch Army. 
Just to give some idea of the scope of the simulation, I will provide 
some numbers. 2,565 military personnel participated in the exercises. 
Their vehicles arrived over two days on 13 trains, consisting of 345 
cars and reaching a total length of 6.5 km. The trains were loaded at 
seven different locations in the Netherlands. During the exercise 31,000 
rations and 175,000 litres of fuel were distributed. As well as 30,000 UZI 
cartridges, 180,000 machine gun bullets, 2,400 rockets for the anti-tank 
gun and 83 tons of ‘dummy’ ammo for the artillery. The training exercise 
took fourteen days. Five of these were what the Army calls ‘logistical’, 
meaning they were taken up with arriving, preparing, dismantling and 
departing. During the other seven days four military missions were 
executed with a special unit of the U.S. Army as the opponent. The 
engineering corps and the medical staff also participated. For example, 
on the first day the 17 Armoured Infantry Battalion had to move to 
an assigned area and set up defences. Then it had to defend an area 
and prevent the enemy from entering it. This mission led to intense 
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combat ‘in which above all the Leopard tanks and the infantry on foot 
gave a praiseworthy performance—both sides suffered heavy losses’87 
(Ministerie van Defensie, 1993b, p. 21). MILES made it much clearer for 
the soldiers whether they were ‘killed’ during the training exercise. This 
is a huge step forward compared to the old situation in which an arbiter 
had to decide who was ‘killed’. As one retired senior officer told me on 
October 23rd, 2008 in Harskamp: 
‘And then I watched CMTC working in practice and we reacted: this 
is what we want. For as an infantryman, the simple soldier with his 
rifle, who never was capable of anything, who stood in the training 
area and shouted ‘pinda, pinda’ (peanut, peanut) to a tank and the 
tank just proceeded (...) During the training at Hohenfels I noticed a 
little scout who eliminated a tank with a Dragon. And that fellow was 
so happy, that he meant so much, that it was something that really 
worked, then I thought , that’s what we need.’88
It was not only the staff officers who were enthusiastic, troop Captain P. 
Van de Valk, the commander of the Alfa team also wrote glowingly of the 
simulation in the evaluation: 
‘Because of the realistic nature of the exercise—’war except for real 
death’—every participant had an optimum level of motivation. The 
attack power of MILES in combination with a truly uncontrollable 
enemy, made this exercise hands down a complete success. Whether 
or not OPFOR won or lost is, in principle, irrelevant if lessons were 
learned that could be applied in actual practice. The fact that by 
chance OPFOR won twice is a pleasant incidental circumstance, but 
it was surely not the objective. Our success against OPFOR can be 
attributed to a large extent to the deployment of our tank crews, 
for which even the Americans made no attempt to disguise their 
admiration’89 (p. 28) 
All taken together, the American duel simulator MILES performed very 
well according to the evaluations. The report even mentions the next 
generation of the MILES duel simulator that was in development. This 
new system was not present during the training exercise, but offered 
great promise. The new duel simulator includes a Global Position System 
(GPS), which enables a range of new features. First, it allowed trainers to 
track precisely the locations of the soldiers and the vehicles. Moreover, 
other types of weapons could be included such as artillery, minefields, 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Brigade General F.J.A. 
Pollé, who was in charge of the training exercise, wrote in the ‘retrospect’ 
of the report: 
‘For me, the introduction of MILES is truly a revolution in the training 
of the Dutch Army. Individual soldiers learn all the basic principles 
almost automatically, whereas their commanders are exercised in 
a way that until now was only possible in real war’90 (Ministerie van 
Defensie, 1993b, p. 31).
The positive experiences are emphasised in the internal memorandum 
(Ministerie van Defensie, 1993c). Providing ‘realistic training’ was the 
major theme in the documentation. The documentation addresses 
several issues more systematically although it does not clarify how these 
issues were identified. The following are some issues that were not 
mentioned earlier:
• ‘Self management’ receives a lot of attention. It is considered  
 very important that the soldiers now behave much more ‘realistically’.  
 For example, the soldiers now take cover and load their guns without  
 supervision. Although sometimes ‘cowboy’ behaviour occurs, the  
 soldiers have to be familiarised with the idea that they can be  
 eliminated or can eliminate someone else.
• More attention should be paid to the development of the ‘rules of  
 engagement’. MILES requires an extensive set of game rules. In  
 principle, the rule should be: ‘let MILES rule the game’, but this  
 requires that all participants are equipped with MILES, which might  
 be impossible for the Dutch Army. Therefore additional rules are  
 necessary to cope with that fact as well as with specialist tasks like  
 logistics, engineering and artillery. ‘Without doubt MILES is a  
 ‘revolution in training for war’, however, it requires a good set of rules  
 and a consistent enforcement of these rules’91 (p.6).
• Training with MILES can be rather exhausting. In hindsight five  
 subsequent days with battle exercises was too much for the soldiers.  
 On the last day the battalion did not have the energy to do the  
 exercise well. Only four to seven hours a day should be reserved for  
 fighting.  
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 This is not a lot, but the exercises are very intense. The suggestion is  
 to set up a more balanced schedule.
• The evaluation of the training exercise is an important aspect of the  
 system. The way in which the U.S. Army approached the after-action  
 reviews was the topic of an on-going debate between the Dutch  
 participants. Some liked the reviews very much but others hated  
 them. Thus a new approach should be developed. For example, the  
 participants of the training exercise were also members of the ‘hero  
 of Hohenfels award program’. Five ‘heroes’ were selected and given a  
 medal for their role. The ‘heroes’ appreciated this enormously.
• The logistics of the ‘wounded’ during the training exercise was a big  
 problem. Only a very small percentage of the wounded were treated  
 within the appropriate time frame. It took too long for wounded  
 soldiers to be examined and taken to the field post (gathering place  
 of the wounded). The transportation from the field post to the field  
 hospital did almost go as it should. 
It is no surprise that, according to the project team, the training exercise 
proved that the duel simulator was necessary. The project team was 
able to align many military interests. The infantry in particular saw this 
simulator as a great contribution to tactical training. Finally they could 
execute large-scale operations and keep everyone and everything in 
the picture. They could train with real weapons and achieve tactical 
training objectives. The cavalry, however, was more interested in the 
‘realistic behaviour’ of the weapon systems. The weapons should 
function the same way they would in combat situations, so that gunnery 
training would be possible (regarding targeting, time lag, ballistics, 
impact and precision). Further, the tank crew should not be hindered 
by the simulation technology within the small space of the tank. Both 
perspectives—infantry and cavalry—had to be taken into consideration. 
Both documents emphasise the realistic experience and self-regulatory 
power of the system. The duel simulator became a new kind of arbiter 
that makes the decision about the ‘life or death’ of the soldier. This 
experience with MILES had an enormous impact on the formulation of 
the requirements for the new simulator. 
Exhibit 2: Master plan Duel Simulators and 
Instrumented Terrain (March 1995)
The second ‘proof’ of the value of the duel simulator was that the 
duel simulator would fit seamlessly into the military organisation. The 
Duel simulator project team presented its vision on March 8th, 1995 in 
the Master plan Duel simulators and instrumented terrain (Ministerie 
van Defensie, 1995b). It is a big step towards the formal procurement 
procedure. The Master plan aims to integrate the duel simulators and 
instrumented training with the overall training program of the Royal 
Dutch Army in order to improve the quality of training in the field. It 
specifies the qualitative and quantitative requirements of the training 
simulator. The aim of the Master plan is to improve the field training 
exercises from level one to level five. 
The Master plan gives an extensive description of the duel simulator. 
Even at this early stage a distinction is made between duel simulators 
with a ‘one-way laser system’ and duel simulators with a ‘two-way laser 
system’. The ‘one-way laser system’ just sends a laser beam toward its 
target and the target calculates the damage that is caused.92 The ‘two-
way laser system’ reflects the laser beam to its sender so that a ballistic 
trajectory of the ammunition can be calculated. The target can then 
calculate the precise location of the ‘hit’ and the damage that should be 
caused. The ‘two-way laser’ makes it possible for the duel simulator to be 
used for gunnery training. The one-way versus two-way laser discussion 
would pop-up several times over the next three years, as discussed in 
the previous chapter.
The Master plan systematically follows the vocabulary on the levels 
of training introduced in the Study on GOLM, but links it with ‘three 
levels of duel simulation’. The three levels of duel simulation are: (1) 
Duel simulators as such (DS); (2) Duel simulators with instrumentation 
(DS/IT); and (3) Duel simulators with instrumentation and Area Weapons 
Effects Simulation (DS/IT/AWES). I will briefly explain each type. The 
first level, the duel simulator as such, is able to send and receive laser 
signals. It is able to hit targets and calculate damage. Thus soldiers 
can be trained to fight opposing forces and the system simulates the 
bullets that are exchanged. However, in this simulator the positions 
of the soldiers and vehicles as well as the status of the weapons are 
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not recorded. Therefore training exercises cannot be evaluated with 
detailed data and many trainers are needed for overseeing the training 
exercise personally. On the second level a tracking and tracing system 
(GPS) and facilities for evaluation are also present. The location and 
status of all soldiers and vehicles are recorded. Facilities for after-action 
reviews are also present to allow for a discussion of the training exercise 
among the commanders. On the third level, besides the duel simulator, 
an instrumented exercise terrain and a system for Area Weapons 
Effect Simulation are available. That system enables the simulation of 
artillery fire, chemical, biological and nuclear threats. These can only be 
simulated when the exact locations of soldiers are known by the system. 
The Master plan discusses some ‘scenarios of use’:
Scenario 1: A DRAGON (anti-tank weapon) fires with a weapon 
simulator at a tank. The detectors on the tank receive the signal and 
recognise the signal as a DRAGON. The system on the tank processes 
this signal as a hit, which disables the firing mechanism (laser) of the 
tank and activates a flashing light and smoke flair on the tank. The tank 
cannot disable other targets anymore and the soldier with the DRAGON 
sees that he disabled the tank by the flashing light and smoke. If a laser 
signal of a rifle hits a tank, the system on the tank recognises this signal 
and it doesn’t have any effect on the tank.
Scenario 2: Every soldier wears a special vest and has sensors 
attached to the body and helmet. If a soldier fires at and hits another 
soldier the soldier who is hit will hear a loud beep from his/her vest and 
will not be able to use his/her rifle. 
Scenario 3: A nuclear, biological or chemical threat can be simulated 
in specific areas. If soldiers in an affected area do not wear their 
protective masks, the simulator will recognise this and notify the soldier. 
He will hear a loud noise and the soldier’s rifle will be disabled. The 
same procedure will be followed when soldiers are in a certain area 
that is hit by artillery. The system can calculate how many vehicles and 
soldiers would be affected within that area. 
The Master plan emphasises that training exercises need to simulate 
‘real’ circumstances for combat. 
‘Training must be done under simulated combat circumstances. The 
better simulation imitates reality, the higher the efficiency. Experience 
has shown that the first actual contacts in battle claim most casualties. 
With duel simulators reality can be approached very closely. In the 
Gulfwar it appeared that by using duel simulators the inexperienced 
units / the inexperienced personnel had acquired so much training 
and selfconfidence that they fought like as if experienced units.’93 
(Ministerie van Defensie, 1995b, p. 7)
The experience of the U.S. Army in the first Gulf War is taken for granted. 
It is an interesting argument considering the controversies surrounding 
the Gulf War.94 In the analysis section of this chapter I will discuss this 
argument. Now, however, I continue my discussion of the structure of the 
Master plan. It states that if no duel simulators are available for the army 
then the army cannot train the soldiers adequately. The Master plan 
mentions that the Army possesses only a few duel simulators for training 
on level one and two but these are out of date. This equipment cannot 
be used for large training exercises or for the practice at the higher 
levels (esp. team and battalion). 
Figure 5: Table from Master plan Duel simulators and instrumented terrain  
(Ministerie van Defensie, 1995b)
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In Figure 5 for each level the value of the duel simulator is assessed. I 
will discuss this table in some detail. Again we see the different levels of 
military training (explained in paragraph 2), this time from 1/2 to 6/7/8 
(first column). The next column gives an assessment about whether the 
duel simulator is a necessity. The answer in each case is yes (‘ja’), except 
for levels 6/7/8. For these levels it is not necessary because the Army 
of the Netherlands is not large enough for training the (international) 
cooperation of many battalions together. The third column assesses 
whether instrumentation and AWES are necessary. Here we see a more 
ambiguous picture: for levels 1/2 and 2 the answer is no (‘nee’). Then on 
level three the answer was yes desirable (‘gewenst ja’), but not necessary 
(‘noodzakelijk nee’). On level 4 and 5 instrumentation and AWES is 
considered necessary. Interestingly, in the fourth column at level 4 and 5 
two remarks are added: the instrumentation should be mobile, meaning 
that it should be possible to use it at different locations (remark 1 of 
level 4); and it would be necessary to use it outside of the Netherlands 
(remark 3 of level 5). The structure of the arguments is based on the 
GOLM study, but this time the arguments are completely focused on the 
added value of the duel simulator. I summarize the argumentation in the 
following paragraph.
On the first level a duel simulator is necessary to prepare the soldiers 
for their tasks. The duel simulator will increase the return on training 
time. Consider, for example, lessons about setting up posts, learning 
to observe, and crossing terrain. The training exercise ‘Laser Fuselier’ 
taught the Army that the duel simulator changed the behaviour of the 
soldiers. On the second level the training is extended; not only are 
individual skills trained but also the cooperation with others. A large 
part of the training on this level can take place on specific simulators. 
However, to train these skills in a training area duel simulators are 
required. On the third level soldiers learn to function as a unit (platoon). 
A tank platoon, for example, consists of a maximum of four vehicles. 
The scale of these exercises is quite small; therefore it is not necessary 
to purchase instrumentation and AWES for this level. On the fourth 
level new issues emerge. This is the level where many disciplines have 
to be combined, for example, observers for fire support, engineers 
for setting up hindrances and specialists on nuclear, biological and 
chemical warfare. The functionalities of AWES are necessary for such 
exercises. At this level the commander should develop a combat plan 
and clearly indicate where s/he wants to use his/her resources. A single 
instructor cannot oversee that. Thus, to get a good overview, the training 
area must be instrumented. The skills of the commander and the men 
should be trained in different training areas and in different weather 
conditions. As the Royal Army of the Netherlands does not possess 
training areas in foreign countries, using a mobile duel simulator would 
be a logical solution. Such a simulator could be set up anywhere. On 
the fifth level the armoured infantry battalions and tank battalions are 
trained. Even more disciplines are in the field and have to cooperate 
together. For each training cycle two scenarios should be practised: a 
large-scale conflict and a humanitarian crisis situation. These scenarios 
will be practiced in foreign training areas because no sufficient space 
is available in the Netherlands. The training exercise for large-scale 
conflicts would require a duel simulator with instrumentation and AWES. 
In such a conflict much movement and firing occurs. However, a training 
exercise for a humanitarian crisis situation or peace mission might not 
require instrumentation.95 The battalion staff would have a coordinating 
role, but most activities would take place on lower levels (unit, platoon). 
Most operations in humanitarian missions are static, for example, setting 
up a roadblock, guarding an area, surveillance in an area, observing 
a sector, and small-scale patrolling. Therefore, even if instrumentation 
were available, the analysts in the control centre would not see much. 
For example, they would not see any movements or fire-exchanges on 
the computer screens. Nevertheless, training military skills on the fifth 
level for large-scale conflict certainly requires a duel simulation with 
instrumentation and AWES. The levels beyond that are not relevant to 
the Dutch Army. These kinds of training exercises are not often practiced 
and when they are the exercises require international cooperation (e.g. 
NATO). It is therefore not necessary to procure duel simulators for this 
level.96
The analysis succeeded in linking the levels of training with specific 
‘levels’ of duel simulators. It showed that all of the parts of duel 
simulators were needed for the training of the Army. This ‘logic’ also 
made it clear how much equipment was necessary. The simple version 
of the duel simulator was needed for training on levels one, two and 
three. This would require simulation equipment for 171 pistols, 2376 
Diemaco rifles, 2705 vests, 70 Dragon (anti-tank weapons), 36 Leopard-2 
tanks, 86 vehicles and six other weapon types. The equipment would 
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be split up over five school battalions and three brigades. For training 
on level four and five a more sophisticated duel simulator was needed 
with instrumentation and AWES: ‘a MILES-2-like system’ (Ministerie van 
Defensie, 1995b, p. 23). For these exercises equipment for 133 pistols, 
688 Diemaco rifles, 24 Dragons, 821 vests, 29 tanks, 62 vehicles and 
five other weapons systems were desired. In the accompanying text 
it is explained that certain duel simulators should be shared during 
large training exercises. Moreover, the duel simulators for pistols were 
not really needed. The fact that the ‘enemy’ should be equipped with 
duel simulators was also taken into account. During the procurement 
procedure the numbers would change several times to fit the 
organisational structure and the budget, as I have already explained in 
the previous chapter.
Analysis
In this paragraph I attempt to explore the ‘validity’ of the training 
simulator. How is validity achieved in the policy documents? The opinion 
of military staff is a very insightful source to explain how validation 
in a military organization works. I will examine several issues that 
have surfaced during my description of the work of the GOLM study 
project team and the project team that prepared the Master plan Duel 
simulators. 
At face value it seems that the military leaders in charge of simulation 
technology worked according to a well laid out plan consisting of three 
phases. First, a vocabulary was introduced that combines organizational 
structure with training and simulators. Second, a ‘real’ training exercise 
was organized and executed to test the strength of the network and 
to enrol new actors (most importantly, the soldiers). This resulted in 
a ‘realistic training’ (exhibit 1). Third, based on these experiences the 
rationale for procuring the duel simulator was constructed for the Dutch 
Army. This mobilized financial and political actors (exhibit 2). It is clear 
that the temptations of ‘mastery and control’, as discussed in chapter 
four, are also present in this description. However, the trainers who 
were quoted in chapter four only spoke about the mastery and control 
of soldiers; now mastery and control is extended to the organizational 
training process. The development of the new policy on GOLM can be 
seen as an attempt to abbreviate and displace local training activities ‘in 
order to facilitate remote control’ (Lilley et al., 2004, p. 76). The policy 
makers try to include the many different training simulators (Figure 2) 
in an overall and closed system (Figure 4). The desire to ‘engineer’ an 
organization can be traced back to a study of (Shenhav, 1999, p. 72). 
Yehouda Shenhav explained how engineers translated system theory 
into the realm of management. They claim that an organization is as 
‘engineerable’ as a technical system. The policy makers follow a similar 
path. In their perspective training is a process that steers soldiers from 
station to station - each a different training simulator - in which the 
soldiers are processed from level one to level five. 97 But every station 
results in an ‘upgrade’ of the ‘end product’ in skills and capabilities that 
serves the interests of specific actors. The challenge for each actor is 
therefor to anchor the (training) process to some sort of ‘reality’ of war 
using specific (simulation) tools. Reality is not just a representational 
matter because the ‘realistic’ behaviour that is trained is based on 
accounts of other trainings and technical skills required to operate 
‘complex weapon systems’ (as soldiers call them). What then can military 
training be anchored to? 
Can the training be anchored to ‘real’ battle experiences? No, 
because trainers disagree on how wars should be fought and soldiers 
should be trained. An editorial in the Militaire Spectator pointed out that 
‘operational warfare’ was experiencing a revival during the development 
of the training policy (“Renaissance van het operationele denken,” 1988). 
Two developments were causing this revival. First, nuclear weapons 
used to be considered devastating instruments that made all military 
operations senseless. However, when nations started to reduce their 
nuclear arsenals military operations became more important again. 
Nuclear weapons soon became somewhat irrelevant from an army 
perspective, as nuclear war would only harm both combatants. Second, 
technological developments in armoury, surveillance, and information 
systems enabled commanders to oversee a much larger terrain. As 
a result, the efficient coordination of different armies (national and 
international) became an important skill. This change made the ability 
to do manoeuvring and tactical operations pivotal for military activities. 
Thus the claim that military training should focus on tactical training 
gained more strength. The new duel simulator training fit very well into 
this philosophy on training. The training simulator creates a regime of 
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‘mastery and control’ that reveals how the different specialities in the 
Army work together. Contemporary commanders like to see a network 
of military capabilities that works efficiently at accomplishing its tasks 
(Bousquet, 2009). Interestingly, discussions about other kinds of military 
operations were silenced. The duel simulator is especially suited for 
training massive operations in which different units work together to 
achieve tactical goals. War is framed as something involving winning 
from the enemy and gaining terrain. In the policy document it was 
explicitly stated that the duel simulator would not be very useful for 
preparing soldiers for ‘peace operations’. This opinion was immediately 
silenced, as it was not considered relevant.98 The new training simulators 
should fit the current military training organization. The current actor-
network is interested in ‘realistic training’ and not in mobilizing new 
actors involved with ‘peace enforcement’. The policy of military training 
is about justifying current interests and stabilizing the actor-network. 
It just disregards the concept of ‘reality’ where ‘peace enforcement’ is 
involved.
Can the training be anchored to the ‘real’ experiences of the U.S. 
Army? No, because experiences cannot be taken out of context. Let 
me illustrate this point with another article in the Militaire Spectator. In 
October 1987 the article Almost war by retired Colonel Van der Spek 
appeared. He wrote that ‘to his surprise’ the Dutch military press did not 
pay any attention to the National Training Centre of the U.S. Army that 
was established in 1981. Van der Spek believed that this is important 
news, because ‘A valid reason existed for that, because the way of 
training in the NTC meant a revolutionary breakthrough to the reality 
of the training grounds, it’s almost like a war going on’99 (Spek, 1987, 
p. 441). Van der Spek described three important features of the NTC. 
First, armoured (tanks) and infantry battalions spend several weeks in 
the Mojave Desert to practice tactical operations against a ‘permanent 
opposing force’. The opposing force could deploy weapons quite 
similar to those allowed by the Warsaw Pact and it operated according 
to that doctrine. Second, both forces are outfitted with the Multiple 
Integrated Laser Engagement Simulation system (MILES). Tanks and 
guns are connected to this system that shoots laser beams. When the 
laser hits a sensor on a target an alarm sounds. The weapon system of 
the target is then automatically disabled. It is possible to reconstruct 
who was disabled, when, and by whom. Third, the training staff also 
includes the so-called ‘observer/controllers’, who monitor the exercise 
from the point of view of a specific military discipline. Importantly, the 
weapons systems must be fully operational; damaged systems cannot 
participate in the exercise anymore. The quality of the gunner now 
has an impact on the outcome of the battle as do surveillance and 
the usage of the terrain. The medical staff and logistical support are 
also important parts of the exercise. Van der Spek notices that military 
training,  ‘With this organisation and resources it proves to be possible 
to get a degree of realism in a training which approaches reality very 
closely. As with live ammunition there’s no messing around with laser’100 
(p. 442). This description was probably the first that many officers in the 
Dutch Army had of the concept of the duel simulator. It suggests that 
training of tactical skills can be supported by advanced technological 
tools. The article concludes with five lessons learned from the U.S. Army 
training exercises: Infantry needs bulldozers to dig gunner holes and 
trenches; The substitutes of the commanders need tactical knowledge 
and the battalion commander should be in the frontline of battle; A 
position without the possibility to fall-back is a trap; In covered terrain 
the deployed infantry should be in the lead, not the lightly armoured 
infantry; Fire, movement and support are the founding principles of 
modern war. According to Van der Spek, the training simulator makes 
training so ‘realistic’ that an army can use it to learn to fight ‘real’ wars. 
But this article makes one very important assumption: the experiences 
and the training technology of the U.S. Army can be used as a relevant 
example for the Dutch Army. 
The U.S. Army is often an example for the Dutch Army. The 
controversy that I sketched about the possibilities of the training 
simulator seems a boring policy debate, but upon closer inspection it is 
mainly about the organisation of military training. Simulation technology 
is linked with different levels of military training and linked with different 
military specialities. What is most important is that the promises for 
better training with training simulators works for the U.S. Army: ‘The Gulf 
War proved that inexperienced units that trained with duel simulators 
had gained enough confidence that they fought like experienced units’ 
(Ministerie van Defensie, 1993a). This could be a frightening promise. 
What is meant by ‘gained enough confidence’? It seems a rather straight-
forward statement that anchors the value of the duel simulator to its 
similarity to ‘real battle’, but it is important to note that the document 
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refers to the Gulf War. Many historical accounts have been written about 
the Gulf War also known as Operation Desert Storm. It took place from 
January 17th, 1991 to February 28th, 1991. Many people watched this 
war unfold live on television. The U.S. Army showed live pictures of 
missiles hitting their targets. The war was a big media spectacle but all 
this ‘transparency’ did not prevent massacres such as the ‘Highway of 
Death’ and the ‘Bulldozer Assault’ from happening.101 The ‘Highway of 
Death’ received a lot of media coverage. A part of the highway 60 km 
north of Al Jahra was bombed to prevent a column of retreating forces 
from fleeing from Kuwait to Iraq. The exact number of deaths was never 
established but more than 500 seems plausible. The ‘Bulldozer Assault’ 
was another military operation in which the U.S. Infantry Division had to 
neutralise a network of trenches that was part of a large defence line of 
the Iraqi soldiers. The commander decided to use anti-mine ploughs 
and just bulldoze the trenches over, burying an unconfirmed number 
of 44 Iraqi soldiers alive. These events clearly demonstrate that the Gulf 
War is not a very convenient example to support the claim that a duel 
simulator is necessary for training the Dutch Army. Nobody challenged 
this example, however, and the claim that duel simulators are effective 
at the U.S. Army was just taken for granted. When I discussed the claim 
of effectiveness on October 23rd, 2008 with the retired senior officer 
responsible for the Master plan he told me that the demonstration in 
Hohenfels convinced him completely, ‘At that moment I thought, yes, 
that’s what we really need.’102 There was no room for other reflections. 
The officer just wanted to improve the effectiveness of the military 
training. In order to make the value of the training simulator visible the 
Dutch Army had to be ‘reconfigured’ by developing a new policy on 
advance learning tools. The retired officer replied: 
‘What is the policy in military training? There is none. No policy 
whatsoever. Oh yes, there used to be some kind of policy formerly, 
but actually we were reinventing the wheel all the time. How are we 
going to train, what are we doing now, levels, what can be ventilated, 
and then in a general generic way to say from there, okay but how 
do we fill that out. But that entire policy which had been agreed 
upon, was nowhere. And the first time that we, and that happened 
before, for we were reinventing the wheel all the time, each time with 
a different input, because the purpose it was meant for and how it had 
to be sold was just a little different in nuance, however, those people 
were philosophing anew each and every time. In that situation I was 
lucky that I had to make this kind of stories a couple of times  which 
enabled me to get back to them.’103 
The advanced learning tools did not fit into the organization very 
well. Instead the organisation was altered to provide for simulation 
technology a better fit. The U.S. Army supported the construction 
of this new policy by supporting the training exercise Laser Fuselier. 
The training exercise was inscribed in the policy on military training. 
This policy paved the way for the Master plan of the duel simulator. It 
was hard work to construct the need for a new training simulator. My 
interviewee did not approve of my suggestion that the working group 
created the need. He said to me on October 23rd, 2008:
‘I didn’t make it up, it existed, you only have to apply it. And it had to 
be sold to the army board, for they had to find a way to sell it to the 
politicians, because it’s an expensive deal.  And then the entire story 
of this document comes to light. For there were people who were very 
enthusiastic, among them the commander of the 13th brigade.’104
An anchor for training simulators is not present in this policy documents. 
This is quite remarkable, because in these policy documents one would 
expect that it was also defined why certain skills have to be trained. Now 
the argument is a kind of circle-argument: We train soldiers a certain 
way, but this can be more effective by new technology. We try this 
technology out and see that it works. Latour makes clear that the validity 
of the argument is located in the ability to involve ‘enough’ actors and 
build a powerful actor-network. A pre-existing external reality that has to 
be simulated has nothing to do with it, only when actors are allowed to 
speak for the ‘reality’ and can claim that it is ‘accurate’ the simulation is 
valid. So, what are the consequences when training simulators become 
detached from something like a ‘pre-representational reality’ (Lilley et 
al., 2004, p. 79)? The answer is quite simple: military training becomes a 
‘simulacrum’ (Baudrillard, 1983, 1995b). In a simulacrum any reference to 
an ‘underlying reality’ is impossible: 
‘All of this is simultaneously true, and the search for proof, indeed 
the objectivity of the facts does not put an end to this vertigo of 
interpretation. That is, we are using a logic of simulation, which no 
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longer has anything to do with a logic of facts or an order of reason. 
Simulation is characterized by a precession of the model, of all the 
models based on the merest fact - the models come first, their 
circulation, (...), constitutes the genuine magnetic field of the event. 
The facts no longer have a specific trajectory, they are born at the 
intersection of models, a single fact can be engendered by all the 
models at once’ (Baudrillard, 1995b, p. 13). 
Thus, the ‘reality’ of the duel simulator has to be made up in the Master 
plan Duel simulation. Baudrillard stated that, 
‘The real is produced from miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory 
banks, models of control - and it can be reproduced an indefinite 
number of times from these. It no longer needs to be rational, 
because it no longer measures itself against either an ideal or negative 
instance. It is no longer anything but operational. In fact, it is no longer 
really the real, because no imaginary envelops it anymore. It is a hyper 
real, produced from a radiating synthesis of combinatory models in a 
hyperspace without atmosphere’ (Baudrillard, 1995b, p. 3). 
The Master plan defines the many components of the duel simulator 
such as the necessary features and the organizational structure. It 
reduces military training to a technical process which soldiers have 
to go through. The soldiers have to move from one simulator to 
another simulator in order to proceed from level one to level five. The 
duel simulator becomes an important actor in the network, because 
it produces the inscriptions which make it clear that the soldiers 
have passed their tests. At the same time the duel simulator is the 
materialisation of a specific script on military training that silences 
alternative voices.
Conclusion
In this chapter I investigated how the military leaders validated the new 
training simulator. I argue that validation is not focussed as much on the 
specific duel simulator, but is focussed on its role in the ‘integral training 
process’. Therefore a fit-for-purpose vocabulary was introduced that 
was able to make connections between soldiers, military organization 
and technology. The external references to how war should be trained 
and fought were inspired by experiences of the U.S. Army. The U.S. 
Army became an influential part of the actor-network that resulted in a 
‘realistic’ training simulator. The experiences of the U.S. Army became 
inscribed in the Dutch Army by accepting the technology, training 
systems and structure. The U.S. Army was able to present an image of 
‘real war’. In other words, the U.S. Army was able to articulate reality 
without much effort. ‘Realistic training’ becomes for the Dutch Army a 
configuration of components that not only connect well on a national 
level but also are compatible at an international level. This makes the 
training of soldiers’ hyper real. Hyper real refers here to the inability 
to distinguish ‘reality’ from a simulation of reality. Nobody knows what 
the next war is and should be modelled for the training simulator, but 
everyone can claim to be a spokesperson for ‘the real war’. Bruno Latour 
would point out that the one that is the most connected with other 
actors is able to enforce its interests. In practice the military leaders with 
the highest ranks are allowed to speak. We can conclude that the actor 
that is able to articulate reality is able to define the validity of the military 
training simulator. But the validity of the training simulator also includes 
the safety of the soldiers. The training of soldiers is not without risks. The 
soldiers are trained to operate dangerous weapon systems that can kill 
people in an instant and the soldiers are sent to locations where they can 
be killed. Thus the training of soldiers cannot be taken lightly. Therefore 







Chapter 7. Political Validation 
Introduction
In the previous chapter I described how the military leaders validated 
the proposals for the new training simulator. I argued that it was not the 
specific duel simulator that was validated, but the training program as 
a whole. I described how the vocabulary of the training program was 
inspired by the approach of the U.S. Army. Thus not only was the training 
simulator introduced in the Dutch Army, but also many modern concepts 
about military operations. The U.S. Army was an influential actor and thus 
part of the actor-network that resulted in the ‘realistic’ training simulator. 
Now in the fourth and last aspect of validation I turn my attention to 
the relationship between the Minister of Defence and Parliament. This 
is a special relationship, because the Minister is the spokesperson of 
the ministry and therefore accountable for all its actions. I will attempt 
to answer the question: Why did the Parliament easily accept simulation 
technology in military training? My exploration starts on Monday the 
10th of June, 1985. On that day a special parliamentary committee on 
the structure of military terrain requested information on how simulation 
technology could contribute to the reduction of military training terrain. 
This request for the Minister of Defence would eventually result in 
six letters on this topic from 1986 until 1993 (Kamerstuk II, 1986/87, 
1988/89, 1989/90, 1990/91a, 1992/93). The correspondence offers a 
rare insight into how the Ministry of Defence was able to build step-by-
step toward an alliance to promote simulation technology. The ability 
of simulation technology to bring the ‘reality of battle’ to the training 
grounds pushed the debate forward. I will provide an overview of this 
correspondence to show how a debate about the utilisation of military 
terrain was transformed into one about the (great) value of simulation. It 
can be seen as the birth of an actor-network around military simulation 
technology. For that reason I use the term ‘simulation network’. I will 
discuss this debate with Bruno Latour’s conception of politics and 
diplomacy in mind. Especially in his later work he proposes an approach 
on how hybrids should be discussed in the realm of politics, as I will 
explain. 
This chapter is mainly based on an analysis of five parliamentary letters: 
(Kamerstuk II, 1986/87, 1988/89, 1989/90, 1990/91a, 1992/93). This 
information was supplemented with archival research in which I traced 
the meetings of the committee that prepared the parliamentary letters 
and the reports on which the letters were based. I tried to explore this 
aspect of validation only by focussing on the data that was available in 
the national archive and public documents.105
This chapter is divided into five parts. I start by describing the 
context in which the question about simulation technology was raised. 
Then I discuss the six memoranda in three paragraphs. Paragraph 
three discusses memoranda 1-2, which focuses on mapping the 
network. Paragraph four discusses memorandum 3, which explains 
the possibilities of simulation technology. Paragraph five discusses 
memoranda 4 to 6, which connects simulation technology with the 
structure of the military organization. After the development of the policy 
on simulation technology is sketched I will analyse three re-occurring 
claims and connect it with the conception of Bruno Latour regarding 
how hybrids should be debated in Parliament. This exploration gives us 
insight into how the training simulator was validated in the relationship 
between the Minister of Defence and Parliament. In the conclusion 
of this chapter I will discuss the relevance of this exploration to my 
understanding of validation.
Setting military training simulators on the agenda
In the mid-eighties Parliament had several debates about the future of 
military training terrains. The aim of the debate was to develop a policy 
on military terrain for the next twenty-five years. It is a rather lengthy 
procedure with many steps and hearings in specific geographical areas 
to develop one spatial structure that is satisfactory for many different 
interest groups. The main actor in this debate is the State Secretary 
of Defence.106 The guiding principle is that the Ministry of Defence 
should have enough terrain available for the tasks that the Armed 
Forces should fulfil. Providing this terrain is challenging. Terrain is a big 
issue in the Netherlands because the Ministry of Defence needs a lot 
of it. For example, it needs ground for training areas, shooting ranges, 
barracks, warehouses, hangers, airstrips and harbour facilities. This 
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is defined in the nota on military terrain as the ‘direct use of terrain’ 
(Boskamp & Snaterse, 1985). But there is also the ‘indirect use of terrain’. 
This involves safety zones, noise zones and environmental impact. One 
can imagine that frequently the interests of soldiers, nature lovers and 
neighbours collide. One wants to have a peaceful walk in nature, and 
the other wants to practice with a noisy Leopard tank or F16 fighter 
jet. The policy on military terrain is therefore developed not only by 
the Minister of Defence, but also in cooperation with the Minister of 
VROM – the ministry that deals with spatial planning, infrastructure and 
environmental issues. A special parliamentary committee was installed 
with representatives from each political party to discuss the many 
environmental aspects of the proposed policy.  
Mr Van Vlijmen, Member of Parliament for the Christian Democrats 
(CDA) sketched the different positions during a meeting of the special 
committee on June 10th, 1985 thus (Handelingen II, 1985): 
‘The monotonous and penetrating clatter of German boots had a 
threatening sound of oppression, in spite of the fact that sometimes 
they sang melodiously, whereas the sound technically unpleasant 
whining of Canadian trucks was music to our ears, as a song of the 
‘song of security’.’107 (92-1) 
The committee on military training areas debated about the intentions 
of the Ministry of Defence to reduce the size of the training areas from 
23,000 to 17,000 hectares. That was a reduction of 25%. This aim could 
only be realised if the current training areas were reconstructed so 
that they could be utilised more intensively. The parliamentarians were 
not unhappy with this reduction of military space, but critiqued the 
accompanying environmental policy. They were afraid that a higher 
usage of certain military terrains could disturb civil life in the vicinity 
too much. Moreover, they were very much concerned about the noise 
pollution especially of low-flying fighter jets. Therefore each and 
every representative of the political parties was eager to point out that 
simulation technology could help to reduce the irritations for civilians and 
also limit the strain put on the environment. The minutes document the 
parliamentary meeting in great detail. I will present three perspectives 
subsequently to show that even in this early stage of the political debate 
the common understanding of simulation technology is striking. 
The representative of the liberal party Den Ouden-Dekkers (VVD): 
‘Of specific interest is the role simulators and simulation techniques can 
play during training, which even may lead to a reduction in sites that 
have been taken up. Regarding this last-mentioned argument, I tend to 
place a query, for practical skills must be acquired on the battlefield. I 
do see possibilities as to the restriction of noise nuisance and for the 
improvement of safety by which the number and size of the unsafe 
zones may be reduced. What will the Government’s opinion be on this 
subject?’108 (92-8)
The representative of the Christian-democratic party Van Vlijmen (CDA): 
‘I would like to get more explicit information concerning simulation 
techniques. I already discussed the effect of changes in the military 
forces during training, but in what way will simulation techniques 
develop and what will be the effect on the use of training sites? A certain 
minimal experience in practice will remain necessary. How much must 
this be? In firing you may gain a lot by means of simulation techniques, 
however, driving a tank must be learned by doing.’109 (92-2)
 
The representative of the socialist party Van den Bergh (PvdA): 
‘We are much dissatisfied with the memorandum on the significance of 
simulation techniques. Modern computer techniques offer an almost 
unimaginable opportunity in the field of simulation and training. 
Using these opportunities optimally may even reduce the full use of 
the training sites. It is disappointing that in no way whatsoever has 
the willingness become visible to calculate the effect of simulation 
techniques on the full use of the sites, though the significance is pointed 
out in the structure scheme. I must admit that this calculation is not a 
simple matter; however, the willingness should exist in principle. In this 
stage my judgment on the full use as formulated earlier and based on 
a well-trained military force is that the Ministry of Defence put aside the 
effects of simulation and asked too much. I will ask the State Secretary 
to set out in detail where the calculations come from, in an attempt to 
convince my parliamentary group as to this element.’110 (92-23)
The Members of Parliament brought up several issues but along one 
common theme. They expected that simulation technology could reduce 
the size of military training areas and therefore reduce the negative 
impact of these areas on people and the environment. The link between 
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simulation technology and ground is easily made, but this link is also 
immediately restricted for, as the parliamentarians explain, ground will 
always be needed for training practical skills. This raises the question 
of the difference between the ‘real world’ and the ‘simulated world’. 
Apparently, training should always be partly done in the ‘real world’. This 
is an interesting point because a training exercise is always a simulation of 
dramatic events, such as wars, rescue missions or protection missions, just 
to name a few. Training is therefore already a simulation. But in this line of 
argument it is meant that the events are not real, only the equipment that 
is handled is real. Thus, the crucial idea is that training with a simulator 
is ‘less realistic’ than training in a vehicle that actually can be used in the 
event of war. 
In the debate of June 10th, 1985 the Minister of Defence wanted to 
bring forward two points concerning training simulators. First, he argued 
that simulation technologies will not necessarily lead to the reduction of 
military terrain, but it could lead to a less intensive use of the terrain. For 
example, instead of forty weeks of training exercises in the field, only thirty 
weeks would be required if a part of the training was done with simulators. 
This would mean that the size of the terrain would be the same, but the 
disturbance for people living nearby would be reduced. Second, the 
Minister agreed that the application of simulation technology for training 
could reduce the damage for the environment, and therefore, it should 
be considered ‘when possible’. But he also emphasises that there are 
restrictions, stating: 
‘Nevertheless, the use of simulators is faced with restrictions. Situations 
occur that cannot be practised at this moment. The question is, will 
it ever be possible, certainly in a military apparatus? For example, a 
situation that is hard to imitate comes about when training technical 
manoeuvres with a number of units and tanks. It’s the intention then 
that in a dangerous situation soldiers leave their tanks fast in order 
to dash for cover. The need for training sites will be understood by 
everyone.’111 (92-34) 
Despite his elaborate explanation, the Minister promised to study the 
potential of simulation technology and was willing to inform Parliament 
about the findings. This promise would eventually lead to six letters to 
Parliament.
Memorandum 1-2: Focus on simulation-network 
(February 1987)
On February 23th, 1987 the memorandum ‘Simulation techniques’ was 
submitted to Parliament (Kamerstuk II, 1986/87). It is a document of 
thirteen pages that defines simulation technology as follows: ‘Simulation 
techniques are considered to be all automated means of learning with 
which reality can be imitated, be it fully or partially.’112 The first paragraph 
of the memorandum introduces a number of concepts. Many distinctions 
are made. Simulation technology can be used to train the ‘handling’ and 
‘maintenance’ of weapon systems. The technology can ‘support’ training 
practices, but also ‘replace’ it. This has consequences for the ‘direct’ 
and ‘indirect’ use of terrains, but also for ‘noise production’. Simulation 
technology should be judged in terms of ‘educational’ and ‘financial’ 
criteria. Educational criteria are the ‘educational return of investment’, 
the ‘level of reality’, and the ability to ‘control and evaluate’. Financial 
aspects are related to the reduction of exploitation costs in terms of wear 
and tear of materiel, ammunition and fuel. This network of concepts 
is related with different types of simulators. Two main groups are 
distinguished: ‘indoor’ and ‘outdoor’ simulators. The indoor simulators 
can be broken down into the following subcategories: ‘handling 
simulators’, ‘driving simulators’, ‘command and control simulators’ and 
‘flight simulators’. Outdoor simulators are ‘weapons system simulators’ 
that can be used for ‘gunnery training’ as well as ‘tactical training’. The 
reader is made aware that simulation technologies within the armed 
forces do have an educational and financial impact on all six types of 
training. Instead of one actor (simulator technology) the reader is now 
left with six actors (types of training), which are not only related with 
one actor (space), but at least with two others (education and finances). 
How is this network of concepts connected with the impact on military 
terrain? I will look into the argument that was set-up to ‘proof’ the 
benefits of three types of simulators: the driving simulator, the flight 
simulator and the weapon system simulator, paying particular attention 






















Figure 1: Network of concepts related to simulation technology
First, I summarise the argumentation for the adoption of the indoor 
driving simulator. The memorandum explains that ‘a certain number’ 
of driving simulators are used to train drivers to use tracked vehicles, 
including the infantry fighting vehicle M113CV and the tank Leopard I. 
In 1987 additional simulators will be used for the updated tank (Leopard 
II) and the new light-armoured vehicle (YPR 765). The procurement 
of simulators for ‘wheeled vehicles’ is now ‘being considered’. It has 
become clear – according to the memorandum – that the simulator 
significantly reduces the number of kilometres that needs to be driven 
to complete the course for a military driving license. This reduction is 
almost 50%. This point is explained with the following table.
Vehicle Without  
Simulator
With Simulator Reduction of costs in  
exploitation (yearly)
Leopard I  
(improved)
220 km per trainee on a 
training vehicle
80 km per trainee
30 hours with the simulator
2.2 million Dutch guilders
M113 CV 270 km per trainee on a 
training vehicle
135 km per trainee
10 hours with the simulator
0.7 million Dutch guilders
Table 1: Savings with a training simulator (Kamerstuk II, 1986/87, p. 06)
Table 1 shows that without the training simulator a trainee has to 
drive a tank 220 km to earn a driving license. If a training simulator is 
available, then the trainee need only drive 80 km on actual military 
terrain. Therefore, a reduction of 140 km can be accomplished for 
each trainee, which means there is a reduction of noise pollution and 
the military terrain is spared. This saves the army 2.2 million Dutch 
guilders (approximately 1 million euro). But this is only a small part of 
the training. After completing the driving course, the soldiers have to 
take part in the ‘prescribed training exercises for military units’. Those 
exercises are focused on the cooperation as a crew in a single vehicle 
and cooperation together with other vehicles. In those types of training 
exercises a training simulator cannot be used. However, much is to be 
expected from the new ‘Computer Generated Imagery’ (CGI) systems 
that will make it possible to visually simulate the outside world. The 
technology is under development for the Leopard II and YPR 765, but it 
will probably not lead to a further reduction of kilometres. The simulation 
technology may help to decrease the wear and tear of the actual 
equipment. It will save the environment and it will save money. Thus, 
the letter concludes that the possible savings for the required military 
terrains have already been achieved and it is not to be expected that 
much more can be gained.
Second, I will summarise the argumentation for the adoption of the 
indoor flight simulator. Flight simulators help to familiarize the trainee 
with the airplane, board systems and procedures. The pilots can gain 
experience. With training simulators some emergency procedures can 
be practiced that otherwise would be too risky. The training simulator 
is ‘an ideal means of instruction, because guided flight situations can 
be imitated, repeated or registered relatively realistically.’113 The flight 
simulator supports training, but can also ‘partly’ replace it. According 
to NATO norms, the fighter pilots of the Royal Air Force have to fly at 
least 180 hours yearly. The pilots fly additionally an average of 35 hours 
in the simulator. It is noted that ‘This number of hours is needed for 
gaining and keeping the operational standard required. The real flight 
training comprising elements which cannot or only in a restricted way be 
simulated in a flight simulator makes it impossible to replace a greater 
part of the real flight training by flight simulators.’114 The flight time with 
the ‘real’ airplane cannot be reduced any further. The current state of 
technology cannot produce a detailed three-dimensional picture of 
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the world. It is necessary for pilots to see detail and depth, for example, 
when taking off, landing, flying low, engaging ground-based targets and 
in air combat. The simulator can only partly simulate physical forces. For 
example, the force of taking off on the human body cannot be simulated 
adequately. This means that the fighter pilot does not feel as engaged 
in a simulator as he would in real flight. To maintain an acceptable ‘skill 
level’ pilots must do at least the number of training missions currently 
required. The effects on noise production are already taken into account 
in the current data in the nota on military terrain. It is emphasized that 
simulation technology is constantly improving especially the realistic 
presentation of three-dimensional worlds, so possibly the use of training 
simulators can increase. However, ‘Because of this and the restrictions 
earlier mentioned a further reduction of the flight hours really needed 
will be impossible. The result of a further application of simulators 
will be an improvement of the quality of education.’115  This pattern of 
argumentation is very similar to that in the first the statement about the 
tank simulator. In this case, more attention is paid to the shortcomings of 
training simulators. 
Third, I summarise the argument concerning the adoption of 
the outdoor simulator for ‘tactical training’. The text anticipated the 
procurement of the duel simulator, the system that we know as the 
Mobile Combat Training Centre. This argument explains more or less 
why a simulator for tactical training is needed but it does not address 
its effects on the required training areas. It starts with a description of 
the ‘minimal needs for approximately 1000 weapon system simulators’, 
which includes simulators for: Light Automatic Rifle (FAL), MAG Machine 
Gun, anti-tank weapons Dragon and TOW, the 25mm board gun and 
both the Leopard I and Leopard II. The proposed weapons system 
simulators serve as a sort of precondition for the rest of the argument. 
Training areas are important because military units should be able to 
learn how to coordinate their actions with each other; therefore they 
should be able to practice together in real time and space. This is 
called ‘tactical training’. Tactical training is crucial for acquiring skills 
that are ‘essential in war’. Three kinds of military operations should 
be practiced: defensive operations, delay operations and offensive 
operations. The operations should be trained in natural terrain, because 
weather conditions and fatigue must be personally experienced and 
the possibilities of terrain fully exploited. This can only be done in large 
training areas and an indoor training simulator cannot replace this. The 
outdoor simulation technology, however, can increase the ‘reality’ of the 
training exercise. Laser-transmitters and laser-receivers can be mounted 
on weapon systems so that vehicles can be immobilized and individual 
soldiers taken out. It should be possible to outfit a platoon with 
these weapons simulators. That would mean enough weapon system 
simulators for two teams of approximately four hundred soldiers each. 
The argument continues. It is not yet clear what the consequences will 
be for military terrain. The duel simulators could lead to less frequent, 
but more effective usage of the training areas. The laser technology is 
also valuable for the training of gunners because it can replace firing 
with ‘real’ ammunition. However training with ‘real’ ammunition remains 
necessary because lasers will ‘never be able to completely simulate 
a sharp shot; the necessity to make the soldiers get confidence in 
their own weapon system; the necessity to test the weapon system 
periodically.’116 Therefore the number and size of training areas 
cannot be reduced, but their use will possibly change. The simulation 
technology will make it possible to practice more complex skills, such 
as shooting from a moving vehicle. Maybe some training can be moved 
from the shooting range to the training area. 
This third argumentation goes even a step further than the previous 
two. The need for a new kind of simulator is presented.117 This simulator 
is immediately linked with training for tactical operations and a more 
effective use of space. It will not reduce the need for space, but it will 
improve learning. The simulator is taken outside to the training area. The 
driving simulator and flying simulator are examples of simulators that 
are inside a building and replace the real world with a virtual world. Now 
the duel simulator replaces the real world with an augmented world. 
Following this augmentation: training becomes even ‘more realistic’. 
In the vocabulary of Latour, many actors are associated with each 
other in this case study. New connections can be strengthened 
in many ways and it becomes very difficult for the critical reader 
to challenge the new network of connections. The reader is now 
convinced that simulation technology is effective for the Army. Let’s 
discuss the connections between the three main actors of the story: 
simulation technology, spatial structure and reality. I showed that 
simulation technology is immediately divided into many different 
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types of simulators. All these simulators have a connection with space 
but the relation between space and simulation technology becomes 
fuzzy. Simulation is not ‘one thing’. The same happens with space. Space 
is divided into direct and indirect use. Both mainly refer to the actual 
occupation of ground, water or air by human and non-human actors. It 
becomes possible to map the territory and occupy it with markers in terms 
of geographical coordinates. Mapping space becomes an exchange 
market where military terrain can be given up and compensated with 
virtual space. So, the idea of ‘reality’ enforces two opposite ways of 
looking at simulators. Reality is, on the one hand, used as a concept to 
promote simulation technology. Simulation technology enables a more 
realistic way of training to improve the quality of learning. On the other 
hand, however, it is impossible to replicate reality completely. Reality in 
military training can only be found in the real world. Suddenly there are 
different levels of reality: virtual reality and ‘real’ reality. They must be kept 
separate and managed. How does that work?
Memorandum 3: Focus on simulation technology 
(January 1989) 
On May 11th, 1987 the memorandum ‘Simulation techniques’ (nr. 1-2) 
was discussed with the parliamentary committee of defence. Although 
the minutes of this meeting are undisclosed, it is clear that this meeting 
led to a new memorandum, number 3, which was sent to Parliament 
on January 17th, 1989 (Kamerstuk II, 1988/89). Upon the request of the 
parliamentary committee on defence, the Minister of Defence did make 
an inventory of available simulators and discussed the possibilities. 
Three ‘decisions’ were proposed. First, the armed forces should take 
the possibilities of simulation into consideration when procuring new 
military material. Second, the department of Research and Development 
must monitor the new developments in simulation technology 
together with the national industry and research institutes. Third, a 
coordination group is installed under the responsibility of the ‘Deputy 
Secretary General’ (the second in charge of the department after the 
Minister and State Secretary) and should periodically report about the 
application of simulation technologies in the armed forces. Together 
with the department of Research and Development the coordination 
group should formulate recommendations to develop simulation 
technology. The topic will also be addressed in the yearly defence 
budgets. Thus the discussion on simulation technology has moved from 
the special parliamentary committee on military terrain to the regular 
parliamentary committee of defence. The effect of simulation technology 
on training areas is not the main focus anymore; the focus has shifted 
to the new possibilities of the technology. Let’s discuss the gist of the 
memorandum. 
The terminology used in memorandum numbers 1 and 2 is 
discontinued. Now simulation is defined as ‘an aid in designing 
and evaluating systems and processes. A simulator arises when the 
simulation model is coupled to an imitated system. The simulation can 
be operated by people for the purpose of research or education and 
training.’118 Ergo, two areas of application are now identified: simulation 
for the development and evaluation of processes, and simulation for 
education and training. The Navy, Army and Air Force have different 
perceptions of simulation technology. Especially the Navy uses 
simulation technology for the development of new materiel. The Army 
and Air Force use simulation technology mostly for training. Not only was 
the concept of simulation technology broadened, but the classification 
of simulators for education and training was changed as well. Now 
three categories are identified: (1) Universal trainers; (2) Type-oriented 
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The categories are explained in appendix 1 of the memorandum. 
Universal trainers are for training skills that are not for a specific type of 
operational system. For example, 
‘As an example may serve the ship segments that are placed ashore to 
practise fire-and sea-damage fighting. Universal trainers are generally 
set up of components which are for sale in the civil sector, that’s why 
they are less expensive than the type of trainers specially developed 
for military purposes.’119 
The so-called ‘type-oriented trainers’ aim at training skills that are 
specific for certain military systems, for example, a flight simulator for the 
F-16 fighter jet, a trainer for the command centre of a submarine and a 
simulator for the Leopard II tank. Tactical trainers train tactical knowledge 
and skills. Therefore these are not type-specific trainers but combine 
several systems into one simulator. For example, the Action Speed 
Tactical Trainer (ASTT) combines sensors, weapons, and command 
systems so that a collective operation undertaken by a fleet of ships can 
be practiced. Interesting about this categorisation are the negotiations 
about the civil and military distinctions. The fact that certain technology 
is developed for civil purposes justifies creating a separate category of 
trainers. Here we see actors at work constructing and distributing new 
types of orderings, other than the ones addressed in the memorandum 
number 1-2. There is a whole new world of actors that must be managed 
in order to be able to become accepted by the military world. 
The memorandum continues. It points out that simulators are 
becoming an important part of military training. Simulators are meant 
to improve the quality of training. The arguments are similar with those 
used in the previous memorandum, but now the future has a voice: 
‘The fast technological developments allow simulators to imitate reality 
in an increasingly realistic way, because of which the student, after his 
education, is sooner capable of functioning skilfully in his military force 
division.’120 
However, the memorandum warns that, 
‘As stated in the memorandum of February 23rd, 1987, the use of 
simulators will never be in a position to fully replace education and 
training with the help of operational weapon systems. Simulation, 
however realistic, will always remain an approximation of a part of 
reality. The psychological strain, among other things, that occurs when 
working with real equipment is not experienced to the same degree 
with simulators. Simulators, however, offer more opportunities to 
practice than would be possible under peaceful conditions.’121 
This comes with a price.  
‘Simulators are expensive because they are produced in relatively 
small quantities.’122 
The benefits are qualitative: better training, a safe environment, and no 
burden for the natural environment. Further, the memorandum points 
out that quantitative benefits can only be found in ‘variable costs’ like 
ammunition and fuel. And then, again: 
‘Purchasing a simulator (a flight trainer, for example) does not mean 
that there is no need for training personnel in the real-world anymore. 
A simulator can replace neither ship nor tank nor plane.’123 
It continues: 
‘There are no general rules as to the standard of reality of simulators for 
an effective education and training. It has been ascertained, however, 
that after passing a certain standard of reality the educational value 
can only be further increased at significantly higher costs. For the sake 
of cost efficiency, it’s therefore important to be able to define the 
break-even point.’124 
The reality of the simulator is a reoccurring theme in the discussion. It 
appears to be two sides of the same coin. According to the argument, 
simulation is a desirable technology because it can replicate reality 
so well. But, on the other hand, it can never replace ‘real’ military 
training because it represents only a ‘part of reality’. But that ‘part’ can 
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always become ‘more realistic’. Suddenly the future gets an important 
voice. The Minister of Defence concludes that simulation technology 
offers many interesting challenges. It can create new and tailor-made 
training trajectories, which affects the work of trainers, maintainers and 
developers. Commercial components should be used to lower the price. 
New visualisation technology should be developed. Thus, new parties 
need to become interested to cope with these challenges. National 
defence industries, research institutes and international partners are 
mobilized. 
The third memorandum has extended the actor-network even 
further. New technological possibilities are anticipated. New local 
actors are enrolled: trainers, maintainers and developers. And new 
actors are identified: research institutes, national defence industry and 
international defence industry, and military partnerships with other 
countries. Simulation technology is now embedded in a much larger 
network than the Ministry of Defence. The ambition for ‘more realistic’ 
training becomes an argument for further development. Simulation 
technology is something that is considered desirable. It should be 
bought and implemented in the organization. In the next paragraph I 
explain how conditions for procurement were set.
Memoranda 4 to 6: Focus on organization (June 1990)
Memorandum 4 was sent to Parliament on June 27th, 1990. This time 
a simulator is defined as ‘a means of learning which with the help 
of advanced techniques imitates, entirely or partly, the educational- 
and training situations for users and/or keepers of the system.’125 It 
emphasises that ‘A modern military force cannot function without the 
application of simulation techniques. (...) Especially based on these last 
two assessments the use of simulation techniques is becoming more and 
more important for training and education. Its importance is so great that 
these days it has become an undetachable and integral part of training 
and education in the military forces.’126 The memorandum of 1990 (nr. 
4) does not mention the uncertainties that the memorandum in 1987 
(nr. 1) did. In 1987, ‘From the memorandum it appears that the means 
of applying simulation techniques are being rapidly developed both 
internationally and nationally.’127 In 1990 the application of simulation 
is widespread. The memorandum aims to inform the Parliament about 
the activities of the ‘coordination group simulators’ (abbreviated as 
COSIM), and the policy for simulators. The memorandum consists of 
four pages and it has nine pages of appendixes. It starts by outlining the 
developments in simulation technology. 
‘Caused by the rapid developments in simulation techniques it has 
become possible to imitate the relevant aspects of reality in designing 
training- and practice scenarios in complex weapon simulators on a 
higher scale. These developments are all important because they 
increase the quality of training. Besides, Defence knows a number 
of restrictions in the field of spatial planning in times of peace and 
has the aim to reduce the environmental impact by 25% at a later 
date. (...) In many cases, for that reason, an efficient and effectual 
training in modern weapon systems without using simulators is no 
longer possible.’128 
The Ministry of Defence requested the NIID to make an inventory of the 
Dutch defence industry’s knowledge on simulation technology. The NIID 
is the association of Dutch industry and can represent it in negotiations 
about new defence projects. The NIID immediately set up a special 
‘platform’ for the Dutch companies involved in simulation technology: 
NISP (Netherlands Industrial Simulation Platform).129 This platform aimed 
to coordinate the developments of simulators for the Ministry of Defence 
and offered the possibility for the ministry to work with one spokesperson. 
The NISP categorised its knowledge into ten sub-domains and mapped 
it with different types of simulators. After this exercise it became clear 
that the Dutch defence Industry was (quite unsurprisingly) very capable 
of supporting the Ministry of Defence in simulation technology. Not only 
national defence industry was mobilized, but also the different divisions of 
the armed forces. Almost forty projects were started that considered the 
purchase of some kind of simulator. The appendix A of memorandum 4 
lists an extensive overview of these projects. Each division of the armed 
forces – the Navy, Army and Air Force – identified relevant developments 
in simulation technology. Only the Navy made a distinction between 
universal trainers, type-oriented trainers and tactical trainers, quite 
different from the second memorandum (compare Figure 1 and Figure 3). 
The Army and Air Force identified only two types of training simulators:  



















Figure 3: Network of concepts related to simulation technology
I will discuss the remarks of the Army regarding training simulators. It 
now believes that simulation technology is indispensable: 
‘In education and training achieving a maximum output is of utmost 
importance. Therefore parts of education and the preparation for 
training sessions must take place under fully controlled circumstances. 
Sophisticated means of learning, among which simulators and 
simulation techniques take a prominent position, offer the prospect 
of improved training results. Moreover they offer, thanks to their 
capability of detached commentary on reports, unprecedented 
opportunities as to quality control.’130 
The Army developed a policy on ‘advanced learning tools’ that aimed to 
improve the training of weapon systems. A project team was set up to 
coordinate the policy on training simulators. Its task is to learn lessons 
that could be helpful for new projects and validate new training tools. 
The principles are only discussed briefly. A list with the description of 
nine training simulators that the Army has or will procure from 1989 to 
1992 concludes the current state of affairs. 
Four months later – on October 24th, 1990 – the parliamentary committee 
on defence discussed the memorandum. The account of that discussion 
is five pages long, memorandum number 5 (Kamerstuk II, 1990/91a).  
Mr De Kok, Member of Parliament for the Christen Democrats: 
‘(...) considered the letter with enclosures as a technical document 
containing only a few or no political lines. Those political lines had also 
been outlined earlier in papers on this subject. Just because it deals 
with a paper with a highly technical subject, it would be desirable to 
obtain a ‘second opinion’. In practice, however, this appears to be 
almost impossible in the Netherlands.’131 
This remark illustrates the theme of the debate. The Minister of Defence 
explained that the purpose of the memorandum was foremost to inform 
Parliament on developments in simulation technology. He pointed out 
that in the nota on defence (Kamerstuk II, 1990/91b) and the upcoming 
report on the structure of military terrain (Kamerstuk II, 1991/92) 
special attention has been paid to simulation technology.132 However, 
he promised to keep the Parliament informed about the policy on 
simulation technology. After this commitment was made only one letter 
was sent to inform Parliament. That was in 1993, memorandum number 
6 (Kamerstuk II, 1992/93). The short letter concludes with the remark that 
the procurement and use of simulation technology is now completely 
integrated within the Armed Forces, so it is not necessary anymore to 
inform Parliament on this as a separate issue. Thus concludes seven 
years of policy development on simulation technology as reported  
to Parliament. 
The letters to Parliament sketch clearly the construction of a 
simulation-network. It started with some hesitations about the 
applicability of simulation technology, because it was too closely 
associated with savings on military terrain. But the argument later 
included issues such as national defence industry, modern technological 
developments, international prestige and so on. In a short period of 
three years it seems the technology was totally accepted. There are 
other themes as well. Simulation technology started off as one kind 
of technology, but in the later letters different types of simulators 
were identified so that they could be distributed within the military 
organisation. Every division requires its own kind of simulation 
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technology. Simulation technology became linked with the ‘reality’ of the 
military operations. The Ministry of Defence is a very powerful actor; no 
one doubts its position in the network as the ‘centre of calculation’. The 
Ministry of Defence can organize spokespersons for industry (NISP), to 
redefine the organisation (by setting up work groups and restructure the 
departments), to speak for the technology (saying how it should work) 
and to award others (distributing funding). The Minister of Defence can 
therefore able to construct the simulation-network by aligning all the 
different actors on the idea that simulation technology brings realistic 
training to the soldiers. However, the story does not end here. Let’s look 
at whether the arguments that the Minister of Defence formulated in his 
letter were ‘right’ and whether Parliament asked the ‘right’ questions.
Analysis
In the previous three paragraphs I described how the Ministry of 
Defence systematically extended the simulation-network. In this 
paragraph I discuss three powerful connections that were made 
to extend the simulation-network. The first connection is about the 
educational effect of training simulators. The second connection is about 
the financial benefits of simulation technology. The third connection 
is about the reduction of environmental impact made possible by 
simulation technology. 
Connection 1: Educational effect?
How is simulation technology connected with educational effect? The 
expected training effects and financial savings created by a tank-training 
simulator were presented on February 23rd, 1987 in the memorandum 
number 1-2 ‘Simulation techniques’ (Kamerstuk II, 1986/87). These 
results can be reconstructed with a letter to the members of the working 
group on simulation (COSIM) dated November 14th, 1989.133 The letter 
presented a draft of the model that was used to calculate the effects of 
training simulators in the army. I will analyse this model briefly.   
Figure 4: Scan of original model (in Dutch)
The letter of COSIM explains that the Leopard 1 driving simulator 
was chosen because information about its use was easily accessible, 
which made it possible to compare training with the simulator to 
training without the simulator. The underlying assumption is that the 
performance of the drivers is the same for both types of training. The 
model consists of a table with three columns (criteria, with and without 
simulator) and twenty-two criteria, ranging from effectiveness to costs 
(See Figure 4 above). The criteria are grouped into four categories: 
Effectiveness (learning aims, reality, validity, control, time, involvement, 
repeatability, assessments, transfer); Safety (stress-factors, availability); 
Environment (air, water, ground, sound, landscape); and Costs (as 
total, and safety, education, and environment). The writers of the letter, 
i.e. the Bureau of Planning and the Bureau for Educational Research, 
judged most criteria in qualitative terms, that is, rather by discussion and 
comparisons than by calculating. However, the writers claim also that the 
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quality of knowledge transfer of the training simulator can be calculated. 
If a student does not require any additional training for driving a tank, 
then the transfer of the simulator is 100%. However, as the simulator 
cannot completely replace training with the real tank, the percentage 
of 100% is not achievable. But it is possible to calculate the knowledge 
transfer for the class of ’86-’87 by using the following formula: Training 
transfer = (Duration of the training of those without the tank simulator 
- Duration in hours or kilometres for the additional training with the 
training simulator) / Duration of the training of those without the tank 
simulator x 100%. It works out like this:134 
Tr = (t-st)/t x 100% 
Tr = training transfer 
t = duration of the training of those without the tank simulator
st = duration in hours or kilometres for the additional training with 
the training simulator 
Tr = (125km-85km)/125 x 100% = 32%. 
Tr = 32% is rated as a positive effect ‘++’. The training transfer would 
be negative if the students spent more time with the training simulator 
than without. The main assumptions of this model are that every student 
requires the same training (125km) and that passing the exam means 
that the same result is achieved. These assumptions about training are 
not discussed; however, they are rather big assumptions. Collin Marsh 
and George Willis would point out that most educational planners see 
a curriculum as a set of courses placed in a certain order that a student 
has to go through, but that it would make more sense to define it much 
more broadly as: ‘An interrelated set of plans and experiences that a 
student undertakes under the guidance of the school’ (Marsh & Willis, 
1999). This definition makes it possible to make distinctions between 
curricula that are conceived by the planners (‘planned curriculum’), 
trainers (‘enacted curriculum’), students (‘experienced curriculum’) and 
the unspoken, implicit, learning effects (‘hidden curriculum’).135 In the 
hidden curriculum one can also find the effects of the technology. The 
assumption that the ‘materiality of learning’ makes no difference at 
all seems to many authors a huge step. For example, Estrid Sørensen 
would argue that technologies (materials) would ‘influence the 
formation of learning’ (Sørensen, 2009, p. 07). Following her argument, 
the memoranda of the Ministry of Defence focus mainly on the 
functionalities and the applications of training simulators, but seem to 
forget that the material cannot be separated from the social. Questions 
about how this technology might change learning, knowledge, testing 
and, most importantly, the criteria that are measured are never asked. 
Sørensen points out, ‘the way in which humans are with materials, 
contrary to how humans make sense of materials -or how they make 
sense of themselves with the help of materials’ (Sørensen, 2009, p. 138). 
Training simulators may be more than just a tool; they may shape how 
people make sense of what they are and what they do. For a further 
discussion of the relation between learning and materiality see also 
(Fenwick & Edwards, 2010).
Connection 2: Financial gains?
How is simulation technology connected with financial gains? In the 
letter of COSIM the financial costs of the simulators are also calculated. 
I will describe step-by-step the reasoning of the letter and analyse some 
of its assumptions. 
On average 400 students per year do the driver training. Each 
student drives on average 125 kilometres (it refers to a report of 
the training centre ’86-’87). The cost for each kilometre is 176.72 
guilders (it refers to the list of tariffs LEO-1V from the finance 
department of 1 May 1989).  
(1) So the annual costs are: 400 x 125 x fl. 176.72 = fl. 8,836,000. 
The same reasoning is applied for training with a simulator: 400 
students a year, 85 kilometres per student, cost for each kilometre is  
fl. 176.72, 
(2) Total costs are: 400 x 85 x fl. 176.72 = fl. 6,008,480. 
But the costs of the simulator have to be included. The investment 
was fl. 3,500,000 but it should be operational for twenty years, that 
is (3,500,000/20 = ) fl. 175,000 for each year. The costs for keeping it 
operational are fl. 600,000 yearly. 
190 191
(3) So the costs for the simulator are fl. 175,000 + fl. 600,000 = fl. 
775,000 yearly. 
The driving simulator should be operational for 1800 hours per 
year (225 days x 8 hours). That means that the simulator costs 
(775,000/1800=) fl. 430 for each hour. A student on average spends 
6 hours on the training simulator.
(4) The total costs of the training with simulator are thus: 400 
students x 6 hours x fl. 430 = fl. 1,032,000. 
(5) Plus the conventional costs ((2)+(4) = fl. 6,008,480 +fl. 1,032,000) 
= fl. 7,040,480. 
The conclusion is that the savings with the simulator are (1) – (5): fl. 
8,836,000 - fl. 7,040,480 = fl. 1,795,520. 
The calculation only works because specific set numbers are used. No 
one explains what is included in the cost per kilometre (176.72). Does 
it include an instructor, maintenance, wear and tear? It is taken as a 
matter of fact. The same can be said about the costs of the simulator. 
What is included? Electricity? Maintenance? Development? At first 
sight it hardly seems to make a difference, but the problem is that so 
many assumptions about students and kilometres and instructor costs 
are included that it easily leads to different answers if the assumptions 
are changed. And that is exactly what seems to have happened when 
this calculation was sent to the Parliament. The alert reader notices 
immediately that there have been some slight changes with Table 1 (in 
this chapter) from the letter that was sent to Parliament. The indicators 
were quite different: 220 km per trainee without a simulator (instead 
of 125 km), 80 km per trainee with a simulator (instead of 85 km) and 
30 hours (instead of 6 hours) with the simulator. With these numbers 
we get a totally different outcome, assuming there are 400 trainees.136 
The savings of the training simulator would follow the same logic: fl. 
15,551,360 – 10,815,040 = fl. 4,736,320. But this amount is almost 
double the amount that was presented to the Parliament (which was fl. 
2,200,000). It is not quite clear how this difference in indicators can be 
explained. One can only guess about the motives. 
Although the logic used to calculate the savings seems very precise, 
it is actually very fuzzy. It takes a set of numbers – students, costs and 
kilometres – and presents it as the whole story. The economical footprint 
of the simulator is not taken into account nor are the ‘savings’ translated 
into specific reductions in staff or materiel. Even the developers of the 
model recognise that the model cannot be used to motivate decisions 
for the purchase of training simulators. It can only be helpful for 
comparing the benefits of two similar types of simulators. The outcomes 
of costs and benefits have largely to do with the assumptions one makes. 
Here one can see the power of an inscription device. The Minister of 
Defence presents a table with rather exact cost-benefit calculation. It is 
very difficult to doubt that. Only by looking at the construction of the 
cost calculation model can one start to raise questions. Interestingly this 
‘hard’ data is not doubted by Parliament, because this black box must 
be kept closed. Otherwise the whole financial structure of the Ministry 
of Defence could be at stake. Wiebe Bijker points out that experts are 
very effective in keeping black boxes closed. If the calculation were 
doubted then immediately the question would be raised whether 
the critical inquirer has sufficient expertise to understand the issue at 
all (Bijker, 2006b, p. 18). The Ministry of Defence has more than one 
very effective line of defence: non-military experts cannot understand 
the financial structure of military training. Thus we end up in a circular 
argument: being acknowledged as an expert requires the authorisation 
of the Ministry of Defence. This makes the financial ‘gains’ of the training 
simulator very much an effect of the actor-network set up by the Ministry 
of Defence.
Connection 3: Environmental gains?
How are environmental gains connected with simulation technology? For 
that analysis I take the last letter on simulation technology, memorandum 
number 6 (Kamerstuk II, 1992/93), as the point of departure. In that 
short letter an announcement is made that the Ministry of Defence will 
chair a NATO workgroup that will investigate the impact of simulation 
technology on the environment. Its aim is to map the benefits of 
simulation technology for the environment. This workgroup would 
eventually present the report Use of simulators as a means of reducing 
environmental impacts caused by military activities in 1995 (NATO-
CCMS, 1995). 
I have mentioned that the Minister of Defence was eager to point 
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out to Parliament that simulation technology is less damaging for the 
environment than training exercises that do not involve this technology. 
This argument was often supported with an appeal to reality: training 
with simulation technology is just as good as training in the real world; 
therefore it is not necessary to use resources in the real world. This 
distinction between the simulation and the simulated is very prominent 
in the debates about the usage of terrain. Let’s see how this distinction is 
transformed to measurable terms in order to calculate the environmental 
impact of military training and training simulators.
The report Use of simulators as a means of reducing environmental 
impacts caused by military activities written by the NATO Committee 
on the Challenges of Modern Society (NATO-CCMS) was published 
in November 1995.137 The research project was proposed by the 
Netherlands in June 1990 and completed in March 1995. The final 
report has sixty pages and there is almost the same number of pages 
in its appendixes. Thirty-three participants are listed, including seven 
representatives from the Netherlands. Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Italy and Poland participated with four members each. Greece and the 
United States of America participated with two members each. Norway 
participated with five members. And one representative was from the 
NATO. The report can be read as an exploration of how environmental 
effects can be calculated. The Netherlands provided the chairman and 
the secretariat for the seven meetings of the workgroup.
The ambition of the workgroup was formulated rather clearly: 
‘The environmental argument for the use of simulators was 
difficult to quantify and was usually made in qualitative terms. The 
question of how much environment benefit was gained from the 
use of simulators remained unanswered. In order to research this 
question, in 1990 the Netherlands Proposed a Pilot Study, reporting 
to NATO-CCMS, on the use of simulators as a means of reducing 
environmental damage caused by military activities.’ (NATO-CCMS, 
1995, p. 01)  
This ambition was soon revised: 
‘In the early phases of the pilot study, the group tried to encompass 
the whole spectrum of environmental impacts. During the course 
of the study it became clear that very few quantitative data were 
available on the whole spectrum of the environment. It also became 
clear that a broad definition of environmental impact was not 
workable for a pilot study limited in time and resources.’ (NATO-
CCMS, 1995, p. 02)  
Interestingly the project started with the goal to ascertain the 
environmental impact of training simulators, but this idea was quickly 
deemed to be unmanageable. The workgroup discovered that it was 
too difficult to obtain quantitative data on the environmental impact 
because the resources of the workgroup were too limited and the 
question was not ‘workable’. To narrow the scope of the inquiry, the 
workgroup decided to develop a ‘decision-making management tool 
for the use of simulators based on their impact on air pollution’ (NATO-
CCMS, 1995, p. 02). The result would be an instrument that could 
calculate the environmental impact and answer questions like: In what 
situation would it be beneficial to use training simulators? Although this 
ambition seemed achievable, many research problems still had to be 
solved. Regardless, the workgroup expected that the questions could be 
answered within the constraints of time and money. 
The report starts by making some distinctions. First, the impact of 
military transport systems is, compared with civil transport, very small. For 
example, the air pollution caused by military airplanes is approximately 
0.5% of the total air pollution in Germany and the Netherlands. Second, 
the manufacture, storage and use of some weapon systems can 
cause enormous damage to the environment, ‘In particular, the use of 
ammunition contributes to air and ground pollution in the form of oxides 
of carbon, nitrogen, sulphur, heavy metal elements and casing fragments’ 
(p. 7). Third, military activities like driving, firing weapons, sailing and flying 
can cause damage to soil, flora and fauna. The workgroup was especially 
concerned about the fauna. After remarking that the main activity of 
military organisations is not deployment but training, the study directed its 
focus on the environmental impact of military equipment used in training. 
Again the workgroup encountered many methodological problems. 
The participating countries ‘have very different ecosystems, climates and 
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biotopes in their geographical territory, ranging from arctic conditions 
in the northern part of Norway and Canada, to subtropical conditions 
in Greece, Italy, Spain and the U.S.A.’ (NATO-CCMS, 1995, p. 08). The 
workgroup concluded that it should not be their task to weigh and judge 
the environmental impact. 
The same kind of problems arose when the environmental benefits 
of simulators had to be established. An important assumption in this 
debate was that the usage of simulators should result in a decline in the 
amount of time needed for live-training exercises. That would save fuel 
and be less damaging for exercise terrains. However:
‘Training high-ranking officers or Navy-commanders without the use 
of simulation is difficult, because some aspects of warfare cannot be 
performed, except in all-out war. To compare the situation with and 
without the use of simulators is therefore purely academic and useless. 
Matters were made worse when the group learned that for simulations, 
logistical input-data (e.g. fuel consumption) were classified Secret for 
most computer-programmes.’ (NATO-CCMS, 1995, p. 09)
The focus of the workgroup shifted to training simulators and areas 
were raw data was available, which was mainly: ‘fuel-consumption, 
kilometres driven/ nautical miles sailed / flying hours / shells fired / 
bombs dropped’ (NATO-CCMS, 1995, p. 09). Air-pollution and the 
impact of energy consumption became the central issue in this study. 
Now it was thought to be possible to quantify the environmental 
impact. This seemed to work, ‘[a]fter additional data collection, the 
study group believed it should be possible to quantify the advantages 
of using simulators’ (NATO-CCMS, 1995, p. 10). The challenge now was 
to quantify the advantages of training simulators. The environmental 
impact of live training had to be measured; therefore ‘direct impacts’ 
and ‘systemic impacts’ had to be distinguished. Direct impacts are 
caused by ‘measurable emissions of pollutants into the environment’, for 
example pollution of air (soot particles, hydrocarbons, NOx, SOx, CO, 
CO2); water (contamination); and soil (petroleum, chemical spills); as 
well as noise pollution (pulsating like gunfire, continuous like motors); 
and physical damage (damage to flora and fauna, traffic jams, structural 
damage to soil). Systemic impact represents the effects on the eco-system 
that are not (directly) measurable, for example the number of flora and 
fauna species in a military area and the depletion of non-replenishable 
sources (fossil fuels, raw materials such as metals and rare minerals). But 
then the workgroup had to refine its approach, because it concluded that 
‘an objective comparison of the range of various environmental impacts 
of military activities is nearly impossible and beyond the scope of this 
pilot-study’ (NATO-CCMS, 1995, p. 11). The study states that training 
with a simulator ‘usually’ reduces the use of the original weapons system, 
prolongs the life cycle of the weapon system, reduces fuel consumption, 
reduces ammunition consumption, and so on. The conclusion is that 
most of the simulated training activities involve movement: driving, 
sailing, flying, or the firing of ammunition. Therefore it is concluded that 
‘[t]he emission of pollutants for these activities is therefore of primary 
interest. The investigation was limited to those pollutants released 
during continuous operation of engines and during firing of specific 
weapon systems’ (NATO-CCMS, 1995, p. 12). The systemic impact was 
not investigated further. Three weapons systems were selected to be 
analysed. The main battle tank Leopard 2 is taken as exemplar for a 
land-based system. The patrol boats S-143/S, 143a and S148 are taken 
as exemplar for a naval system. The F-16 / Tornado is taken as exemplar 
for a system that occupies the air. Three levels of operation were 
identified: task-specific individual training, operational team training and 
commanders training for platoon level. For each level the relevant data 
was collected, although it was difficult due to a lack of data, confidentiality 
of data and changing training needs (at the end of the Cold War). 
In the case of the Leopard 2, it was explained that in Germany 
approximately 15% of the training took place on simulators in 1992 
(NATO-CCMS, 1995, p. 41). Germany calculated that this resulted in a 
reduction of environmental impact, providing the following numbers: 
soot particles (0.32 in tons per annum (t/a)), hydrocarbons (0.82 t/a), 
NOx (67.4 t/a), SOx (4.85 t/a), CO (2.08 t/a) and CO2 (2641 t/a). The air 
pollution caused by firing guns, transporting the weapons systems to the 
training area and systems running idle in garrisons was not considered. 
The same type of analysis was performed on the sea and air systems. It 
was concluded that the use of simulators would result in a substantial 
reduction of air pollution. The most gains can be achieved with flight 
simulators. 
‘One of the most important objectives is that by intensified use of 
simulators, the repetition rate of exercises per trainee can substantially be 
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increased almost without any impact on the environment. Furthermore 
the quality of training and the quality of the success in reaching the aim 
of the training or exercise can be monitored by simulators again without 
substantial influence on the environment. Increased training leads to 
better skills, to improved feasibilities in handling weapon systems, in 
improved operational and tactical understanding, in a better combat-
ready status.’ (NATO-CCMS, 1995, p. 46)
The study is a good example as of how difficult it is to measure 
environmental impact. In the end, the calculation is so restricted that 
it only makes the connection between air pollution and fossil fuels (a 
bit) clearer. It is argued that simulators will not harm the environment 
as much as live training because fossil fuels are saved. However, the 
study does not pay any attention to the use of alternative energy nor 
the environmental impact of the simulator itself (it requires power and 
materials as well). Still the workgroup states that it has ‘proven’ that 
simulators reduce the environmental pollution. It is for this reason that 
the workgroup has high expectations of simulation technology, although 
it admits that simulation can never replace live training: 
‘New technologies, such as virtual reality and virtual environment, 
promise to extend the application of cheap, realistic simulations in 
future, but realism is likely to always fall short of live training. Live 
training is seen in most nations as the only reliable test of training 
standards and is likely to remain as the ultimate stage of military 
training for the foreseeable future.’ (NATO-CCMS, 1995, p. 56) 
Now I am back where I started. The study shows that the connection 
between simulation technology and environment is not as obvious 
as it might seem. The workgroup argues that simulation technology 
can reduce environmental impact because military materiel that is not 
used does not consume fuel and will therefore not pollute the air. But 
simulation cannot replace live training completely.  
In this analysis I have discussed the ‘validity’ of three connections of 
the simulation-network: the connection made with educational gains, 
financial gains and environmental gains. The gains are ‘accepted’ by 
the Ministry of Defence and Parliament although I have demonstrated 
that it is not very hard to critique these connections. The connections 
apparently pass ‘the trials of strength’ even though - from a distance 
- many questions can be asked. This observation is related to the 
concept of ‘regimes of justification’ introduced by Luc Boltanski and 
Laurent Thévenot (2006) and expanded upon by Bruno Latour (1993). 
They explain that people can choose between six regimes: civic, market, 
inspirational, fame, industrial and domestic. People can justify their actions 
and critique others in these six different ways. According to Latour, ‘... 
their rich empirical studies make it blatantly apparent that a wide range 
of regimes for criticism and justification are available to the participants 
at almost any point’ (Blok & Jensen, 2011, p. 63). It is always possible to 
develop a critique and exactly that makes critique according to Latour 
meaningless. Maybe it is this observation that makes it hard for Parliament 
to critique simulation technology. Especially when the Minister of Defence 
is accepted as the spokesperson for the ministry (of course) and the 
simulation technology. The arguments from the Ministry of Defence enrol 
a mix of arguments from different regimes. In the parliamentary letters 
and documents no concerns are presented and debated; the arguments 
are taken for granted. For Latour this is common problem in democracy 
discussing hybrids. The problem is that facts and values are treated as 
separate issues. So scientists talk about facts and politicians about values. 
But this separation hides the many assumptions that have become 
inscribed in the facts during their construction. Therefor the distinction 
between ‘matters of facts’ and ‘matters of concern’ was introduced (Latour, 
2004b). The debate presents the notions about military training simulators 
as matters of facts, that is, notions based on stable, justified, and true 
knowledge. But it would be much better for the parliamentary debate if 
the notions were presented as matters of concern, acknowledging that 
the claims are temporary, tentative and represent a certain configuration 
of interests. The debate would immediately shift from the functionalities 
and practical benefits of training simulation to the values it tries to achieve. 
The matters of concern become debatable when one describes the 
construction of the facts. In the analysis of the parliamentary letters it 
becomes clear that the statements made by the Ministry of Defence are 
without any context (or ‘purified’ as Latour would say). The purification 
seems to ‘work’ rather well: the concepts, distinctions and claims – or 
vocabulary – was accepted and played an influential role in the debates 
about the duel simulator (as described in chapters five and six).  
The strong simulation-network could eventually lead to many investments 
in simulation technology, as well as a new training structure and even a 
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different military organization. The validity of the training simulator is the 
result of this configuration and can therefore ‘not really’ be challenged. 
This is the paradox of validation that I will investigate in the next chapter. 
Conclusion
Since the 10th of June, 1985 the State Secretary produced six letters 
and memoranda on simulation technology. During that time (1985-
1993) three different Ministers of Defence and two different State 
Secretaries have been in this post. Memoranda nr.4 and nr.5 (Kamerstuk 
II, 1989/90, 1990/91a) were largely the work of the workgroup known 
as ‘Coordinatiegroep Simulatoren’ which was abbreviated as COSIM.138 
In this chapter I did not want to focus on the discussions that took place 
within the Ministry of Defence and the workgroup in particular, as I did 
in the previous chapter, instead I wanted to focus just on the inscriptions 
that were sent to Parliament prepared by the staff of the Minister of 
Defence.  
In this chapter I have explained how the Ministry of Defence 
presented simulation technology as a valuable tool for military 
training. The Minister argued that it would improve training, reduce 
the environmental impact of military activities, and be cheaper at the 
same time. The Parliament accepted the arguments without much 
discussion, although I have described how difficult it is to ‘prove’ the 
educational, financial and environmental benefits. The exploration of 
these arguments demonstrates the power of an actor-network. Training 
simulation technology becomes valid due to the many actors that have 
been enrolled and thus are in agreement that this technology is the way 
to go. A closer look, however, reveals that simulation technology is not 
one particular object. It has many identities. The identity can shift when 
the different users require it to do so. It is very interesting to see how 
simulation technology is fitted into the military organisation from the 
perspective of Parliament. Latour pointed out that the debate about new 
technology (‘hybrids’ as he calls them) becomes much more informative 
once it shifts from ‘matters of fact’ to ‘matters of concern’. Now that 
training simulators are stabilized it is very difficult to make space for 
new arguments and new viewpoints, as I tried to develop regarding 
educational gains, financial gains and environmental impact.
It is easy to dismiss the impact of the memoranda, but many activities 
were set in motion as I have shown in this chapter. Workgroups were 
forced to talk about simulation technology and as a consequence 
with the Dutch Industry. They were also given instructions to fit it in 
the organization and to make the benefits explicit. The vocabulary on 
simulation technology coined in the letters tot Parliament was relevant 







Chapter 8. Paradox of Validation 
Introduction
In the previous chapters I explored several claims about the value 
of military training simulators. It is commonly accepted that training 
simulators are cheaper, provide more effective training, save the 
environment, and are, all in all, more ‘realistic’ than training with other 
means. Interestingly, most of these claims go uncontested. I have tried to 
demonstrate that the claims about the training simulator were the result 
of an expanding actor-network. The training simulator is so much more 
than just a thing; it is a sum of (social) interactions, transformations, and 
displacements. That is why I introduce the concept of ‘co-production’. 
Validity is not something that a military training simulator has, but validity 
is something that an actor-network does. Validity is not a feature of a 
system, but the total of the work going on to keep it valid. My conclusion is 
that validation should be approached differently. 
For simulationists, validation must feel like the challenge that Sisyphus 
had to face. He was condemned to roll a heavy stone to the top of a 
mountain, but every time he neared the top, the stone rolled down 
again. Validity must feel something like that. Every time someone is able 
‘to prove’ a specific claim, a closer look reveals that not every possible 
question has been asked and answered. Every black box hides a new 
one. Latour speaks of the two faces of science: one offers a truth-claim; 
and the other one, offers doubt by never stopping to ask questions 
(Latour, 1987). In the standard view of simulationists, rational analysis will 
reveal a single truth. The truth transcends reality and brings unanimity. 
In that perspective, differences in opinion can only exist because of 
misinformation and wrong conclusions. In this chapter I explain why this 
viewpoint is flawed.
This chapter will focus on the implications of my study. First, in the next 
paragraph, I will argue that the different communities follow their own 
logics and that during the validation process their logics run up against 
each other, which prompts conflict as well as communication. Second, 
I will argue that it is necessary to develop a more inclusive approach 
to validation to make explicit what values become inscribed in the 
simulation-network. Third, I will reflect on the two statements above from 
a theoretical and personal point of view. I will conclude this chapter with 
some recommendations for the military world.
Logic of validation
In this paragraph I will sum up my observations of the previous chapters 
to explain how different communities follow their own logics while 
acknowledging that these communities must be tightly connected to be 
able to produce validity.
I took the standard view of simulationists as my window to study 
the validation of a military training simulator (chapter two). In the 
standard view, simulationists see themselves as ‘authorities’ establishing 
the accuracy of a simulation. However, this perspective has some 
fundamental flaws because: (a) there is never enough evidence that a 
model is correct; (b) it is also difficult to get the ‘right’ data (empirical 
data is often unobtainable); and (c) it is very difficult to establish the 
‘correctness’ of a model due to the complexity of simulations (many 
models interact). I concluded that the foundation of knowledge is 
for simulationists not as ‘hard’ as they would like. Most simulationists 
would agree that validating a complex training simulator is a utopian 
endeavour, and one that would have to entail a trade off between effort 
(i.e. costs) and confidence. Simulationist Averill Law says for example:
‘… I have seen very few new techniques developed that can 
actually be used to ‘validate’ a wide variety of simulation models. 
Validation is inherently difficult because the systems under study are 
either proposed modifications of an existing system or represent 
completely new systems. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain performance measures from the actual systems of interest 
to use for validation purposes. In this sense, I do not see model 
validation as a particularly fertile area for future simulation research.’ 
(Sargent et al., 2000, p. 05) 
This observation inspired me to look for an alternative perspective. I set 
up a case study to investigate when, where, and how validation of one 
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specific military training simulator took place. I focussed on the practice 
of validation and not so much on how it ought to be. I identified four 
aspects that were related to specific sites and periods within the ‘life-
span’ of the military training simulator that was the object of my study. 
The four aspects that I investigated were practical validation, industrial 
validation, military validation and political validation. I discuss my 
findings below.
In chapter four I explored how practitioners validated the military 
training simulator. I called that ‘practical validation’. The training 
simulator is used in training exercises, but practitioners try to achieve 
many different goals at the same time. The trainers are especially 
attracted to the training simulator because it promises mastery and 
control over the training exercise. I have described how this promise 
worked out and explained that creating a ‘realistic training’ is not so 
much a representational problem, but a configuration problem. The 
trainers try to configure the soldiers – mediated by the training simulator 
– in such a way that they act as they should, according to the military 
trainers. The models are constantly renegotiated between the three 
actors involved, to get the desired behaviour. Use is just one form of 
negotiation. That makes validation not an activity of judging whether 
the model is ‘realistic’, but an activity of constructing ‘realistic’ practice. 
Practical validation consists of making up a ‘realistic’ practice that works 
well enough so that the actors (temporarily) accept its configuration. This 
makes practical validation a trial-and-error process; new modifications 
will lead to new ‘realities’. Thus there is not a rigid purpose (or ‘intended 
use’) to be achieved. Instead, goals are re-negotiated every time the 
training simulator is used. 
In chapter five, I explored validation as it happens in the procurement 
department of the Ministry of Defence. I called that ‘industrial validation’, 
because the validity of the training simulator is related to what the 
military industry has to offer. Here, validation is mainly enacted by 
exchanging (requirement) documents. The different communities 
within the military organization have to work closely together to refine 
requirements, and at the same time, keep the military marketplace large 
enough for competition. The main challenge in this process was to hide 
the discussion about ‘real’ ballistics. No one wanted an assessment 
of ‘accuracy’ because it would shift the debate to scientific research 
methods, which could restrict alternatives in the marketplace. This 
description taught me that requirement documents are not rigid at all 
(despite the claim of simulationists), and that their plasticity is necessary 
‘to keep things moving along’. The activities involved in making the 
training simulator appear ‘realistic’ are the inspiration for the formulation 
of the requirements. From this process it also becomes apparent that 
‘reality’ is negotiated, making it thus a co-production between the civil 
servants of the Ministry of Defence, the engineers of the military industry, 
and the non-human actors (i.e. technology) that makes the training 
simulator ‘valid’. 
In chapter six, I explored how the validation of the training simulator 
happens in the offices of the military operational staff. The military 
staff constructs an argument as to why the military training simulator 
is necessary for the military organization. I argued that the training 
simulator was not so much ‘something’ that was necessary for military 
training, but that it was the other way around. In the policy documents 
on military training, the training program was reformed in such a way 
that many different training simulators became necessary. The military 
staff did not validate a single training simulator, but developed a 
training structure in which different types of training simulators should 
fulfil a role. Training with training simulators was seen as an input-
output process, in which the trainees have to ‘successfully use’ different 
simulators in order to become a soldier. Military validation is the ‘end 
result’, that is, does the future soldier pass the different tests and thus 
fit within the current ideas of military operations. If so, then the soldiers 
are deemed to be ready for their tasks, making the training simulator 
‘realistic’.
In chapter seven I described how the Minister of Defence presented 
modern developments in military training simulators to Parliament. 
I call that ‘political validation’. This analysis was made possible by a 
Parliamentary debate on simulation technology that took place from 
1986 until 1993. The analysis provides insight into how the Ministry of 
Defence was able to extend its simulation-network. Three arguments 
played a key role in this debate: (a) training simulators would lead to 
gains in training quality; (b) training simulators would reduce training 
costs; and (c) training simulators would reduce environmental impact. 
The key assumption was that simulation technology could offer the 
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same (or better) training experience than ‘real’ training exercises. The 
claim was accepted by Parliament without much debate. Thus political 
validation seems to be rather unimportant for truth finding. However, 
that conclusion is incorrect. The impact of the political validation process 
is great; it started the development of a policy on military training 
simulators by installing workgroups and prioritizing activities. I have 
demonstrated that the vocabulary (of the workgroups, policy documents 
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Table 1: Overview of the observations
In Table 1 I present a systematic overview of my observations. The 
standard view of simulationists does reduce the concept of validity 
to that of an accurate representation of some intended use of the 
model. It has become apparent that in a military organization nothing 
is permanent, because modifications are constantly implemented and 
aims revised. There is nothing wrong with that; it is precisely this work 
that makes the training simulator successful. In this way every actor – 
trainers, industry, military staff and politicians – are able to contribute 
to its validity. In that sense, validation is always political. To investigate 
this implication a bit further I have to refer to Michael Power, who points 
out that technologies for accountability are materialisations of certain 
norms and ideals aligned with the interests of a specific community 
(Power, 1999, p. 05). As explained previously, validity means different 
things to different communities, but all of these meanings contribute to 
the validity of the training simulator. However, the different communities 
impose different forms of validity. To impose validity every community 
will have different ideas about ‘trust’ and will set up different instruments 
and agents for control. See, for example, the relationship between 
trainer and trainee in chapter four. Here the trainer tries to get an 
overall picture of the training by developing resources to gather data 
on injuries, treatments, whereabouts and so on, making it a ‘realistic’ 
training. But these ‘measures’ entail assumptions about how trainees 
should behave, what personal distance should be taken from the 
trainees, and how trainees should learn. The problem, according to 
Power, is that setting up these kinds of technologies can have two 
effects: ‘decoupling’ and ‘colonization’ (Power, 1999, p. 94). Decoupling 
is when the technologies are more focussed on the methods of 
verification than on the activities that should be controlled. For example, 
in the case of the medical treatment simulator it could mean that the 
medical trainers become so focussed on using the functionalities of the 
system that the actual training on how to perform medical treatment 
has no priority anymore. Colonization is when the technologies used 
for control take over the values and practices of the organization. In 
our example, this would mean that the medical trainers try to improve 
performance scores of the military health care system, but forget that 
soldiers require tactical training. Both possible unintended effects 
of validation make it important to have a vocabulary to discuss the 
assumptions made. Often claims – as in the examples – go uncontested 
and are circulated among different communities. In the next paragraph I 
will elaborate these implications a bit further.
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Co-production of validity
In the previous paragraph, I have lined up the observations of the 
preceding chapters. I have explained that validity is a co-production 
between many different actors, and not an inherent property of the 
training simulator. I concluded that the different actors invoke normative 
ideas of ‘the real’, but that these ideas are plastic enough to utilize many 
different technologies to establish the ‘reality’ of the training simulator. 
Thus every actor can invoke ‘the real’ in such a way that it serves her/
his interests. In this paragraph I will present a more inclusive concept of 
validation that takes this network of interests into account, and clearly 
shows how the interests become inscribed in the technical object.  
My point of departure is an interview that took place on March 10th, 
2009 with the commander of MCTC. He pointed out that the training 
simulator does its work wonderfully: 
‘I can see the stiff learning curve of the soldiers who trained with this 
system. (...) How he shoots, how he moves through the terrain and 
how he takes cover. If he does not do it correctly, he will be hit by a 
laser and thus by a bullet.’139  
Based on this account one would expect that military commanders 
would use the training simulator as frequently as possible. Therefore, 
I requested the statistics for its use in training exercises. The support 
team of Saab Training Systems keeps a detailed log-file of the training 
exercises. Data from the years 2003-2008 were made available to me.140 
Based on that information, I was able to form three categories of use 
of the simulator: instrumented, non-instrumented, and home based. 
‘Instrumented’ means that the simulator is used as it is supposed to be, 
that is, it is transported to a training area and the training support staff is 
present to monitor the exercise and to do the after-action reviews. ‘Non-
instrumented’ means that the tactical analysis facility was not present. 
Although after-action reviews were therefore not supported with 
computer data, the main functionality of the duel simulator (shooting) 
was operational. Finally, ‘home based’ indicates that some parts of the 
system were lent out to be used in a small training exercise without 







2003 10 7 14 31
2004 10 30 52 92
2005 8 23 49 80
2006 9 23 74 106
2007 8 27 45 80
  2008* 2 3 2 7
*only first quarter available
Table 2: Overview of use of the training simulator in weeks
So, does the army use the training simulator? The log-file is an 
account of the number of weeks that the equipment was lent out; more 
precisely it counts the number of weeks the equipment is ‘away’ from 
the warehouse. It does not indicate how long a certain component is 
used during a training exercise. At first glance the statistics seem to show 
that the training simulator is used quite often (see Table 2). However, 
if one looks a bit closer, the following observations can be made. First, 
the number of weeks per year exceeds 52, which is possible because 
different parts of MCTC may have been lent out at the same time (for 
example 100 sets of the Diemaco – small arms rifle – are sent to different 
exercises) and also because a week is the smallest unit of notation (one 
day counts as a week). Second, most relatively small training exercises 
are home based, which means that the troops are practising at their 
own base. Thus, when equipment is lent out for exercises in urban 
terrain (Marnehuizen), or for exercises by the National Reserve, or for 
military demonstrations, or for Observer/Trainer Courses, it falls within 
this category. Third, the non-instrumented and home-based training 
exercises are the most common type of usage, but in those activities, the 
Tactical Analysis Facility is not operational. The services of the military 
analysts for training support are not required and the sophisticated after-
action review facilities are not operational. 
The last observation makes it clear that the complete system is not 
used as often as everyone were expecting during its procurement. In the 
estimates, at least 40 weeks a year of instrumented use was expected. 
The scarce use of the full-featured training simulator implies that many 
sophisticated components (i.e. medical treatment simulator described 
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in chapter 4) are hardly ever used. I asked the commander of MCTC why 
this was the case and he told me: 
‘The number of instrumented trainings is rather low, which is a direct 
consequence of ISAF141. The resources of the Army are famished by 
ISAF which creates an additional, publicly known, consequence of 
7900 vacancies within Defence. And those two added together...’142 
The commander explained to me that the Army does not have a 
sufficient number of active soldiers to execute large-scale training 
exercises. A fully instrumented training exercise simply requires too 
many people. I asked if the soldiers who were sent to Uruzgan had spent 
enough time training with the sophisticated training simulator. In the 
same interview, he told me: 
‘Look, it has happened before that a unit was appointed at once, to 
execute a surveillance assignment in some port, to where material for 
Afghanistan was transported, and yes that’s generally a unit the size 
of a company which, consequently, is withdrawn from somewhere. 
Preparation, execution, a month and a half, settling affairs, so there’s 
no time for training.’143  
This occasionally happened, but according the commander ‘low use’ 
was not ‘the real’ issue. The real issue was that many of the preparatory 
training exercises for ISAF are not ‘really’ suitable for the training 
simulator. That is rather striking, because ISAF is the International 
Security Assistance Force led by the NATO to rebuild Afghanistan, the 
largest mission in which the Dutch Army was involved. In the same 
interview: 
‘Besides, in the preparational training sessions for ISAF not every 
scenario is suitable for duel simulation. For example, there are many 
static situations and the power of this system is movement. Movement 
is essential; otherwise you will notice figures [on the computer screen] 
have come to a standstill. If, for example, we are negotiating with a local 
[population], which is a static situation, you won’t see any movement 
and nothing will happen on the computer screens. So there’s nothing to 
evaluate, at any rate not with the assistance of the system.’144 
In this interview, it was made clear that usage is not really an issue. 
Usage was dependant on the availability of soldiers and it has to do with 
the scenarios that have to be trained. Not using the training simulator 
to prepare for the expeditionary mission to Uruzgan fits one of the 
observations of the project team that was made in 1995 when the 
requirements of the simulator were formulated. One of the members 
noted that the simulator would not be suitable for training for static 
activities, like roadblocks and talking with the local population (in order 
to ‘win hearts and minds’ as the soldiers say nowadays). This observation 
was quickly dismissed during procurement because training for ‘real’ 
military operations would always be necessary.145 The ‘script’ (Akrich, 
1992) of the training simulator implicitly forces one to train tactical 
movement in open terrain with heavy weapon systems. However, the 
promise was that every event, weapon system and situation can be 
modelled and implemented in the training simulator.
Yet the training simulator is seen as an important asset of the Dutch 
Army. It is expected, now that the Army has left Uruzgan, that the 
simulator will be used more frequently. Many technical improvements 
have been implemented since 2008, so new weapon systems can be 
incorporated into the training exercise and out-dated weapon systems 
(the tanks for example) can be left out.146 Moreover, the software and 
facilities have been upgraded. Many new components have been 
purchased, so that even larger training exercises can be practiced (See: 
“Upgrade Mobile Combat Training Centre: Technologisch hoogstandje 
uit Scandinavie,” 2009). Much effort has been put into making it possible 
to link the simulator with foreign simulator systems, so that it can be 
used in international training exercises. I participated in a demonstration 
that was set up in 2010 described by Trevor Nash (Nash, 2010). In this 
article he celebrates the growing possibilities of linking different systems 
from different nations and manufacturers. In that perspective the training 
simulator is technically extending its reach. However, the moment I 
started to point out usage problems in military conference papers 
(Veen, 2009b), new issues popped up. The project manager of the duel 
simulator told me in a personal conversation that he was concerned 
about the ease with which the Army dealt with the simulator. Every year 
a large sum of money is paid for the maintenance of the equipment. A 
team of military trainers and analysts are employed full time solely to be 
available to support training exercises. Too often, the training simulation 
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was cancelled just one or two weeks in advance of a scheduled training 
exercise. Thus the project manager had prepared a proposal to rent 
out the equipment and expertise to foreign nations. The Army could 
in this way earn some money back from its yearly investment and the 
system would not be sitting inactive in the warehouse. The military staff 
quickly dismissed this proposal. The military staff expected that the full 
capacity would be needed soon, and the system’s non-use should not 
be something that is advertised.
What does this story mean for validation? As I concluded before, the 
total set of negotiations of trainers (practical validation), developers 
(industrial validation), military staff (military validation) and the Minister 
of Defence (political validation), makes the training simulator valid. 
One sees how easily perspectives of validity can be shifted. In this 
story, I moved from usage (scripts), to money, and then to the future. 
Validation is so much more than the ability to represent some aspect 
of military training correctly. It is clearly not about modelling the claims 
in an argumentation network and checking its truth-value. I have 
argued that constant shifts – or ‘interpretative flexibility’ – are necessary 
for the ‘survivability’ of the actor-network. In this way no one can be 
held accountable for the success or failure of the training simulator. 
Everybody stays involved because of the promise of realization. But the 
promise of realization will always trump realization itself. It is precisely 
this process that makes validation a dynamic concept. The bottom-line is 
that the Ministry of Defence is constantly expanding the actor-network. 
This is hard work, as I have extensively explained in chapters four to 
seven. Validation never stops, because new actors emerge to support or 
dissect (new) claims (i.e. enrol or dis-enrol actors). I described that the 
claim ‘the simulator is not used’, has quickly been transformed into the 
claim ‘the simulator will be used soon’. The realisation of the potential 
of the training simulator produces validity. So the question is: What 
alternatives for ‘validation’ do I propose?
I will start with an anecdote that Latour relates in his ‘Compositionist 
Manifesto’ (Latour, 2010a). He makes reference to the public debate 
before the Climate Summit in Copenhagen, in the fall of 2009, that 
would become known as ‘Climategate’. Thousands of emails were stolen 
from a scientific institute and were published and analysed by activists. 
The activists were astonished to see that scientific facts about climate 
change were not as certain as the scientists seemed to suggest. The 
scientists were constructing the scientific facts, while having to cope 
with funding problems and flawed instruments. Latour expresses his 
surprise about the naivety of the activists; of course people have to do 
their scientific work and create facts, which also always can be refined, 
discussed and doubted. But that does not mean that the scientists are 
wrong. Latour is even more surprised at the naivety of the scientists; 
they seemed to have the same idealistic view of science as the activists, 
media and general public. The scientists were not able to formulate an 
insightful response. Latour states: ‘They kept using the old opposition 
between what is constructed and what is not constructed, instead of 
the slight but crucial difference between what is well and what is badly 
constructed’ (Latour, 2010a, p. 478). As explained in Chapter three, 
in Latour’s vocabulary, there is not a truth lying behind our world. For 
Latour, truth is not something idealistic, but something that can be 
found in the mundane world with mundane activities. In other words, 
the work of scientists produces scientific truth. Especially in Climategate, 
it became apparent that scientists have controversies too; they too 
are transforming ‘matters of fact’ into ‘matters of concern’. The idea 
that scientists deliver ‘matters of fact’ and politicians discuss ‘matter 
of concern’ is incorrect. Both – scientists and politicians – need to be 
involved in the debate at the same time. Latour sees the situation, 
therefore, as a missed opportunity in which the ‘disputability of politics’ 
and ‘disputability of science’ were not adequately linked together. 
Nothing should be beyond dispute. The challenge should be to bring 
them together, by forcing scientists, activists and politicians to compose 
a so-called ‘common world’. We should strive for ‘closure’ but take 
sufficient time to achieve that goal. Closing debates too quickly, and not 
involving all relevant actors, creates too much bias. To make this point, 
Latour quotes Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History: ‘Where we see the 
appearance of chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which 
unceasingly piles rubble on top of rubble and hurls it before his feet’ (p. 
485). By constantly ‘improving’ the world, one looks constantly back and 
no-one talks about desired values for the future.
The unwillingness to talk about the values that one wants to achieve 
in the future is typical of what Evgeny Morozov calls the ‘solutionist 
perspective’ (Morozov, 2013).147 Solutionists think in terms of problems 
that must be solved. The terminology of the solutionist is focussed 
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on efficiency, mostly in an economical discourse. This perspective is 
dangerous, according to Morozov, because some problems do not 
need to be fixed. Moreover, some fixes create much bigger problems. 
In the case of the training simulator, one can read in my account of its 
history that it was presented as a solution to improve military training. I 
have explained that different communities validate the training simulator 
differently. In all aspects of validation, I have shown that the claims 
mainly focussed on the realization of some potential. The discussions 
were about connecting oversights in medical training, or getting the 
best offer of the market, or fitting simulation technology into the military 
organization, or saving money and reducing environmental damage 
at the same time. Every time, the training simulator is considered as a 
means to realize a certain end. The higher values society should strive 
for (the why), and the possible unintended consequences of the new 
technology, were not discussed. The communities do not seem to be 
well equipped to raise questions about values. The communities just 
want to solve everyday problems. For example, no one  – during the 
many years of my investigation – discussed the assumptions behind the 
concept of ‘need’. Morozov (2013) points out that ‘needs’ are a relatively 
new concept, introduced to make it possible to make problems visible 
and sell ‘solutions’. However, in his terms, the challenge should be ‘... 
not just to build an artifact to fulfil some genuine social need ‘out there’ 
but also to make us reflect on how that need has emerged, how it has 
become a project worth pursuing, and how, all things considered, it may 
actually not be worth pursuing at all’ (Morozov, 2013, p. 329). The main 
point is that while focussing on implementing the new technology, some 
important values in society can be lost. To make the disappearance of 
values more concrete, Morozov suggests a thought-experiment. He 
explains that one should think about ‘tweaks’ – or scenarios – in the 
existing technology, such as how it can be made to promote more 
socially responsible citizenship and not just efficiency. While writing 
my description of the aspects of validation, it became clear to me that 
many important values were not discussed explicitly, due to the concept 
of ‘realistic training’. I will therefore discuss one simple scenario as an 
example of how easy it could be to inscribe social responsibility ‘into’ the 
training simulator.
In chapter four, I discussed the medical treatment simulator. It 
goes without saying that being able to treat oneself and others when 
wounded is an important human value. In a tactical military training 
exercise, a soldier can only receive medical treatment when an 
opponent shoots him. This makes perfect sense, in the logic of war. In 
war, soldiers get shot. The logic assumes ‘hostile’ opponents, framing 
war as an exchange of bullets. Now imagine for just an instant that we do 
not want to train people to kill without consideration (just as a ‘technical 
skill’), but we want to train people ‘to think’ before they kill. This aim can 
be relatively easily implemented in the training simulator, by adding a 
small multiple-choice menu in which the shooter has to select the injury 
s/he wants to inflict on his/her opponents. The soldiers are now not just 
using a ‘neutral tool’ (the rifle), but are deliberately made responsible 
for their decision to shoot. In terms of the logic of soldiers this scenario 
is not very ‘realistic’ and will be dismissed. However, the scenario makes 
clear how easy it can be to enforce different behaviour with relatively 
small tweaks, and how the argument of ‘realistic training’ inscribes a 
specific perspective on warfare. Such a tweak could, for example, allow 
one to realize the hopes of a well-known scholar in the military world. I 
am referring to Christopher Coker, who in The Future of War defines two 
opposing views on warfare. On the one side, the instrumentalist view 
focuses on developing a new electronic battlefield that gives humans the 
power to slaughter whole armies by pressing a button. Western armies 
understand war this way. On the other side, there is the sacralisation of 
war, in which spirit is considered to be more important than the body. 
This is the position of what Western media depict as ‘suicide terrorists’ or 
‘irregular troops’. Coker’s point is that both positions are undesirable, for 
‘We should aim instead to position ourselves in between – to make war 
valuable morally is to make it sacred in terms of sacrifice, the willingness 
to die for a cause in which one believes’ (Coker, 2004, p. 142). Coker is 
very much concerned about how new technologies take away human 
values such as ‘honour’ and ‘meaning’ from the battlefield. He proposes 
using modern technologies to make war more humane. In conclusion, 
my (very) simple thought experiment makes clear that technology can 
easily raise many questions about military training, military technology 
and the role of the military in society. The thought-experiment enables 
us to open up discussion about the values that society wants to promote 
the military organization. This thought-experiment could be fruitful 
to counter the engineering logic of making processes much more 
‘efficient’, something that underlies most of the discussion about training 
simulators. This desire for efficiency is typical for solutionists, and it is the 
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main ingredient of ‘poorly’ composed actor-networks. I assert that one 
should strive for well composed actor-networks by involving many more 
actors and opening up debates about the values one wants to promote 
with new technologies.
This brings me to the ethical relevance of validation. In the 
introduction to this book, I mentioned that Sherry Turkle explains 
how (new) technology makes new representations possible, and that 
its mere existence can have far-reaching social effects. In her famous 
article about the effects of PowerPoint in classrooms, she describes 
how software changed the way complex subjects are presented and 
discussed (Turkle, 2003).148 She is also worried about the proliferation 
of simulations, especially the experiences they create. People tend to 
be visually overwhelmed by them, because modern simulations are – in 
her terminology – very ‘immersive’. People give themselves over to the 
visual experience, and just go along with it. They forget ‘to doubt’ what 
is going on. Turkle points out that simulation technology is so much 
more than ‘just a tool’ because it changes the way people experience 
the world (Turkle, 2009). I wish to take this argument a step further, and 
propose that it is not only the experience that matters, but also the way 
it is used to ‘solve’ problems in the ‘real’ world. Simulation technology 
is not just inserted into a military organization, but changes that 
organization along the way. If my story makes one thing clear it is that 
change is continual. Actors are constantly trying to realize their interests 
in the military organization; they inscribe these wherever they can, for 
example in simulation technology, policy documents, industry and 
training exercises. There are many opportunities for inscription, because 
the simulation-network is always a drift. New actors are always trying to 
get enrolled and others are – sometimes against their will – disenrolled. 
Drift can be seen as something bad (Dekker, 2011), but in my case it also 
keeps the actor-network stable. Drift presents a great opportunity to 
continually validate the training simulator, by involving more actors and 
raising new questions, especially about the assumptions inscribed in the 
simulation-network. 
Validating the validator
In the previous paragraph, I have proposed a more inclusive concept of 
validation, to be able to discuss simulation technology in more depth. 
It was my aim to shift the debate from ‘matters of fact’ to ‘matters of 
concern’. In this paragraph, I will reflect on my vocabulary, based on 
Latour, and on my own position in this study. 
In chapter three, I presented a rough overview of some of the work 
of Bruno Latour. This is only a small selection of the body of literature 
produced by him, the size and depth of which is quite overwhelming.149 
For that reason, it would be pretentious to claim that my book can 
be read as an ‘application’ of his work. I tried to keep his vocabulary 
flat, in order to translate it to the military world. I took many shortcuts 
and made many simplifications. But even a simplified vocabulary of 
Latour, can result in an extensive case study. The vocabulary in this 
book stems mainly from the early work of Latour, or what is known as 
his anthropology of science. In this work, he investigated how facts are 
constructed by carefully tracing the activities of scientists. During my 
case study, I encountered three problems.
First, I find Latour’s earlier work very polemical. Polemical in the 
traditional meaning of the word, i.e. trying to show that one speaks 
the truth while falsifying others. Polemical stems from the Greek 
word πολεμικός, which means something like ‘warlike, hostile’. Latour 
developed in Laboratory Life and Science in Action a very ‘warlike’ 
vocabulary. In these books, the scientists are constantly trying to use 
their instruments to gain (more) power to be able to make a ‘truth-
claim’. In his books, Latour constructs a master narrative in which it is 
inevitable that power is gained by some and lost by others. In chapters 
four, five, six and seven of my book, I have explored how that works. 
The narrative is clearly told from a researcher point of view. From this 
perspective, I described which claims were made and how these claims 
were substantiated. However, I could also have attempted to interpret 
the arguments in terms of consensus building. In this alternative 
interpretation, the actors are constantly negotiating with each other, not 
to gain power, but to achieve a common understanding of the issues 
at hand. They are trying to close the debate as soon as consensus is 
achieved. Even when the actors cannot preserve their interests, they 
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keep talking with another. In this interpretation, consensus building 
is the on-going activity, especially between the actors directly linked 
with the Ministry of Defence. It becomes immediately apparent that the 
vocabulary of Latour does not help to gain insight into how one achieves 
compromise. 
The second problem that became apparent in my description 
is that Latour cannot explain how issues should be settled. My 
descriptions show that opening up something that is already closed 
is quite problematic when the technology is considered a ‘successful 
tool’. The communities I spoke with are not by themselves interested 
in transforming ‘matters of fact’ into ‘matters of concern’. The only 
thing that Latour has to offer is a toolbox for making descriptions and 
mapping controversies; he provides no answers as to how to make 
controversy relevant for practitioners. Controversy is against their 
interests. This is explainable with this vocabulary. One of the features 
of successful technology is that it can enrol new actors quickly, making 
it easy to assimilate new claims. A ‘successful’ actor-network has the 
ability to grow and prosper. In his book Aramis, or the love of Technology 
Latour describes a failed technology project, and its actor-network 
(Latour, 1996). One can look for the reason of the network collapse. 
However, in successful technology, the negotiations are on going. 
When controversy occurs, it is immediately settled because being able 
to do so is the fundamental capability of a successful actor-network. 
Bringing in new issues and settling them is a never-ending story, until the 
technology and its network dies. 
The third and final problem I want to point out is that the vocabulary 
of Latour does not offer a normative framework. He presents his 
vocabulary as toolbox. It is suited for making well-articulated 
descriptions, but after that, diplomacy must take over. Latour does 
acknowledge that new approaches for diplomacy still have to be 
developed (Latour, 2010a). We should learn, according to him, to deal 
with ‘collectives’ – i.e. societies or cultures – that do not share our basic 
assumptions. Currently many issues are silenced that should be debated 
for better democratic control. So, for example, simulationists do not 
talk about their assumptions when building their models. However, as 
I have made clear, even when one opens the black box to make some 
assumptions explicit, then it still remains difficult to discuss these. Last 
year Latour published a book An Inquiry into Modes of Existence and 
opened a website which should be helpful for mapping and discussing 
controversies (Latour, 2013). The book complements Latours earlier 
work by describing what the moderns care about and what is important 
for them. It investigates the values that moderns hold dear and the 
account given of that value. In a book review it is pointed out that Latour 
‘... demands that actants be heard in a new type of parliament open 
to both humans and non-humans. However, the anthropologist is the 
one holding the pen clicking the mouse when it comes to drafting of 
new inclusive politics, or cosmopolitics’ (Delchambre & Marquis, 2013, 
p. 572). So different communities are allowed to hold different values 
dear, but at the same time they are enthused to negotiate about their 
values with another. It is, however, not clear to me how this should work. 
I support the idea that debates about military technology should be 
informed by (many) more actors than they do now, but the consequence 
of Latours approach is that the normative judgement is nothing else than 
the effect of the actor-network. This leaves everyone with empty hands 
and detailed – sometimes beautiful – descriptions.
The three problems I encountered – warlike vocabulary, always 
growing actor-networks, no normative framework – bring me to my 
personal position. I started with this book in the beginning of my 
appointment as a lecturer at the military academy (2007). I had been 
appointed in the field of Information Technology, and was allowed to 
raise questions from a social science perspective. The people I spoke 
with were eager to tell me how things ‘work’ in a military organization. 
I did not see myself as someone who was checking up on them, to see 
whether their work was done ‘properly’. The problem, of course, is that 
my research presupposes a relation of accountability. The interviewee 
has to give an account to me. This makes me an actor that has the power 
to take certain actors into account, and to refuse to acknowledge other 
actors. I discussed certain issues and avoided others. I could check-up 
on their accounts to determine whether they were ‘right’ according to 
others. I did not. I just tried to relate their stories to the documents I 
found in the archives guided by the stories I had heard. Looking back, 
my notes include many more stories about the training simulator than 
could be told. Many more controversies could be ‘revealed’. But every 
time, I would really be telling the same story: validity is a co-production 
of many different actors and not some inherent ‘feature’ of the simulator. 
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Actors develop certain methods for validation that serve their interests, 
and link them with the ideals of ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. 
Now, in March 2014, I am writing this last chapter, after I was 
transferred from the military academy to a senior advisory position in the 
research & development department. I am now responsible for checking 
up on research projects, mainly done by external scientific research 
institutes. The transfer came quite suddenly, because my job at the 
military academy was cancelled, due to budget cuts. The ‘validation of 
the virtual’ does not have a high priority at the military academy. I have 
not had any impact on the existing simulation-network. Problematising 
(new) technology is not something that anyone is expected to do in the 
military organisation. Ironically, my new job puts me in a much more 
strategic position to ‘compose’ an actor-network. The job entails aligning 
many different stakeholders, during long-term research projects. To 
compose actor-networks ‘well’, I have to study the current actors and 
their connections carefully. I will mention three challenges. First, one 
very important distinction is made between knowledge-creation, 
technology-development, and knowledge-use. Each concept hides 
its own world for funding and accountability. But the rather traditional 
understanding of the diffusion of technology has never been discussed. 
In this book I have explained that diffusion of technology involves many 
forms of negotiation. It is not about ‘pushing’ new technologies into the 
organization, but about ‘co-producing’ it. Second, another key distinction 
is between civil and military research, which entails the relationship 
between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Economical Affairs. 
Both actors are trying to expand their networks without consensus about 
what should be achieved in society. How can both ministries compose 
a hybrid that serves the interests of the collective? Third, there is the 
concept of ‘military technology’. Most military leaders consider military 
technology as an object that can be inserted in the military organization 
to improve some ‘military capabilities’. This technical object can either 
be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending on its use. As I have explained, this is a 
flawed understanding of technology. The validity of technology depends 
very much on who is authorized to define its ‘reality’. This causes most 
discussions about military technology to be rather shallow: do we need 
it or not? Much more attention should be paid to the construction of 
the actor-network in order to come up with solutions that are not only 
profitable for the Ministry of Defence, but also for society. So my new job 
brings me into a world that probably can be better understood with the 
vocabulary of Latour. As they say, this will be an interesting topic for my 
next book.
Conclusion
Different communities have to validate my work. Some military 
colleagues might not agree with my stories, analyses, and conclusions; 
some scientific colleagues may not agree with the theoretical framing 
or explorative approach of my research. But both communities will 
‘validate’ my work. In this book I have tried to make it clear that every 
actor tries to inscribe its interests in the actor-network, with the result 
being ‘a realistic training simulator’. There is nothing wrong with that. 
The only problem is that the interests become ‘black boxed’  making 
it impossible to have a debate about. A more inclusive concept of 
validation would help to open up this debate. In this paragraph I will 





To: Minister of Defence
From: Maarten van Veen
Concerns: Future of Military Technology
Excellency,
It is my privilege to present you a brief outline of my thesis and the consequent conclusions.
Training simulators have become indispensable in training the skills needed to use complicated 
military technology. Those simulators appear in many shapes and sizes, sharing the assumption 
that crucial aspects of reality can be modelled ‘realistically’. In my research I have examined the 
way people judge whether a training simulator is ‘realistic’.
The process of purchase, development and use of a specific military training simulator was 
mapped, in order to investigate how trainers, purchasers, military staff and politicians validated 
it. Each group developed a very different strategy. My study describes how these people talk 
about the training simulator and how they substantiate their arguments. My observations 
provide insights into the acceptance of new technology in a military organization. 
Three important implications will be given further consideration to: 
1. The parties involved understood the training simulator as a reflection of reality. The 
simulator is ‘correct’, when it matches reality. It is easily forgotten that someone has to make 
that judgment. Developers of simulators tend to position themselves as experts for making 
that judgment. They develop standards for that purpose, and set up (‘independent’) centres 
of expertise. But, my study shows that training simulators are constantly changing and that 
flexibility gave them the assurance to be ‘realistic’.
2. Military leaders see technology as something that is needed in order to perform a specific 
task. However, only those needs are identified that solve problems of today rather than 
tomorrow. This picture does not acknowledge the social-political processes needed for 
purchase, development and use of the technology. It would enrich decision-making when non-
military experts from different special interest groups would be involved. A one-sided vision on 
military technology would then be avoided.
3. Simulation technology promises to improve the training of soldiers. At the same time 
this technology is developed by men, which implies that a certain ideology on training, 
communication and warfare is ‘inscribed’ in the technology. Never has the bias in training 
simulators been researched systematically, even though simulation technology is omnipresent. 
For that reason it is very important to assess how simulation technology contributes to the 
values that the military organization wants to contribute to.   
My conclusion is that when decisions on military technology are being made it is all important 
to involve many more non-military special interest groups. Military technology has too great 
an impact on values in society then to leave it entirely to the military organization. Complex 
decisions should not be narrowed down to: ‘do we need it or not?’ Often many more interests 
are at stake and they deserve it to be discussed thoroughly. Such an approach could make the 
relevance of Defence for society much clearer.
Looking forward to the opportunity of exchanging ideas with you on the value of a public 
debate concerning the future of military technology. 
Yours respectfully,
Maarten van Veen
I conclude with a recommendation for each of the five actor-worlds I 




Validation is understood by simulationists as, ‘the process of determining the 
degree to which a model or simulation is an accurate representation of the real 
world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model or simulation’. 
However, this is not achievable because changing perspectives regarding 
accurateness and intended uses are inevitable. One needs to strive to develop a 




The claim that the training simulator provides ‘realistic training’ makes no sense. 
However, the simulator does provide a sophisticated tool for controlling and 
evaluating the behaviour of soldiers. One should be more aware of the negative 




The claim that the simulator is selected based on the ‘best value for money’ makes 
no sense. The current procedure for tender is not very well suited for the long 
duration of technology development because the requirements must be presented 




The claim that 'new technology is needed' is often driven by a 'solutionist desire' 
to do things and make things better. However, this desire often lacks a serious 
study of what the needs consist of and how they have come about. 
Political validation
(Chapter 7)
The claim that ‘simulation technology is realistic, saves money and reduces 
environmental damage’ presupposes a specific kind of military training and 
military organization. Thorough studies on the impact of simulation technology 
on the military organization, military industry, military training, budget and 
environment should be requested from non-military organizations.
Table 3: Overview of recommendations
‘At the time, there seemed to be no choice’, that is what practitioners 
told me when discussing their work. It had, meanwhile, become clear 
that devising a ‘realistic’ training simulator requires a lot of work and 
takes a tremendous amount of time. Apart from giving a light impression 
of the work performed, this thesis deals with the way practitioners 
currently validate the training simulator by describing the gap between 
what they say they do and what is actually done. My exploration makes 
visible that training simulators are ‘political’ even before they are 
‘switched on’. Validation is a process of changing actors, goals and 
intentions. The rigid view of validation should be replaced by a view of 





1 This is a particularly interesting statement because it assumes that skills  
 can be separated from context. I will return to this topic later.
2 See Industry Review Report Store: The Global Military Simulation and  
 Virtual  Training Market 2011-2021. http://www.industryreview.com, dated  
 2 April  2012.
3 Jane’s is a very respected handbook for the military world, see:  
 http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence/det-products/simulation-train 
 ing.aspx. 
4 More information on IITSEC can be read on http://www.iitsec.org.
5 Tools to simulate war are much older (Chess for example), but they lack  
 the technical complexity that the Link Trainer has, see (Creveld, 2008) and  
 (R. Smith, 2010)
6 Paul Virilio makes a similar argument, but refers to the concept of speed.  
 The increasing speed of military technology makes that there is very little  
 space left for humans to reflect and negotiate in (Virilio, 2006). 
7 DeLanda published in 2011 a book that investigates how ‘emergence’ can  
 be traced in different ‘genres of simulation’; see (DeLanda, 2011). 
8 Quite a similar system as the Mobile Combat Training Centre as I have  
 described in the introduction.
9 The authors Roza and Voogd are employed at NLR and TNO. These   
 organizations have set-up in cooperation of the Ministry of Defence an  
 independent company Q-tility, whose aim it is to ‘become a recognized  
 V&V service provider in the area of modeling, simulation and serious  
 games (...) and to be the first to successfully implement and commercially  
 exploit the new SISO and NATO standard: Generic Methodology for   
 Verification and Validation (GM-VV).’ See: http://q-tility.nl.
10 Smith states ‘This is not a binary Yes/No decision’ (R. Smith, 2007b, 
 pp. 10-09) He explains that there are five possible outcomes: (1) use   
 simulation as is; (2) use simulation with limitations; (3) additional VV&A;  
 (4) do not use simulation; and (5) modify simulation. In all cases Smith  
 assumes that the underlying model is correct or not, there are only several  
 ways how to cope with that.
11 See for different perspectives on validation: (Ören & Yilmaz, 2013).
12 For more information about the work of Bruno Latour see: (Blok & Jensen,  
 2011; Harman, 2009; Schmidgen, 2011; Wieser, 2012).
13 The problems of ‘doing’ research in social science is discussed in more  
 depth in (J. Law, 2004)
14 The title of the article was (translated) ‘Combat Mobile Training Centre  
 (MCTC) replaces MILES’. That title was wrong, because two systems have  
 been mixed up. It should have been ‘The Mobile Combat Training Centre  
 replaces MILES’. I wrote down the title, as it should have been, to make it  
 not more confusing than it already is (“Combat Manoevre Training Centre  
 (MCTC) vervangt Miles,” 2003).
15  More precisely the company Saab Training Systems handed symbolically  
 over the system to the department responsible for the procurement of  
 military material of the Royal Army and the department handed the system  
 over to the Training Centre of Manoeuvre (OTCMAN).
16 MILES is the name of the technology that was used in CMTC in Hohenfels,  
 Germany. The US has several training areas where the system is exploited.  
 In chapter 5 you will find more information about MILES and CMTC.
17 Original in Dutch: ‘Het bestaat in principe uit chips die via een   
 draagmechanisme gekoppeld worden aan het wapen. Deze chips   
 worden voorgeprogrammeerd met de specifieke eisen van het wapen  
 waar het op wordt gemonteerd. Zo zal het wapen van de schutter lange  
 afstand (SLA) bijvoorbeeld tot duizend meter effectief kunnen   
 schieten terwijl de Diemaco tot vierhonderd meter effectief treffers boekt.’  
 (“Combat Manoevre Training Centre (MCTC) vervangt Miles,” 2003, p. 6)
18 The soldiers called this voice jokingly ‘Ingrid’ a fictive Swedish female.
19 A ‘paper-based’ solution was available, but I will not go in to that.
20 Original in Dutch: ‘Het systeem communiceert met elk individu,   
 uiteindelijk bepaalt het systeem wat er daadwerkelijk gebeurd is. Het  
 systeem is onverbiddelijk, dus geen discussies meer met de Hotel   
 Lima’s (afk. Hulp oefenleiders) die je vroeger bij MILES wel had’. (“Combat  
 Manoevre Training Centre (MCTC) vervangt Miles,” 2003, p. 6)
21 Original in Dutch: ‘Het geïnstrumentaliseerd trainen zorgt ervoor dat  
 de militairen op alle niveaus een spiegel krijgen voorgehouden. Het laat  
 ook geen ruimte voor discussie. Alle acties worden geregistreerd en  
 tekortkomingen genadeloos blootgelegd.’ (Santegoeds, 2008, p. 6)
22 Photo of soldier with laser transmitter and detector. Commander MCTC  
 De Jong used the photo in a PowerPoint presentation about MCTC for  
 military units in 2004. 
23 The PowerPoint Presentation was made available to me on October 31,  
 2008. It is titled ‘Cursus MCTC’ and ‘Mobile Combat Training Center: The  
 New challenge’, dated 2004. Its aim was to introduce MCTC to military  
 units.
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24 Technical properties like this can change after ‘updates’ and   
 ‘modifications’, so this information might not resemble the current system.
25 Shown to me and explained in the interview on July 15th, 2009. 
26 Original in Dutch: ‘Het MCTC (Mobile Combat Training Center) heeft  
 als doel trainingen tot teamniveau op zodanige wijze te ondersteunen 
 dat, op zo realistisch mogelijke wijze, commandanten worden
 geconfronteerd met de resultaten van de uitvoering van hun opdracht. 
 De nabootsing van de realiteit wordt verkregen door het gebruik
 van geavanceerde middelen. Deze middelen genereren op basis van 
 bepaalde normering een gemiddelde uitwerking op materieel en/of 
 personeel. Het operationeel geneeskundig optreden binnen het 
 bataljonsvak dient op een zo realistisch mogelijke wijze te worden 
 uitgevoerd. Hierbij gaat het naast de individuele kwaliteiten op het gebied 
 van deelhandelingen (aanleggen van een specifiek verband of toedienen 
 van een medicament) meer om de samenhang van de totale behandeling 
 van gewonden in het militair gezondheidszorgsysteem. Om dit te 
 bereiken is een systeem benodigd dat de hulpverlener een patiëntmodel 
 biedt aan de hand waarvan beslissingen moeten worden genomen 
 (onderzoeken en behandelingen) en dat het mogelijk maakt dit 
 patiëntmodel over te dragen aan een hulpverlener op een hoger niveau. 
 Het patiëntmodel dient, op basis van uitgevoerde behandelingen, 
 realistische waarden aan te nemen.’ (Ministerie van Defensie, 2002, p. 01)
27 Personal conversation before the recorded interview on October 31st, 2008.
28 Original in Dutch: ‘We zitten altijd als een vreemde eend in de bijt. 
 Manoeuvre heeft al sinds oudsher de neiging om heel erg met haar 
 eigen ding bezig te zijn. Het integreren van het geneeskundige aspect, tja, 
 dat gaat nog wat moeizaam. Dat gaat steeds beter nu we nu aardig wat 
 uitzendingen hebben gehad want er wordt nu toch wel op de noodzaak 
 gewezen. Het is dus heel belangrijk dat je je geneeskundige elementen 
 raadpleegt en meebetrekt in je besluitvorming.’ (Interview May 29th, 2008)
29 Quarterly Progress Report CILS/COS NO 7, 2005, of Mobile Combat 
 Training Center (MCTC) written by Saab Training Systems, page 8. Saab 
 permitted me to study the documents on June 4, 2008. Original text was 
 in English.
30 Original in Dutch: ‘Het was koud, het sneeuwde en het was guur. We 
 gaan lekker bij de warme kachel zitten  en doen wat we moeten doen.   
 Dat was niet datgene wat we wilden. We willen ‘train as you fight’. We 
 willen dat mensen dingen echt gaan doen. Dat de mensen behandelen en 
 een noodverbandje plakken. De dingen doen die ze normaal in het echt 
 ook zouden doen. Dus we zaten met een heel mooi doorontwikkeld 
 geneeskundig systeem dat in de praktijk gewoon niet bruikbaar was.’ 
 (Interview May 29th, 2008)
31 Photo of the medical treatment simulator taken from the website of Saab 
 Training Systems. Weblink: http://www.saabgroup.com/en/training-
 and-simulation/air-training--simulation3/mout-solutions/combat-training-
 centres/medical-treatment-simulator-mts/ Retrieved on April 15th, 2014.
32 In military terminology this is called Level 4 and 5 training. The levels are 
 extensively explained in chapter six: military validation.
33 The PowerPoint-file was developed by: a staff officer of the medical unit. 
 The presentation was titled: ‘Medical Treatment Simulator: De onmisbare 
 aanvulling op het MCTC’. The PowerPoint was presented at a Workshop 
 about the Medical Treatment Simulator at the at the manufacturer Saab 
 Training System in Huskvarna, Sweden. The file was made available to me 
 on 2008, 29th of May.
34 Original in Dutch: ‘Medical Threatment system (MTS) is nu min of meer  
 een ketencontroleur geworden. Het was een systeem voor de Combat-life-
 saver (CLS-er) en dan moest hij ten eerste de handelingen die hij aan 
 de patiënt zou gaan uitvoeren in dat systeem invoeren en daarmee kon hij 
 dan de vent stabiliseren. Want anders zegt dat systeem na een uur: 
 dood. Maar daar zijn we vanaf gestapt om bepaalde redenen.  Nu kunnen 
 we controleren vanaf het eerste contact met een CLS-er dat de gewonde  
 vent op tijd bij de pillendraaier op tafel ligt. En dat kunnen we 
 helemaal volgen. Daarnaast is het uitgebreid met allerlei fotootjes van 
 de meest verschrikkelijke verwondingen van wat die vent zou kunnen 
 krijgen. Het wordt door het systeem bepaald welke foto naar voren popt, 
 dan weet hij: dat is de verwonding die ik moet gaan behandelen.’ 
 (Interview March 10th, 2009)
35 Retrieved from the website http://www.saabgroup.com/Training-and-
 Simulation/ on February 19th, 2013.
36 Original in Dutch: ‘De gewonde is op dat moment alleen 
 maar een onderwijsleermiddel, oneerbiedig gezegd, een tooltje om die 
 managementgegevens boven water te krijgen. ... en meer eigenlijk niet... 
 net als een schoolbord of weet ik wat, heel oneerbiedig, maar meer is 
 het in feite niet. Het is een hulpmiddel om managementgegevens te 
 genereren.’ (Interview May 29th, 2008).
37 Statement in a personal conversation during lunch, after the interview on 
 May 29th, 2008.
38 Original in Dutch: ‘Hierdoor zal een spanning in het weefsel rondom de 
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 projectielbaan in het lichaam worden gegenereerd die, indien een 
 zekere drempel wordt overschreden, aanleiding zal geven tot 
 scheurvorming. Het moge duidelijk zijn dat organen met een grote 
 elasticiteit, zoals spierweefsel, deze verplaatsing beter kunnen doorstaan 
 dan minder elastische, bv. lever of milt.’ (Crucq, 1990, p. 309)
39 Convention of The Hague 1899 and revised in 1907 explicitly forbids the 
 use of bullets that fragment or transform.
40 Original in Dutch: ‘We gaan lekker bij de warme kachel zitten en bekijken 
 wat we nu moeten doen.  Dat was niet datgene wat we wilden.’ (Interview 
 May 29th, 2008).
41 I cannot say anything about the realization of the new system because it 
 was introduced after my fieldwork in 2008.
42 The medical non-commissioned officer told me in 2008, 29th May the 
 medical healthcare system was ‘short cut’ because wounded soldiers in 
 Uruzgan are straight flown in from the battlefield directly to the military 
 hospital by helicopter, this puts pressure on the representation of the 
 health care system in the MTS (model 3).
43 Parliamentary documents from 1814 to 1995 are accessible on  
 http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl. Parliamentary documents from 1995 
 onwards are accessible on zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl. The National 
 Archive makes the documents for the Minister of Defence physical 
 accessible after they have be cleared see www.nationaalarchief.nl.
44 Original in Dutch: ‘Om de vereiste graad van operationele gereedheid 
 te bereiken, moet de krijgsmacht haar personeel zo realistisch mogelijk 
 opleiden en trainen. Zij maakt daarbij onder andere gebruik van 
 simulatoren.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1995/96, p. 01).
45 Information about the organizational structure of the Dutch Army in 
 January 2003 can be read in English  (Kramer, 2004), especially page 221 
 onwards. In the articles of (Princen & Wijnen, 2004) and (Ruiter, 2011) 
 is the history of the organizational structure of  the Army explained, both 
 in Dutch however. In my text I will keep the organizational structure quite 
 simple to bring in not too many actors.
46 Original in Dutch: ‘Je kunt wel zeggen ik moet iets hebben dat kan 
 dansen, maar als je de marktverkenning doet en je vindt geen enkele 
 fabrikant die dingen bouwt die kunnen dansen, dan is dat niet realistisch.’ 
 (Interview June 16th, 2008)
47 Original in Dutch: ‘Ja, het begint met de trigger. Het operationele concept. 
 De behoefte.’ (Interview April 21st, 2008)
48 Sources interview June 16th, 2008, and (Ministerie van Defensie, 2000).
49 Original in Dutch: ‘Tuurlijk, we hebben om ons heen gekeken en bekeken 
 wat de Amerikanen aan eisen hebben gesteld en wat stellen de 
 Canadezen aan eisen, wat hebben de Duitsers aan eisen gesteld, wat 
 hebben de Noren aan eisen gesteld en vervolgens gekeken hoe e.e.a. 
 toepasbaar was voor de Nederlandse situatie.’ (Interview June 16th, 2008)
50 Original in Dutch: ‘Dat is te lang geleden, dat weet ik niet meer, dan praat 
 je over tien jaar terug. Over het algemeen detail verschillen.’ (Interview 
 June 16th, 2008)
51 Original in Dutch: (1) Instrumentatie; (2) Instrumentatie van relevante 
 gevechtsgegevens; (3) Instrumentatie benodigd voor oefenleiding, 
 inbegrepen AAR; (4) Gebiedsbedekkende wapeneffect simulatie (AWES); 
 (5) Duelsimulatoren; (6) Algemeen. Note: I numbered the headings to 
 make the structure visible. (Ministerie van Defensie, 1995a)
52 Original text in Dutch: 
 ‘2.d. Het moet mogelijk zijn voor de daarvoor in aanmerking komende 
 wapensystemen, gebaseerd op de ingevoerde afstand, een variabele  
 ‘flight-time’ in te stellen.
 2.e. Het moet mogelijk zijn dat het dragen van scherfwerende vesten 
 wordt verwerkt in een aanpasbaar- kwetsbaarheidsmodel.
 4.e.1.  Aard van de verwonding dient afhankelijk te zijn van type eenheid 
 en soort wapen waardoor getroffen. Ad random middels een 
 kwetsbaarheidsmodel in het systeem.
 5.k. Het is noodzakelijk dat tref- en kill-kans overeenkomen met de 
 gesimuleerde wapens.
 5.l. Het ballistische gedrag van de echte munitie moet zo realistisch 
 mogelijk worden nagebootst.
 5.m. Het is wenselijk dat het gebruik van duelsimulatoren zo min 
 mogelijk handelingen vergt die afwijken van de normale handelingen aan 
 het wapen(systeem).
 6. n. Duelsimulatoren dienen zoveel mogelijk onder realistische 
 omstandigheden te kunnen worden gebruikt, inbegrepen onder 
 omstandigheden van verminderd zicht.
 6.aa. De tijd benodigd voor laden, vuren en herladen moet realistisch zijn.
 6.ab. Duelsimulatoren moeten een hiërarchie hebben die overeenkomt 
 niet specifieke wapenkenmerken.  Bijvoorbeeld een Diemaco geweer- kan 
 geen Leopard-2 tank afschieten, een TOW kan dat wel.  Een Leopard-2 
 tank kan wel een Diemaco schutter uitschakelen.
 6.ac. De duelsimulatoren moeten treffers op voertuigen/wapenplatformen 
 kunnen categoriseren: (1) catastrophic kill (total kill). (2) weapon kill (alleen 
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 wapen uitgeschakeld). (3) mobility kill. (4) radio kill (intercom blijft 
 functioneren). (5) fracticide. (6) treffer zonder schade (random 4%). (7) 
 near miss. Het soort treffer is afhankelijk van wapensvsteem, munitiesoort, 
 richting, trefhoek en plaats treffer.’ (Ministerie van Defensie, 1995a)
53 Original in Dutch: ‘6ac. (...)Het soort treffer is afhankelijk van 
 wapensysteem, munitiesoort, richting, trefhoek en plaats treffer.’
 (Ministerie van Defensie, 1995a)
54 The document (Request for Information) was prepared in Dutch. The draft 
 was titled: ‘Operationele eisen duelsimulatoren Geinstrumenteerd 
 oefenterrein simulatie gebiedsdekkende wapensystemen’ dated June 
 1996. It was quite different from the Request of Information that eventually 
 was sent out in November 1996.
55 Interview June 16th, 2008.
56 Original in Dutch: ‘Dan heb je dus allemaal eigen vertalingen van een 
 stuk wat ik in het Nederlands voor me heb liggen.  Dan kom ik daar om 
 erover te gaan onderhandelen. Ik praat Engels in Duitsland, Zweden, 
 Amerika en Nieuw-Zeeland. Dat spreken we af, onze voertaal is Engels. 
 Dus ik ga onderhandelen met de leverancier over een artikel in het 
 contract -  dat ik in het Nederlandse hier heb liggen en hij in het Engels 
 - en uiteindelijk komen we dan tot de conclusie dat hij het misschien wel 
 verkeerd vertaald heeft.’ (Interview September 25th, 2008)
57 As explained before the specifications are written in English.
58 Original in Dutch: ‘Dat was toen vrij uniek. Ik probeer het zelf nog steeds 
 te promoten. Ik denk dat het de bruikbaarheid van offertes die je daarna 
 krijgt verhoogt. Kijk, wij hebben natuurlijk nooit van zijn leven de wijsheid 
 in pacht, we weten een hele hoop, maar wij kunnen natuurlijk heel goed 
 bepaalde eisen ineens opschrijven die gewoon absoluut onmogelijk zijn 
 of als we het op die manier omschrijven dat je enorme kostdrijvers 
 gaat creëren die je op een heel slimme manier zou kunnen omzeilen. Er 
 zit een gevaar in dat als je commentaar van bedrijf A verwerkt dus een 
 uniek iets gaat opschrijven van bedrijf A, waardoor bedrijf B 
 gediscrimineerd zou worden. 
 Maar dat gevaar is ook gelijk de veiligheid, omdat wij ons dat bewust zijn 
 zullen wij dus nooit op één leverancier richten, omdat je anders gewoon 
 aan de hoogste boom wordt opgeknoopt. Dat is op zich een heel leuk 
 spel het vraagt wel enig inlevingsvermogen in de materie. En je moet 
 ook wel weten wat er technisch wel en niet kan. Maar door het spel op 
 die manier te spelen, weet je zeker dat op het moment dat je de offerte 
 aanvraagt met het definitieve programma van eisen, dat je iets vraagt 
 waarvan de industrie al heeft aangegeven, ja, dat moet op die manier echt 
 wel mogelijk zijn.’ (Interview September 25th, 2008).
59 The specifications are written in English. No page-numbers are printed in 
 the document.
60 Original in Dutch: ‘Als je kijkt met name in het softwarematige deel van 
 het project, daar zit natuurlijk interpretatieruimte, alleen dan is het 
 afhankelijk van op welk abstractieniveau je dan uiteindelijk het oordeel 
 velt. Dus onder een eis kan natuurlijk een hele wereld van belevenis zitten, 
 maar zolang je dus de bovenste eis afdekt [is dat geen probleem] Dat 
 vond ik wel heel sterk in het MCTC verhaal, dat het programma van eisen 
 behoorlijk functioneel gesteld was.’ (Interview September 25th, 2008).  
61 Original in Dutch: ‘Een één-weg systeem zendt een puls uit. Het 
 ontvangende systeem bepaalt dan op grond van trefkansberekening of 
 het getroffen is. Dit systeem houdt geen rekening met de ballistiek. Een 
 tweeweg systeem zendt ook een puls uit. Het ontvangende systeem 
 reflecteert de puls waardoor de afstand wordt gemeten. Hierdoor kan 
 de ballistiek worden verrekend en kan er een nauwkeurige 
 trefferberekening plaats vinden. Bij één-weg systemen treden in geringere 
 mate negatieve leereffecten op die echter nog nooit zijn gekwantificeerd. 
 Deze negatieve leereffecten beperken zich tot ander gedrag dat de 
 schutter moet vertonen om te kunnen vuren. Mocht dit negatieve gedrag 
 al aangeleerd zijn dan kan dit altijd weer achteraf gecorrigeerd worden 
 door scherp te gaan schieten of door een korte training in een 
 schietsimulator. Overigens worden deze negatieve leereffecten alleen bij 
 tank- en TOW schutters onderkend.’ (Ministerie van Defensie, 1998, p. 7).
62 Original in Dutch: ‘En dat werd dan gesimuleerd met een one-way laser 
 systeem. Waarbij met de snelheid van het licht een schot gesimuleerd 
 werd over een afstand van 1000 meter voor de Dragon: 1000m (TOW 
 3km.) dan praat je niet over een enkel negatief leermoment, dat is een 
 volstrekt verkeerde schiettechniek, dat slaat helemaal nergens op. En dat 
 zij dat volledig naast zich neerlegde, daar kan ik niet bij.’ (Interview 
 October 17th, 2008)
63 Original in Dutch: ‘... financieel gezien moeten we er één kiezen.  Eentje 
 van die en die omvang, dan wordt het 1-weg systeem. Of als we iets 
 meer geld hebben dan mag het 2-weg worden, want dan kunnen we er 
 ook de schietopleiding mee doen. Maar dat is één van de argumenten 
 geweest in het begin, dat het een tactische trainer te velde is om tactische 
 situaties te beoefenen en dan is de schiettechniek ondergeschikt.’ 
 (Interview October 23rd, 2008).
234 235
64 Original in Dutch: ‘Waarom zei de directeur van STS dat? Nou omdat 
 ie het gevoel had dat altijd 2-weg systemen duurder zijn dan 1-weg 
 systemen. En dat hoeft helemaal niet waar te wezen. Kijk STS had een 
 bepaald beeld van wat een 2-weg systeem is. (...) Ik zei: je moet dat 
 wel even zien in het licht van wat jouw concurrenten aanbieden. Je weet 
 dat je in concurrentie bent. Als jouw concurrent iets niet aanbiedt en jij 
 biedt dat wel aan, ondanks dat de concurrent daarmee wel aan onze eisen 
 voldoet, dan ben je niet zo goed bezig, want dan moet je dat element er 
 gewoon buiten houden’ (Interview April 21th, 2008).
65 I saw many drafts, calculations, and re-calculations as of how many 
 components were needed. It is an interesting black box that I did not open.
66 Original in Dutch: ‘Er was eigenlijk op dat moment maar één leverancier 
 die een 2-weg systeem kon leveren. Dat was SAAB. Wat je niet wilt in 
 een concurrentie is dat je te maken hebt met een monopolist, want dan 
 betaal je gewoon de prijs die hij vraagt. Dus het is ook een beetje het spel 
 en het was ook een beetje de ontwikkeling die gaande was. SAAB 
 had bijvoorbeeld wel 2-weg systemen, maar niet voor alle wapens. SAAB 
 had bijvoorbeeld geen oplossing voor de handvuurwapens, want dat 
 kent geen 2-weg systeem en is ook niet zinvol, het kan er ook niet op, daar 
 zijn die dingen te groot voor. Zo had iedere fabrikant wel wat. Dat was 
 eigenlijk de reden om het 1- en 2-weg niet als uitsluitsel te willen 
 gebruiken. Dus de omschrijving zodanig maken, en er wel bepaalde 
 eisen in zetten wat betreft nauwkeurigheid, wat je uiteindelijk wilt hebben. 
 Het hoger gelegen doel is dat eenheden getraind worden op een zo 
 realistisch mogelijke manier en dat ze naderhand een goeie AAR kunnen 
 krijgen, waarmee ze geconfronteerd worden met hun resultaten. Dat is 
 natuurlijk het hoger gelegen doel, het is maar net hoe de fabrikant dat 
 kan invullen. Een 1-weg of 2-weg is een technische discussie. Geen 
 operationele discussie. Dus we hebben het eigenlijk willen optillen naar 
 een operationeel niveau waarbij je eigenlijk zegt: dat zijn de 
 bovenliggende eisen en daar moet je aan voldoen, bedenk daar maar een 
 concept voor. Of het nu 1-weg of 2-weg heet dat boeit niet zo.’ (Interview 
 April 21th, 2008)
67 The National Archive makes the documents for the Minister of Defence 
 physically accessible after they have been cleared see  
 http://www.nationaalarchief.nl and (l’Ecluse, 1998).
68 Translated: Project Group Simulators of the Royal Army. The PTSIMKL was 
 after submitting the policy on advanced educational tools dismissed 
 (October 1993). The tasks were taken over by the advisory committee 
 advanced educational tools (in Dutch: ACGOLM or Advies Commissie 
 Geavanceerde OnderwijsLeerMiddelen) that should see to the execution 
 of the policy. The army board was the highest managerial organ of the 
 army and reported directly to the Minister of Defence.
69 See minutes of the 1471e meeting of the Army Board (in Dutch: 
 Legerraad), dated 2 November 1993, reference 33/2/92.
70 Translated: Automated educational tools and simulators.
71 Original in Dutch: ‘Het belangrijkste aspect van het optreden door 
 manoeuvre-eenheden is de interactie van vuur en beweging d.w.z. 
 uitvoeren van het samenspel van bewegen, waarnemen en vuren. 
 Vaardigheden als het zo onbeschadigd en onopgemerkt mogelijk door 
 het terrein verplaatsen naar de plaats van c.q. tijdens inzet is daarbij net 
 zo belangrijk als het kunnen uitbrengen van effectief vuur.’ (Ministerie van 
 Defensie, 1993a, p. 47)
72 I have explained both concepts in chapter 1. Or see the glossary.
73 TACTIS would be a modern version of the American system SIMNET.
74 The Dutch Army had bought some sets of MILES for training in the 
 Marnewaard (see excerpt from appendix 2, 19878, nr. 3, 1988-1989, p.15). 
 This set was small and did not have many features. It should be noted that 
 laser technology in combination with remote targets for training weapons 
 systems was quite common in shooting ranges.
75 Original in Dutch: ‘Een knelpunt is hoe zo reëel mogelijke operationele 
 omstandigheden kunnen worden gesimuleerd. Het oefenen met 
 duelsimulatoren en het gebruik van een geïnstrumenteerd oefenterrein 
 geeft de mogelijkheid om te oefenen onder optimaal gesimuleerde 
 operationele omstandigheden. Alleen aspekten als bijv. de angst om 
 gewond of gedood te worden in het gevecht zijn niet te simuleren. Het 
 nut van duelsimulatoren behoeft geen betoog.’ (Ministerie van Defensie, 
 1993a, p. 56)
76 Original in Dutch: ‘Aangezien de waarschijnlijkheid van inzet van 
 eenheden met BBT-ers groter is geworden in vergelijking met de tijd van 
 het ‘dienstplichtleger’, is het een absolute noodzaak dat BBT-eenheden 
 optimaal worden geoefend om een zo hoog mogelijke graad van 
 professionaliteit te bereiken. Alleen zo kan worden zorg gedragen dat niet 
 alleen de taken kwalitatief goed worden uitgevoerd, maar ook dat de 
 kwantitatieve vulling op een zo hoog mogelijk peil blijft. Het oefenen 
 met een compleet manoeuvrebataljon in duelsituaties (tegen een zo 
 professioneel mogelijke vijand) moet het benodigde zelfvertrouwen 
 geven. Het gebruik van  duelsimulatoren in bataljonsverband op een 
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 geinstrumenteerd oefenterrein (zoals momenteel wordt beproefd op 
 Hohenfels) is voor de opleiding en oefening van een beroepsleger 
 een haast noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor uitzending t.b.v. peace-
 enforcement.’ (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993a, p. 57)
77 Translated from ‘Werkverband duel simulatoren’.  Most recommendations 
 seemed already set in motion before the formal decision to accept the 
 proposed policy on Advanced Educational Tools. It is clear that the policy 
 set the context to continue on this path.
78 The picture is re-drawn for readability; it is an exact copy of its original.
79 See for example the introductory PowerPoint presentation titled ‘Simulatie 
 voor de maneuvre’ for the students of the Netherlands Defence Academy 
 (NLDA) held by ‘Kenniscentrum Simulatie’ on March 29th, 2011. 
80 I am well aware that three years after the implementation of the study on 
 GOLM the workgroup AC-GOLM started to work on an update, see 
 the documents in preparation of the meeting on July 3th, 1996 (reference 
 LAS BO/1387/53). The new policy would eventually be finalised in 
 January 2001 (see minutes meeting AC-GOLM October 7, 1999, reference 
 OB&T/1999/22040).
81 Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) Hohenfels AAF, Regensburg, 
 Bayern, Germany.
82 Original in Dutch: ‘Op het moment dat je behoeftestellingen gaat 
 doen van een wapensystem, dan zitten diegenen die de 
 behoeftestellingen doen wat hoger in de organisatie. Ze hebben zo’n 
 pakweg 15 tot 20 jaar geleden hun elementaire opleiding gehad en zijn 
 eigenlijk een generatie geleden gevormd. Die proberen dus iets nieuws 
 te maken van iets waar de jongste generatie nu al mee werkt. Als je daar 
 met technische nieuwere zaken gaat komen dan heeft die oudere 
 generatie daar toch een ander gevoel bij.’ (Interview October 23rd 2008)
83 The report was written by the section communication and S3 (operations) 
 of 13Mechbrig. Dirk-Jan Donatz, Hendrik Jan Erkens, Frits Hendrikx, 
 Alex Huysmans, Maarten Nuyts. Dated: August 24th, 1993. Printed by 
 Lecturis bv Eindhoven.
84 Original text (in English).
85 Interviews on 2008, September 29th and October 17th. 
86 Original text (in English).
87 Original text (in English).
88 Original in Dutch: ‘En toen heb ik CMTC in de praktijk gezien. Toen zeiden 
 we van dit is wat we moeten hebben.  Want als infanterist, de simpele 
 soldaat met zijn geweer, die kon nooit wat, die stond in het veld en riep 
 ‘’pinda, pinda’’ tegen een tank en die tank reed gewoon door. (...)  Ik zag 
 tijdens een oefening in Hohenfels een verkennertje die met een Dragon 
 een tank uitschakelde. En die vent was zo gelukkig, dat hij zoveel 
 betekende dat het ook echt iets was wat werkte, toen dacht ik, ja, zoiets 
 moeten we hebben.’ (Interview October 23rd, 2008)
89 Original text (in English).
90 Original text (in English).
91 Original in Dutch: ‘MILES is zonder meer ‘a revolution in training for war’, 
 het vereist echter een goede set spelregels en een consequente 
 handhaving van deze regels.’ (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993c, p. 06)
92 The MILES training simulator used in Hohenfels Germany was a one-way 
 laser system.
93 Original in Dutch: ‘Oefenen dient te geschieden onder gesimuleerde 
 gevechtsomstandigheden. Hoe beter de gesimuleerde 
 gevechtsomstandigheden de werkelijkheid nabootsen, hoe groter het 
 oefenrendement. Ervaringen hebben aangetoond dat de eerste 
 daadwerkelijke gevechtscontacten de ‘meeste slachtoffers eisen’. Met 
 duelsimulatoren kan de werkelijkheid zeer dicht benaderd worden. In o.m. 
 de Golfoorlog is gebleken dat door het gebruik van duelsimulatoren de 
 onervaren eenheden/het onervaren personeel dermate training en 
 zelfvertrouwen hadden opgedaan dat ze vochten als ervaren eenheden.’ 
 (Ministerie van Defensie, 1993c, p. 07). 
94 This is common knowledge, even Wikipedia gives an extensive overview, 
 see the webpage and the quoted resources on http://en.wikipedia.org/
 wiki/Gulf_War#Controversies.
95 Interview October 23rd, 2008.
96 Nowadays much more attention is being paid to the interoperability 
 of duel simulators. The ideal is that that each army can use its own 
 equipment and exchange information with the systems of the other 
 armies. Standards are in development for that purpose, see for example: 
 (Nash, 2010). 
97 This model of education is based on the ideas of B.F. Skinner. Skinner 
 introduced the so-called ‘radical behaviorism’ that sees human behaviour 
 as effects of environmental reinforcements. But most importantly it does 
 not accept private events such as thinking and emotions as explanation. 
 People are empty shells that respond to stimuli from the environment.  
 It is a common perspective in military training. An example: Michael 
 Macedonia, chief scientist and technical director of the U.S. Army 
 Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM), 
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 explained the aims of military training in this way: ‘that’s what we are trying 
 to do with these soldiers with these training systems. When they go out 
 there, they’ll think, I was here. I’ve been here before. I know what I’m 
 supposed to do. And that is the essence of it.’ (Halter, 2006, p. 201)
98 During the discussion about the study on GOLM the Army Board decided 
 that automated training support of ‘peace-enforcing’ should not be 
 investigated discussing (see letter dated October 28th, 1993, KL-Staf 
 Legerraad, The Hague, nr. 33/2/93 in preparation for the meeting on 
 November 2nd, 1993).
99 Original in Dutch: ‘Daarvoor was toch wel alle reden omdat de wijze 
 van oefenen in het NTC een revolutionaire doorbraak naar de realiteit van 
 het gevechtsveld is: het is er bijna oorlog.’ (Spek, 1987, p. 441).
100 Original in Dutch: ‘Met deze organisatie en hulpmiddelen blijkt het 
 mogelijk te zijn in een oefening een realisme te verkrijgen dat zeer 
 dicht bij de werkelijkheid ligt. Evenals met scherpe munitie valt er met 
 laser niet te discussiëren en te rommelen.’ (Spek, 1987, p. 442)
101 More information about the context of the Gulf War, see (Sifry & Cerf, 
 1997, 2003), and about the mediatisation of the Gulf war (Baudrillard, 
 1995a; Hammond, 2010)
102 Original in Dutch: ‘ (...) toen dacht ik, ja, dat moeten we hebben zoiets (...)’ 
 (Interview October 23rd, 2008)
103 Original in Dutch: ‘[W]at is het beleid aan opleiden? Dat is er niet. Er is 
 helemaal geen beleid. En ja er is vroeger wel eens beleid geweest, maar 
 eigenlijk zaten we elke keer het wiel weer opnieuw uit te vinden: Hoe 
 gaan we opleiden, wat doen we nu, niveaus, wat moeten we ventileren, 
 en dan zo algemeen, generiek mogelijk en vandaar uit dan zeggen, 
 ja maar hoe moeten we dat dan gaan invullen. Maar dat hele beleid dat 
 ergens vaststond, dat was nergens. En de 1ste keer dat we dat, en dat 
 is wel vaker gebeurd, want we zaten elke keer het wiel opnieuw uit te 
 vinden, elke keer met een andere insteek omdat het doel waarvoor het 
 bestemd was en hoe het verkocht moest worden ook net weer een 
 nuance anders lag, maar die mensen zaten elke keer weer opnieuw iets te 
 filosoferen. Dan had ik het geluk dat ik een aantal keren van dit soort 
 verhalen heb moeten maken, dus daar kon ik steeds weer op 
 teruggrijpen.’ (Interview October 23rd, 2008)
104 Original in Dutch: ‘Ik heb het niet verzonnen, het bestond, alleen je moest 
 het wel toepassen hier. En het moest wel verkocht worden aan de 
 legerleiding, want die moesten het ook zien te verkopen aan de politiek, 
 want het is een vrij duur geheel. En dat komt in het hele verhaal van dit 
 document o.a. naar voren. Want er waren mensen die waren daar heel 
 enthousiast over, o.a. de commandant 13e brigade.’ 
 (Interview October 23 rd, 2008).
105 Parliamentary documents from 1814 to 1995 are accessible on http://www.
 statengeneraaldigitaal.nl. Parliamentary documents from 1995 onwards 
 are accessible on zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl. The National Archive 
 makes the documents for the Minister of Defence physically accessible 
 after they have been cleared see http://www.nationaalarchief.nl.
106 The State Secretary can also be described as the deputy minister, junior 
 minister or vice-minister. A State Secretary, not to be confused with the 
 Secretary of State who is a Minister of Foreign Affairs, is appointed by 
 the Minister and is responsible for a specific topic. Although he falls 
 under the responsibility of the minister s/he is on his topic personally 
 responsible to Parliament. The State Secretary does not necessary belong 
 to the same political party as his minister. In the case of simulation 
 technology the State Secretary who is responsible for new military material 
 is the spokesperson in Parliament and signs relevant letters. The names J. 
 van Houwelingen (1982-1986, 1986-1989), B.J.M. baron van Voorst tot 
 Voorst (1989-1993) and A.B.M. Frinking (1993-1994) appear in letters and 
 reports. The relevant Ministers of Defence were: Job de Ruiter (1982-
 1986), Wim van Eekelen / Piet Bukman / Frits Bolkenstein (1986-1989), 
 Relus ter Beek (1989-1994).
107 Original in Dutch: ‘Het monotone en indringende gekletter van Duitse 
 laarzen had een bedreigende klank van onderdrukking, ondanks het feit 
 dat ze er soms aardig bij konden zingen. Het geluidstechnisch zeker niet 
 aangename gejank van de Canadese trucks klonk ons echter als muziek in 
 de oren, als de ‘song of security’.’ (Handelingen II, 1985, pp. 92-01) 
108 Original in Dutch: ‘Specifiek van belang is de rol die simulatoren en 
 simulatietechnieken in de opleiding kunnen spelen, die zelfs kunnen 
 leiden tot vermindering van het ruimtebeslag. Wat het laatste punt betreft, 
 zet ik hierbij enige vraagtekens, omdat de praktische vaardigheid 
 nu eenmaal in het veld verworven moet worden. Ik zie wel mogelijkheden 
 voor beperking van de geluidshinder en voor de bevordering van de 
 veiligheid waardoor mogelijk het aantal en de omvang van de onveilige 
 zones kunnen worden teruggebracht. Wat vindt de regering hiervan?’ 
 (Handelingen II, 1985, pp. 92-08) 
109 Original in Dutch: ‘Graag krijg ik nadere informatie over de 
 simulatietechnieken. Ik sprak al over het effect van veranderingen in 
 de krijgsmacht op de oefeningen, maar hoe zullen de simulatietechnieken 
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 zich ontwikkelen en welke effecten zal dit hebben op het gebruik van 
 terreinen. Een bepaalde minimale praktijkervaring zal nodig blijven. 
 Hoeveel zal dit zijn? Met schieten kun je veel bereiken door middel van 
 simulatietechnieken, maar rijden met een tank moet je toch een keer in de 
 praktijk hebben gedaan.’ (Handelingen II, 1985, pp. 92-02) 
110 Original in Dutch: ‘Wij zijn zeer ontevreden met datgene wat in 
 de nota is geschreven over de betekenis van simulatietechnieken. 
 Moderne computertechnieken bieden een welhaast onvoorstelbare 
 mogelijkheid op het terrein van de simulatie en hiermee voor de 
 geoefendheid. Optimaal gebruik hiervan brengt wellicht ook het totale 
 beslag op de terreinen omlaag. Het is teleurstellend dat op geen enkele 
 wijze de bereidheid zichtbaar is geworden, het effect van 
 simulatietechnieken op het totale beslag van de terreinen in te calculeren, 
 hoewel in het structuurschema de betekenis ervan wordt aangegeven. 
 Ik geef toe dat dit incalculeren niet eenvoudig is, maar de bereidheid 
 ertoe moet in beginsel bestaan. In dit stadium is mijn oordeel over het 
 geformuleerde totale beslag uitgaande van een goed geoefende 
 krijgsmacht dat Defensie effecten van simulatie en dergelijke terzijde heeft 
 geschoven en heeft overvraagd. Ik vraag de staatssecretaris, precies 
 uiteen te zetten waar de berekeningen vandaan komen, in een poging 
 ook mijn fractie op dit punt te overtuigen.’ (Handelingen II, 1985, pp. 92-23) 
111 Original in Dutch: ‘Niettemin zijn er ook beperkingen gebonden aan het 
 gebruik van simulatoren. Er zijn nu eenmaal situaties die in een simulator 
 op dit moment niet kunnen worden geoefend. Het is vraag of dit ooit 
 zal kunnen, zeker in een militair apparaat. Bij voorbeeld het oefenen van 
 tactische manoeuvres met een aantal eenheden en met een aantal tanks, 
 waarbij het de bedoeling is dat in een bepaalde situatie de manschappen 
 snel hun tanks verlaten om ergens dekking te zoeken, is met een simulator 
 heel moeilijk na te bootsen. Iedereen zal dit begrijpen. Iedereen zal ook 
 begrijpen dat daarvoor oefenterreinen nodig zijn.’ (Handelingen II, 1985, 
 pp. 92-34) 
112 Original in Dutch: ‘Onder simulatietechnieken worden alle 
 (geautomatiseerde) leermiddelen verstaan, waarmee de werkelijkheid 
 geheel of gedeeltelijk kan worden nagebootst.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1986/87, p. 04) 
113 Original in Dutch: ‘(...) een ideaal instructiemiddel, doordat vluchtsituaties 
 onder begeleiding betrekkelijk realistisch kunnen worden nagebootst, 
 herhaald of vastgelegd.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1986/87, p. 06)
114 Original in Dutch: ‘Dit aantal uren is nodig voor het behalen en behouden 
 van de vereiste operationele standaard. Aangezien de werkelijke 
 vliegtraining belangrijke elementen omvat, die in vluchtnabootsers niet of 
 slechts beperkt kunnen worden gesimuleerd, is het niet mogelijk een 
 groter deel van de werkelijke vliegtraining te vervangen door het gebruik 
 van vlucht- simulatoren.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1986/87, p. 07)
115 Original in Dutch: ‘Hierdoor en door de hiervoor beschreven beperkingen 
 is een verdere vermindering van het benodigde aantal werkelijke 
 vlieguren onmogelijk. De verdere toepassing van simulatoren heeft 
 wel een verbetering van de kwaliteit van de opleiding tot gevolg.’ 
 (Kamerstuk II, 1986/87, p. 08)
116 Original in Dutch: ‘het nimmer volledig kunnen simuleren van het scherpe 
 schot; de noodzaak de bemanning vertrouwen in het eigen 
 wapensysteem te laten verkrijgen; de noodzaak het wapensysteem 
 periodiek te testen.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1986/87, p. 11)
117 The need for duel simulation is explained again in (Kamerstuk II, 
 1990/91b, p. 209).
118 Original in Dutch: ‘Simulatie is dus een hulpmiddel bij het ontwerpen 
 en evalueren van systemen en processen. Wanneer het simulatiemodel 
 wordt gekoppeld aan een nagebootste bedieningsomgeving ontstaat 
 een simulator. Het systeem kan dan door de mens worden bediend ten 
 behoeve van onderzoek of voor opleiding en training.’ (Kamerstuk II, 
 1988/89, p. 04)
119 Original in Dutch: ‘ Een voorbeeld hiervan is de aan de wal opgestelde 
 scheepssegmenten voor brand- en averijbestrijdingsoefeningen. 
 Universele trainers zijn meestal opgebouwd uit componenten die in de 
 civiele sector op de markt te koop zijn en daardoor veelal minder kostbaar 
 zijn dan het type trainer dat speciaal voor militaire doeleinden 
 ontwikkelde systemen bevat.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1988/89, p. 12)
120 Original in Dutch: ‘Door de snelle technologische ontwikkelingen bootsen 
 simulatoren steeds realistischer de werkelijkheid na, waardoor de leerling 
 na zijn opleiding sneller volwaardig kan functioneren bij zijn krijgsmacht-
 onderdeel.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1988/89, p. 05)
121 Original in Dutch: ‘Zoals in de notitie van 23 februari 1987 reeds is 
 aangegeven, zal het gebruik van simulatoren opleiding en training 
 met behulp van operationele wapensystemen nooit volledig kunnen 
 vervangen. Simulatie, hoe realistisch ook, blijft altijd een benadering 
 van een deel van de werkelijkheid. Onder meer wordt de psychologische 
 druk die optreedt bij het werken met echte apparatuur niet in dezelfde 
 mate verkregen met simulatoren. Met simulatoren kan echter vaak meer 
 worden geoefend dan onder vredesomstandigheden mogelijk is.’ 
 (Kamerstuk II, 1988/89, p. 05)
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122 Original in Dutch: ‘Simulatoren zijn duur. Dit komt onder meer omdat 
 simulatoren in relatief kleine aantallen worden geproduceerd.’ 
 (Kamerstuk II, 1988/89, p. 06)
123 Original in Dutch: ‘De aanschaf van een simulator (bij voorbeeld een 
 vluchttrainer) betekent echter niet dat het personeel niet meer in de 
 praktijk geoefend moet worden. Een simulator kan geen schip, tank of 
 vliegtuig vervangen.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1988/89, p. 06)
124 Original in Dutch: ‘ Er bestaan geen algemene regels voor het 
 realiteitsgehalte van simulatoren voor een effectieve opleiding en training. 
 Wel is vastgesteld dat na het passeren van een bepaald niveau van 
 realiteitsgehalte de educatieve waarde nog slechts tegen sterk verhoogde 
 kosten verder kan worden vergroot. Voor de kosteneffectiviteit is het 
 daarom van belang het omslagpunt te kunnen bepalen.’ 
 (Kamerstuk II, 1988/89, p. 06) 
125 Original in Dutch: ‘leermiddel dat met behulp van geavanceerde 
 technieken de opleidings– en oefensituaties voor gebruikers en/of 
 instandhouders van het systeem geheel danwel gedeeltelijk nabootst.’ 
 (Kamerstuk II, 1989/90, p. 01)
126 Original in Dutch: ‘Een moderne krijgsmacht kan niet zonder de 
 toepassing van simulatietechnieken.(...). Vooral op grond van deze twee 
 laatste vaststellingen wordt het gebruik van simulatietechnieken bij 
 training en opleiding steeds belangrijker. Zo belangrijk dat het in deze 
 tijd een onlosmakelijk en integraal onderdeel van de opleiding en training 
 bij de krijgsmacht is geworden.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1989/90, p. 01)
127 Original in Dutch: ‘Uit de notitie blijkt dat de toepassingsmogelijkheden 
 van simulatietechnieken zowel internationaal als nationaal nog sterk in 
 ontwikkeling zijn.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1986/87, p. 01)
128 Original in Dutch: ‘Door de snelle ontwikkelingen in de simulatietechniek 
 wordt het mogelijk de relevante aspecten van de werkelijkheid 
 bij het ontwerpen van opleidings- en oefenscenario’s in complexe 
 wapensysteemsimulatoren steeds beter na te bootsen. Deze 
 ontwikkelingen zijn van groot belang, omdat zij de kwaliteit van de 
 opleiding verbeteren. Bovendien kent Defensie in vredestijd een aantal 
 beperkingen op het gebied van de ruimtelijke ordening, en heeft 
 Defensie zich tot doel gesteld haar milieu– belastende activiteiten op 
 termijn met 25% te verminderen (Kamerstuk 21 323 nr. 12 van 27 
 september 1989). In veel gevallen is dan ook een doelmatige en 
 doeltreffende opleiding op moderne wapensystemen zonder gebruik van 
 simulatoren niet meer mogelijk.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1989/90, p. 02)
129 See letter from NIID (Stichting Nederlandse Industriele Inschakeling 
 Defensieopdrachten) to the State Secretary of Defence, dated May 1st, 
 1990 it contained a letter of intent from Dutch Industry (six companies 
 signed the letter among them Fokker and DAF) dated April 26, 1990, 
 to set-up NISP (Nederlands Industrieel Simulator Platform) to ‘advice the 
 Dutch government about the Dutch industrial potential’.
130 Original in Dutch: ‘Bij opleiding en training is het bereiken van een 
 optimaal rendement van groot belang. Daarom dienen (delen 
 van) opleidingen en (de voorbereiding van oefeningen) steeds meer 
 onder volledig beheersbare omstandigheden plaats te vinden. 
 Geavanceerde onderwijsleermiddelen - waaronder simulatoren en 
 simulatietechnieken een voorname plaats innemen - geven zicht 
 op verbeterde opleidingsresultaten. Bovendien bieden zij door hun 
 capaciteit tot objectieve verslaglegging tot dusver ongekende 
 mogelijkheden tot kwaliteitsbewaking.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1989/90, p. 07) 
131 Original in Dutch: ‘De heer De Kok (C.D.A.) beschouwde de brief met de 
 bijlagen vooral als een technisch stuk, met weinig of geen politieke 
 beleidslijnen. Die beleidslijnen zijn ook al in eerdere notities over dit 
 onderwerp geschetst. Juist omdat het om een sterk technisch getint 
 stuk gaat, zou het gewenst zijn om hierover een «second opinion» te 
 verkrijgen. In de praktijk blijkt dat echter in Nederland vrijwel onmogelijk 
 te zijn.’ (Kamerstuk II, 1990/91a, p. 03). 
132 The ‘Defensienota 1991’ was especially important for the Army, it is 
 considered as a new perspective on the structure and tasks of the Army, 
 see (Ruiter, 2011).
133 These results can be reconstructed with a letter from the department 
 educational research of the Royal Army to the members of the working 
 group on simulation (COSIM) dated November 24, 1989 
 (reference 54.341) as response to a inquiry of the COSIM (see minutes 
 October, 11, 1989, reference S89/086/3329).
134 Original text in Dutch: ‘Tr = (t-st)/t* 100% Tr = trainingsoverdracht. st = 
 duur (in km of uren) van de aanvullende training van de simulatorgroep 
 op de tank. t = duur van de training van de tankgroep op de tank.  
 Tr = (125Km-85Km)/125Km* 100%. Tr = 32%.(++)’
135 I have explained the concept of ‘hidden curriculum’ in more detail in 
 (Veen, Fenema, & Jongejan, 2012)
136 The result is: Costs without simulator 400 * 220 * fl176,72= fl.15.551.360. 
 Costs with simulator: 400 * 80* fl.176,72 = fl. 5.655.040. 400* 30*fl.430 
 = fl.5.160.000,-. So fl. 5.655.040+ fl. 5.160.000=fl.10.815.040. The savings 
244 245
 of the training simulator are thus fl. 15.551.360 - 10.815.040 = fl. 
 4.736.320.
137 Study Use of Simulators as a means of reducing environmental impacts 
 caused by military activities (report no. 210). NATO-Committee on the 
 Challenges of Modern Society (NATO-CCMS). November 1995. All quotes 
 from the report are original (English) text.
138 COSIM was initiated by the State Secretary to bring the different military 
 branches on high ministerial level together: the Vice Secretary General, 
 sous-chef operations and military strategy, sous-chef operations navy, 
 sous-chef plans Army, sous-chef plans Air force, and representatives from 
 the department on buildings and terrain, the department on scientific 
 research for material, the department of finance and the department of 
 personal. Now it suffices to say that the proposed policy was well 
 received according to the chairman of the COSIM in a letter on April 
 14th, 1992.  It is important to notice that the work of the COSIM was 
 located on a ministerial level and that it involved the Army, Navy and 
 Air Force. That means that the workgroup was able to inform the minister 
 directly. However, below that level each military branch followed its 
 own approach about training simulators. This is easy to see when one 
 studies the memoranda. Specific tasks, responsibilities and challenges 
 always are formulated for each military branch separately. Not an integral 
 policy was formulated. See letter S89/086/1663, dated May 3rd, 1989 
 from the ministerial staff to all top executives of the department. The first 
 step that had to be taken was to make a list of current simulation projects 
 at the ministry of defence (see minutes of the first meeting COSIM dated  
 June 30, 1989). 
 Please note, that it is not quite clear to me how memoranda nrs. 1-2 
 (February 1987) were prepared. However in preparation for memorandum 
 nr. 3 (January 1989) a symposium was organized for the Secretary of State 
 from the Netherlands and Germany on September 13th, 1988 (see letter 
 from the department of material on July 5th, 1998, reference  
 M88/0019/5247).  
139 ‘Er is een hele steile leercurve waar te nemen. (...) Ja, het werk van de 
 soldaat waar hij al die maanden voor heeft getraind met vuur en dekking 
 en noem alles maar op, hoe hij zich überhaupt voortbeweegt in het 
 terrein, daar moet hij uitvoering aan geven anders wordt hij misschien wel 
 geraakt door een laser en dus door een kogel.’ 
 (Interview March 10th, 2009) 
140 Saab Training Systems. Mobile Combat Training Center (MCTC) Quarterly 
 Progress Report CILS/COS, from 2003 to 2008.
141 ISAF is the International Security Assistance Force led by the NATO to 
 rebuild Afghanistan, the largest mission in which the Dutch Army was 
 involved.
142 Original in Dutch: ‘Nee, het aantal geïnstrumenteerde oefeningen is aan 
 de lage kant, dat is een direct gevolg van ISAF. ISAF vreet de KL leeg met 
 als gevolg daarnaast, dus een publiek geheim, dat er 7900 vacatures zijn 
 binnen het Defensie apparaat, en die twee bij elkaar opgeteld.’ 
 (Interview March 10th, 2009)
143 Original in Dutch: ‘ Kijk het is weleens voorgekomen dat bijvoorbeeld een 
 eenheid per direct wordt aangewezen, je moet een bewakingsopdracht 
 uitvoeren in de haven van weet ik veel, waar materieel voor Afghanistan 
 arriveert, en ja dat is meestal een eenheid van compagnies grootte en 
 dus die wordt ergens aan onttrokken. Voorbereiden, uitvoering, 
 anderhalve maand, afwikkelen, dus die kan niet oefenen.’ 
 (Interview March 10th, 2009)
144 Original in Dutch: ‘Daarnaast bij de voorbereidingsoefeningen voor ISAF 
 worden scenario’s gespeeld. Niet ieder scenario leent zich voor 
 gebruikmaking van duelsimulatie-middelen. Bijvoorbeeld er is daarbij 
 heel veel statisch optreden, en de kracht van dit systeem zit hem juist in 
 beweging. Er moet beweging zijn, want anders zie je op je beeldscherm 
 stilstaande poppetjes, als we bijvoorbeeld aan het onderhandelen zijn 
 met een local – dat is statisch optreden – dan zie je geen beweging en dan 
 gebeurt er niks. Dan valt er ook niks te evalueren. Althans niet met behulp 
 van het systeem.’ (Interview March 10th, 2009)
145 During the discussion about the study on GOLM, the Army Board decided 
 that automated training support of ‘peace-enforcing’ should not be 
 investigated (see letter dated October 28th, 1993, KL-Staf Legerraad,  
 The Hague, nr. 33/2/93 in preparation for the meeting on November 2nd, 
 1993).
146 On April, 8 2011 the Parliament decided to abandon the 82 Leopard 2A6 
 tanks due to budget cuts of the Ministry of Defence. However, the Dutch 
 Army will keep training with German Leopard 2 tanks.
147 Morozov is a critical researcher of new technology and is deeply 
 influenced by Latour.
148 See also Feynman, how PowerPoint contributed to the challenger disaster, 
 for a discussion see: (Tufte, 2005).
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Dit boek gaat over de wijze waarop een militaire trainingssimulator 
wordt gevalideerd. Valideren wordt door mensen in de simulatie-
wereld - ik noem ze gemakshalve simulationisten - gedefinieerd als 
‘the process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation 
is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective 
of the intended uses of the model or simulation’ (U.S. Congress, 
1995, p. 35). In deze definitie staat de relatie tussen de ‘echte wereld’ 
en het ‘model van de wereld’ centraal. Het is deze relatie die ik als 
uitgangspunt heb genomen om te onderzoeken hoe professionals 
in de militaire organisatie ‘bewijzen’ dat door hen gewenste 
trainingssimulator valide is. 
Simulationisten zien zichzelf als autoriteit op het gebied van 
modellering en simulatie (modelling & simulation). Zij vinden dat 
ze bij uitstek degenen zijn die in staat zijn om de ‘realiteit’ van 
een simulatie te bepalen. Hiervoor hebben ze een uitgebreid 
instrumentatrium van testmethoden en procedures ontwikkeld. Echter, 
hun wetenschappelijke methoden kennen enkele fundamentele 
tekortkomingen. Het blijkt extreem moeilijk om de ‘realiteit’ van een 
model te bepalen door diverse factoren. Een beetje gecompliceerde 
simulatie maakt gebruik van verschillende modellen die elkaar 
wederkerig beïnvloeden waardoor het ondoenlijk is om het systeem te 
testen (bijv. een simulatie van militaire operatie, zal diverse modellen 
combineren over gedrag van wapens, tegenstanders, terrein, etc.). 
Bovendien is het principieel onmogelijk om hoogwaardige empirische 
data te verzamelen over toekomstige gebeurtenissen zonder allerlei 
aannames over de te verwachten verschijnselen te hebben (bijv. er is 
geen garantie dat een simulatie die de impact van militair optreden 
kan berekenen juiste uitkomsten genereert over situaties die nog 
moeten plaatsvinden). Een extra complicerende factor is dat modellen 
worden ontwikkeld voor een specifiek doel, maar dat gebruikers van 
de modellen vaak andere doelen nastreven (bijv. een simulator die 
ontwikkeld is om tactisch optreden te beoefenen, wordt gebruikt voor 
schietoefeningen). 
De observatie dat validiteit van een simulatie zich niet met zekerheid 
laat vaststellen is de aanleiding van mijn onderzoek. Ik heb daartoe een 
uitgebreide casestudy uitgevoerd waarin ik heb bestudeerd wanneer, 
hoe en waar precies een trainingssimulator wordt gevalideerd. Ik 
richt me op de praktijk van het valideren, niet zozeer op concepten 
die hierover zijn ontwikkeld door de simulationisten. Dus niet hoe het 
moet, maar hoe het nu in de militaire organisatie gebeurt. Met andere 
woorden, ik wil dus niet bepalen of de beschreven trainingssimulator 
valide is, maar hoe deze valide is geworden. Mijn doelstelling is het 
beschrijven van de activiteiten hoe een trainingssimulator binnen een 
militaire context valide wordt gemaakt.
De studie heb ik gepositioneerd in het wetenschapsgebied 
Science and Technology Studies (STS). Deze discipline richt zich 
op de samenhang tussen technologie en maatschappij en neemt 
veelal praktijken van specifieke technologie als uitgangspunt. Juist 
de totstandkoming en ontwikkeling van technologie in een sociale 
context is het object van analyse. Het vocabulaire van mijn studie heb ik 
gebaseerd op het vroege werk van Bruno Latour. Hij heeft onder meer 
gedetailleerd beschreven hoe wetenschappers hun werk doen op zoek 
naar kennis - en hiermee wetenschappelijke feiten creëren - en anderen 
proberen te overtuigen. Dit perspectief heb ik in mijn studie gevolgd. 
Daartoe heb ik vier ‘aspecten’ benoemd die voor de trainingssimulator 
van belang zijn. De vier aspecten zijn elk in een hoofdstuk beschreven: 
(a) praktische validatie; (b) industriële validatie; (c) militaire validatie en 
(d) politieke validatie.
Mijn beschrijving van praktische validatie richt zich op de wijze 
waarop het gebruik van de trainingssimulator wordt gevalideerd. Het 
oefenterrein is de plek waar soldaten, trainers en de ontwikkelaars 
elkaar ontmoeten. Hier wordt de trainingssimulator ‘echt’ gebruikt. Maar 
gebruik is bij nadere beschouwing een gecompliceerd begrip. Tijdens 
het gebruik van de trainingssimulator worden namelijk verschillende 
doelen nagestreefd. De trainers zijn bijvoorbeeld geïnteresseerd in de 
trainingssimulator omdat ze hierdoor de oefening kunnen overzien, 
hetgeen ik de belofte van ‘mastery and control’ heb genoemd. Maar 
tegelijkertijd biedt de simulator de belofte van een ‘realistische’ training 
aan zowel de commandanten en de soldaten. Iedereen praat over 
realisme in termen van wetenschappelijke representatie, ‘het lijkt er 
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precies op’, maar bij nadere beschouwing zien we dat representatie als 
configuratieprobleem wordt begrepen. Gesignaleerde tekortkomingen 
worden meteen aangegrepen om de gelijkenis te verbeteren. Het 
gevolg is dat er voortdurend wordt onderhandeld over de juiste 
procedures en de geschikte technologie door de betrokkenen. 
Validatie is kennelijk niet iets dat moet worden vastgesteld, maar iets 
dat veranderingen in gang zet. Iets ‘is’ niet realistisch, maar wordt 
juist realistisch ‘gemaakt’. Validiteit is dus niet een ‘eigenschap’ van de 
trainingssimulator, maar een uitkomst van een sociaal proces, een ‘co-
productie’.
Mijn beschrijving van industriële validatie richt zich op de relatie van 
het Ministerie van Defensie met de militaire industrie. Ook deze relatie 
draagt in belangrijke mate bij aan de validiteit van de trainingssimulator. 
Het Ministerie van Defensie formuleert zogeheten ‘requirements’ 
waaraan de gewenste producten moeten voldoen. De militaire 
industrie kan dan voorstellen doen hoe ze deze willen realiseren en 
aangeven wat het gaat kosten. Het ministerie moet er dus goed op 
letten dat deze requirements zodanig zijn geformuleerd dat meerdere 
industriële partijen een voorstel indienen. Immers, als dat niet het 
geval zou zijn, dan kan de partij die precies kan leveren wat er wordt 
gevraagd, elke prijs vragen. De grootste uitdaging voor het Ministerie 
van Defensie in het geval van de militaire trainingssimulator was om 
de nauwkeurigheid van de simulatie (in dit geval de ballistiek) niet al 
te precies te formuleren. Hiermee werd voorkomen dat degene die 
de meest nauwkeurige ballistische modellen kan leveren automatisch 
‘winnaar’ zou worden. Ik laat aan de hand van dit voorbeeld zien dat 
de requirements helemaal niet zo vaststaan als simulationisten willen 
geloven. Requirements worden bij uitstek gebruikt om een vorm van 
industriële politiek te bedrijven, ze sluiten partijen ‘uit’ en andere 
partijen ‘in’.  Deze flexibiliteit (‘plasticity’) van requirements blijkt 
noodzakelijk om ‘de boel aan de gang te houden.’ 
Mijn beschrijving van militaire validatie richt zich op de wijze waarop 
militairen het nut van de trainingssimulator valideren. Ik heb ingezoomd 
op enkele discussies over simulatie-technologie die binnen de muren 
van het Ministerie van Defensie zijn gevoerd. In dit hoofdstuk laat ik 
zien dat de behoefte aan de militaire trainingssimulator systematisch 
is gecreëerd. Trainingssimulatoren zijn onmisbaar gemaakt door de 
training van militairen op een bepaalde manier te structureren. In de 
discussies ging het dus niet meer over de aanschaf van een individuele 
trainingssimulator, maar over de manier waarop moet worden getraind. 
In elke fase van de training van de soldaten speelt een andere 
trainingssimulator een belangrijke rol. Militaire training wordt kennelijk 
gezien als een proces waarin vaardigheden worden gestapeld. De 
soldaat-in-wording moet als het ware een opeenvolging van simulatoren 
passeren. In militaire validatie is dus de aandacht vooral gericht op het 
programma om tot het ‘juiste’ eindproduct te komen. Simulationisten 
moeten zich dan ook realiseren dat een trainingssimulator altijd 
onderdeel is van een trainingsprogramma waardoor de ‘realiteit’ van de 
specifieke trainingssimulator wordt bepaald door het grotere geheel. 
Iedere trainingssimulator vertegenwoordigt bepaalde belangen van 
verschillende actoren binnen het Ministerie van Defensie. 
Mijn beschrijving van politieke validatie richt zich met name op 
de wijze waarop het Ministerie van Defensie simulatietechnologie 
presenteert aan de Tweede Kamer. Ik richt me niet zozeer op de 
interactie tussen beide, maar bekijk vooral hoe de ‘black box’ 
simulatietechnologie vorm krijgt. Deze analyse is mogelijk doordat 
simulatie-technologie expliciet werd besproken in de Tweede Kamer in 
de periode van 1986 tot 1993. Hier wordt zichtbaar hoe het Ministerie 
van Defensie het zogenoemde ‘simulatienetwerk’ opbouwt. In de 
verschillende kamerbrieven komen drie argumenten (‘claims’) telkens 
terug: simulatietechnologie leidt tot (a) betere militaire training, 
(b) besparing van kosten, (c) minder schade aan het milieu. De 
onderliggende aanname is dat simulatietechnologie op zijn minst zo 
goed voldoet als training in het ‘echt’. Ik analyseer hoe deze argumenten 
tot stand zijn gekomen en ‘trails of strength’ (kritische analyse) hebben 
overleefd. Uit mijn beschrijving blijkt dat de drie argumenten niet 
zozeer inhoudelijk worden bekritiseerd - hoewel daar alle aanleiding 
voor was - maar hoe recht kon worden gedaan aan de belangen van 
de verschillende onderdelen van de militaire organisatie. Ik gebruik 
dit als voorbeeld om te laten zien hoezeer ‘matters of fact’ en ‘matters 
of concern’ met elkaar zijn verbonden. Simulationisten kunnen hiervan 
leren dat ze hun aandacht niet zozeer moeten richten op het bepalen 
van mate van ‘realiteit’ van een simulator, maar een belangrijke rol 
zouden moeten hebben bij de discussie over de waarde van simulatie-
technologie.
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In het laatste hoofdstuk breng ik de vier aspecten van validatie samen. Ik 
concludeer dat validatie een uiterst paradoxaal concept is. De militaire 
organisatie moet in staat  zijn om beslissingen over simulatietechnologie 
te toetsen, maar tegelijkertijd moeten we constateren dat niet alles 
kan worden getoetst. De ‘realiteit’ kunnen we niet als toetssteen 
gebruiken, omdat uitspraken hierover direct verbonden zijn aan de 
historiciteit en belangen van verschillende actoren. Dit maakt validatie 
een vloeibare activiteit. Meer data verzamelen en analyseren is niet 
de weg die we moeten bewandelen, dat maakt de issues die op het 
spel staan alleen maar ondoorzichtiger zodat vragen over de sociaal-
politieke factoren makkelijk worden vergeten. Niet de ‘realiteit’ in 
termen van wetenschappelijke representatie (‘matters of fact’) moet 
worden getoetst, maar haar waarde voor de samenleving (‘matters of 
concern’). Momenteel worden waarden (ideeën over militair optreden, 
ideeën over militaire marktplaats, ideeën over training, ideeën 
over simulatietechnologie) ‘verpakt’ in feiten. Feiten die bij nadere 
beschouwing geconstrueerd zijn door politiek-sociale processen. 
Daarom moeten betrokkenen rond de trainingssimulator ophouden met 
te beweren dat een simulator een ‘waardevrije’ afspiegeling is van de 
werkelijkheid.
Hieruit concludeer ik dat validatie primair gaat over het bundelen 
van uiteenlopende belangen. Ik beveel de militaire organisatie dan 
ook aan om minder in pasklare oplossingen te denken en vaker het 
overstijgende probleem grondig vanuit verschillende gezichtspunten 
te analyseren. Niet alleen het woord laten aan militairen, maar 
juist buiten haar wereld te kijken. In de vluchtige zoektocht naar 
antwoorden, worden de problemen vaak versimpeld en komen niet alle 
belanghebbenden aan het woord. Gemakshalve verdwijnt de waarom-
vraag uit het oog. Maar wil de militaire organisatie in staat zijn om haar 
taken zorgvuldig te verrichten dan moeten de vragen over de waarde 
van de mens en technologie (‘matters of concerns’) meer aandacht 
krijgen in alle geledingen van de samenleving. Het zoeken naar een 




Accreditation An official determination that a model or simulation is acceptable 
 for a specific purpose. 
ACGOLM Advisory Committee Advanced Educational Tools (Dutch 
 abbreviation). 
Army Board  Army Council or in Dutch ‘Legerraad’. The executive board of the 
 Army, before the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence in 2003.  
AWES   Area Weapon Effects Simulator. Simulates 
 effects of non-line-of-sight weapons like mines and artillery.  
BLS   Chief Commander Army (Dutch abbreviation).  
C2   Command and Control.  
C3I   Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence.  
CGI   Computer Generated Imagery.  
CLAS   Command Royal Armed Forces. (Dutch abbreviation)  
CMTC   Combat Manoeuvre Training Centre. Training area  
  with instrumentation of U.S. Army in Hohenfels, Germany.  
Constructive  Simulate people in simulated systems. 
simulators    
COSIM  Coordination Group Simulators. (Dutch abbreviation) 
COO  Computer Supported Education. (Dutch abbreviation) 
DMO  Department Material Organization. (Dutch abbreviation) 
DMP  Defence Material Selection Process. (Dutch abbreviation) 
Deelsim  Simulator for specific task (often focussing on a specific part of a 
 weapon system). 
Diemaco  The standard issued assault rifle calibre 
  5.56 which has been used by the Dutch Army since 2007.  
Dragon   Anti-tank weapon system. Shoulder-fired, man-portable, wire-
 guidance system.  
Duel Simulator DUELSIM. A category of simulators which can simulate fire 
 exchanges between opposing forces. 
EDA  European Defence Agency. 
EXCON  Exercise Control of MCTC. It contains all necessary functionality to 
 support planning and preparation of exercises, exercise execution, 
 and evaluation and presentation of exercise results. (See TAF) 
FAL  The Fusil Automatique Léger was the rifle of the Dutch Army before 
 the Diemaco rifle was adopted (2007). The FAL is a semi-automatic  
  rifle with 7.62 calibre.  
GOLM  Advanced Educational Learning Tools. (Dutch abbreviation) 
Gunnery training  Technical training of the skills used to shoot at a designated target.  
INTACT  Interactive trainer for team commanders. (Dutch abbreviation) 
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force. The military operation of 
 NATO in Afghanistan.  
KIBOWI   Constructive simulator to train command and control skills of 
 commanders.  
KKW-Sim Small calibre weapon simulator. (Dutch abbreviation) 
Leopard 1 and  The main battle tank of the Dutch Army. The Leopard 2 tank was 
Leopard 2 developed in the early 1970s by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. In 1979 
 the Leopard II replaced the older Leopard I tanks which had been 
 developed in 1956 for the West German Army. On April 8, 2011 
 Parliament decided to remove the Leopard 2 tank from the Army 
 due to budget cuts. 
Live Simulators Real people operating real weapon systems. 
LOT  Life of Type. 
M113CV An armoured personnel carrier, which has been used since 1966 
 by the Dutch Army. The carrier was replaced in 1994 by the YPR-765. 
MAG  General Purpose Machine Gun. Sold by Fabrique National  
  Herstal Belgium. 
MCTC  Mobile Combat Training Centre. 
MILES  Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System. 
Model  Representation of an event and/or thing that is real or contrived. It 
 can be a representation of an actual system. It can be something 
 used in lieu of the real thing to better understand a certain aspect 
 about that thing. 
MTS  Medical Treatment Simulator. 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NATO-CCMS NATO-Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 
NBC  Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (weapons)  
NIID  Netherlands Industry Involvement Defence. (Dutch abbreviation). It 
 profiles itself as the ambassador for the Dutch defence industry. 
 Recently it changed its name to NIDV (Netherlands Industries for 
 Defence and Security). 
NISP  Netherlands Industry Simulation Platform. (Dutch abbreviation) 




PVT  Pelotons Vuurleiding Trainer. Training for platoons to improve the 
 coordination between tank crews. The crews have to shoot at 
 targets that can be activated from a distance in the shooting area.  
Rijsim  Driving simulator. (Dutch abbreviation) 
SAF  Semi-Automated Forces. 
SEES 2.0 Security Exercise Evaluation System, version 2.0.  
SIMNET  Simulator Network. Network of virtual simulators used to practise, 
 for example, a tank-platoon operation. It allows several tanks to 
 operate in a virtual world together. 
Simulation Simulation is the imitation of the operation of a real-world process 
 or system over time. 
Simulator The machine that makes the simulation possible; it can be a mock-
 up, computer-program, cardboard model, etc. 
State Secretary Staatssecretaris. Deputy minister. 
t/a  Tons per annum. 
Tactical training Field training of commanders, staffs, and troops. Tactical training is 
 the combination of fire, technical, and drill training, and it involves 
 the use of combat vehicles and weapon systems. 
TACTIS  Tactical Indoor Simulator. This is the recently developed Dutch 
 version of SIMNET.
TAF  Tactical Analysis Facility. (See EXCON) 
TOW  Anti-tank weapon system. Platform-fired. Tube-launched, optically 
 tracked, wire-command link guided missile. 
UZI  The Uzi is an Israeli blowback-operated submachine gun. It was 
 used from 1960 to 1998 by the Dutch Army.  
V&V  Verification and Validation. 
Validation The process of determining the degree to which a model or 
 simulation is an accurate representation of the real world from the 
 perspective of the intended uses of the model or simulation.  
Verification The process of determining whether a model or simulation 
 implementation accurately represents the developer’s conceptual 
 description and specifications. 
Virtual Simulators Real people in a simulated environment. 
VLC  Virtual Constructive Live Simulation. 
VV&A  Verification, Validation and Accreditation. 
YPR  YPR-765. Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle used since 1977 by  



























# Date Responsibility Organisation Duration R* T**
31. 2008, 17 November Senior officer O/T Ministry of Defence. CLAS 0:48:26 yes no
32. 2008, 24 November Commander OTCman Ministry of Defence. CLAS 1:10:39 yes no
33. 2008, 9 December Quality auditor MCTC Ministry of Defence. DMO 1:16:19 yes yes
34. 2009, 18 February Quality manager MCTC 
(retired) 
Ministry of Defence. DMO 2:41:46 yes yes
35. 2009, 10 March Commander MCTC Ministry of Defence. CLAS 2:20:51 yes yes
36. 2009, 7 April Relation manager Saab Training Systems 1:27:13 yes no
37. 2009, 9 April Procurement expert Ministry of Defence. DMO 1:09:11 yes no
38. 2009, 14 April Compensation specialist Ministry of Economic Affairs 0:58:56 yes no
39. 2009, 18 May Project manager MCTC Ministry of Defence. DMO App 2 hrs no no
40. 2009, 19 May Assistant project  
manager MCTC 
Ministry of Defence. DMO 2:00:35 yes no
41. 2009, 25 May Sous-Chef C3I (retired) Ministry of Defence. DMO 2:57:54 yes no
42. 2009, 10 June O/T en analyst Ministry of Defence. CLAS 1:37:06 yes yes
43. 2009, 10 June O/T en analyst Ministry of Defence. CLAS 1:18:02 yes yes
44. 2009, 11 June Junior Information  
Architect MCTC 
Ministry of Defence.  DMO 1:44:33 yes yes
45. 2009, 15 July Medical analyst / specialist Ministry of Defence. CLAS 1:35:49 yes no
46. 2009, 25 September Expert VV&A University of Wageningen 1:40:35 yes no
47. 2010, 11 November Project manager MCTC Ministry of Defence. DMO App 1 hrs no no
48. 2011, 16 November Experts VV&A TNO & NLR App 1 hrs no no
49. 2011, 21 November Quality manager MCTC Ministry of Defence. DMO 2:15:51 yes no
50 2012, 11 September Commander CLAS Ministry of Defence. CLAS App 2 hrs yes no
51. 2013, 19 February Expert VV&A NLR App 1,5 hrs no no
*Recorded?  ** Transcribed?
Site visits and workshops
 
# Date Name Location
1. 2006, 27-29 November Site visit of training exercise Falcon Guard. Alten-Grabow, GE
2. 2007, 27-29 August Site visit of training exercise Peacock Preparation. Bergen-Hohne, GE
3. 2007, 15 November Site visit Marnehuizen for a demonstration of MCTC in urban terrain. Marnehuizen, NL
4. 2007, 3-5 December Course Military Simulation: Techniques and Technology by Roger Smith. Orlando, Fl.
5. 2008, 28-29 October Site-visit factory of Saab Training Systems in Lindkoping, Sweden. Lindkoping, SE
6. 2009, 16 June Attended the handover ceremony of the upgrade (level 5) of  
MCTC to the training unit.
Amersfoort, NL
7. 2009, 30 November Attended tutorial on VV&A by S. Youngblood at IITSEC2009. Orlando, Fl.
8. 2010, 16 September Attended a demonstration of interoperability MCTC with other  
systems (UCATT).
Marnehuizen, NL
9. 2011, 28 November Attended tutorial on VV&A by M. Roza & J. Voogd at IITSEC 2011. Orlando, Fl.
10. 2012, 22 March Attended a workshop on GM-VV by M. Roza & J.Voogd at  
Ministry of Defence.
Den Haag
11. 2012, 3 December Attended a tutorial on VV&A by M. Petty at IITSEC2012. Orlando, Fl.
Appendix 3: Resources
Interviews
# Date Responsibility Organisation Duration R* T**
1. 2007, 27 August Commander BurSim Ministry of Defence. CLAS app 1,5 hrs no no
2. 2007, 28 August Commander MCTC Ministry of Defence. CLAS app 3 hours no no
3 2007, 5 November LtCol Marines (retired) Ministry of Defence. CLAS 1:14:32 yes no
4. 2007, 15 November Commander OVG Ministry of Defence. CLAS 1:26:25 yes yes
5. 2007, 21 November Head procurement Ministry of Defence. DMO 2:01:15 yes no
6. 2008, 10 March Test/ operational support Saab Training Systems 1:33:14 yes yes
7. 2008, 21 April Project manager MCTC Ministry of Defence. DMO 1:40:45 yes yes
8. 2008, 14 May Implementation  
manager MCTC 
Ministry of Defence. DMO 2:19:39 yes no
9. 2008, 29 May Medical analyst Ministry of Defence. CLAS 1:43:31 yes yes
10. 2008, 3 June Commander BurSim (retired) Ministry of Defence. DMO 1:44:58 yes yes
11. 2008, 4 June Test / operational support Saab Training Systems 1:57:48 yes no
12. 2008, 16 June Project manager MCTC Ministry of Defence. DMO 1:58:34 yes yes
13. 2008, 19 June Assistant MCTC Ministry of Defence. DMO 1:57:08 yes no
14. 2008, 5 September Head SimCen Ministry of Defence. DMO 2:23:50 yes no
15. 2008, 18 September Quality auditor MCTC  
(retired) 
Ministry of Defence. DMO 3:11:09 yes yes
16. 2008, 20 September Senior officer policy MCTC 
(retired) 
Ministry of Defence. CLAS 1:53:47 yes yes
17. 2008, 25 September Contract manager MCTC Ministry of Defence. DMO 2:22:55 yes yes
18. 2008, 29 September Senior officer policy MCTC 
(retired) 
Ministry of Defence. CLAS 2:43:55 yes yes
19. 2008, 17 October Senior officer policy MCTC 
(retired) 
Ministry of Defence. CLAS 2:41:29 yes yes
20. 2008, 23 October Senior officer policy MCTC 
(retired) 
Ministry of Defence. CLAS 2:42:53 yes yes
21. 2008, 28 October Industrial cooperation STS Saab Training Systems 0:42:30 yes no
22. 2008, 28 October Project manager Saab Training Systems 0:59:47 yes yes
23. 2008, 28 October System development Saab Training Systems 1:02:56 yes yes
24. 2008, 28 October Quality manager Saab Training Systems 0:50:00 yes yes
25. 2008, 28 October Test / operational support Saab Training Systems 0:58:29 yes yes
26. 2008, 28 October Marketing Saab Training Systems 0:33:16 yes yes
27. 2008, 29 October Contract manager Saab Training Systems 0:59:44 yes yes
28. 2008, 29 October Requirements managers Saab Training Systems 0:52:56 yes yes
29. 2008, 29 October Manager upgrade 5 Saab Training Systems 1:10:50 yes yes
30. 2008, 31 October Commander MCTC (retired) Ministry of Defence. CLAS 2:14:56 yes yes
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1995, March Publication Master plan Duel simulation and instrumented terrain 
 by working group. 
1995, September Completion of DMP-A report Duel Simulator and instrumented 
 terrain. 
1996, March Letter to Parliament about DMP-A phase Duel Simulator  
  (24400X, nr. 84). 
1996, November Distribution Request for Information MCTC. 
1997, April Meeting AC-GOLM on one-way and two-way simulators. 
1997, March Official institution of Project team Mobile Company Training Centre 
 & Instrumentation System, chaired by J. Verhoeven. Letter 
 dated March 3rd, 1997 signed by Brigade-General H.J.G.L. de 
 Klerk (reference Sim/97.131/4). 
1998, January Completion DMP-B/C report MCTC. 
1998, August Publication of policy document for the (new) unit Training Centre 
 for Manoeuvre (OTMAN) in which the training support is laid out 
 for the Duel simulator, TACTOS and Kibowi. (Dated August 26, 1998) 
1998, September Letter to Parliament about DMP-B/C phase MCTC (25600X, nr. 58). 
1999, March Distribution Request for Proposals MCTC. 
1999  Proposal MCTC developed by Saab Training Systems. 
2000, February Completion of DMP-D report MCTC. 
2000, April Letter to Parliament about DMP-D phase MCTC (26800X, nr. 37). 
2000, June Signing ceremony of the contract. Saab Training Systems is 
 selected as the manufacturer of MCTC by the Ministry of Defence. 
2000, October Course for the engineers of Saab Training Systems on how the  
  Royal Netherlands Army operates. Titled: Orientation RNLA at  
  company level, by LTCOL Uilenbroek. 
2001, January New Policy on Advanced Educational Tools published by the Royal 
 Army. (In Dutch: Beleid Geavanceerde OnderwijsLeermiddelen KL). 
2002, October Draft statement of need of medical treatment simulator. 
2003, January Acceptance test of MCTC by 13 Mechanized Brigade in Vogelsang, 
 Germany. 
2003, April  Handover ceremony of MCTC from manufacturer to Ministry of 
 Defence in Amersfoort. 
2004, December Publication of several Operators Manuals for the many components 
  of the Mobile Combat Training Centre. 
2005, February Evaluation of medical treatment simulator in training exercise Rhine 
 determined in Bergen-Hohne. 





1985, June Special Parliamentary Committee on the structure of terrain they  
  wanted to know more about the possibilities of military training  
  simulators from the Ministry of Defence. 
1987, February Ministry of Defence sends a letter to Parliament about simulation 
 technology (19878, nrs. 1-2). 
1988, June Installation of project team simulation in the armed forces (PT-
 SIM-KL) to implement the policy on advanced education and 
 training tools that was accepted by the Army Board on October, 20, 
 1987. The letter was dated June 8th, 1988 and signed by General-
 Major A.K. van der Vlis (reference 78.660). 
1989, January Ministry of Defence sends a letter to Parliament about simulation 
 technology (19878, nr. 3). 
1989, May Institution of working group COSIM, letter dated May 3, 1989 
 signed by State Secretary J. van Houwelingen  
  (reference S89/086/1663). 
1990, June Minister of Defence sends letter to Parliament about simulation 
 technology (19878, nr. 4). 
1990, November Minister of Defence sends letter to Parliament about simulation 
 technology (19878, nr. 5). 
1991  Publication vision paper: ‘A Fighting Chance: The role of simulators 
 in gunnery and combat training’ by Saab Training Systems. 
1991, March Defensienota 1991 (Titled: Restructuring and scaling down: the 
 Armed Forces in a changing world.) 
1992, April Completion of working group COSIM, letter dated April 27th,
 1992 signed by State Secretary B.J.M. baron van Voorst tot Voorst 
 (reference S92/086/1664).  
1993, June Training exercise Laser Fuselier at Hohenfels, Germany. 
1993, July Minister of Defence sends letter to Parliament about simulation 
 technology (19878, nr. 6). 
1993, August Publication Reference guide Laser Fuselier by operational unit. 
1993, October Project team Simulation Army submits its study on advanced 
 training tools to the Army Board. Report is known as ‘Deelstudie GOLM’. 
1993, November Distribution Training Report Laser Fuselier in Army by the duel 
 simulator project team. 
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2007  The Ministry of Defence and Saab Training Systems sign the   
  contract for the upgrade of MCTC to Battalion level. 
2008  PowerPoint presentation on an update of the medical treatment  
  simulator by medical staff. 
2009  Acceptance of upgrade level 5 by the Army and Marines. 
2009, June Handover ceremony from Saab Training Systems to the Ministry of  
  Defence. Midlife update and upgrade level 5 MCTC in Amersfoort.
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‘Reality is  
a special case  
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An Extensive Case Study
of a Military Training Simulator
War has the potential to transform the social and political order in 
which we live. How can a nation best prepare for war is the question 
that military organizations must face every day. This book is about 
that struggle between the unthinkable and the mundane daily  
work that takes place in a military organization. 
The study takes the world of modelling & simulation as entry point 
to critically explore the social-political processes in the military 
organization. Through a detailed analysis of the development of 
an advanced training simulator the author shows how a ‘realistic’ 
simulator is produced. The study demonstrates how ‘reality’ 
is negotiated between many different parties making it a co-
production. 
Maarten van Veen is information scientist and currently employed 
as a senior advisor Research & Development at the Netherlands 
Defence Academy (NLDA).
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